The partner as resource or restriction? : labour market careers of husbands and wives and the consequences for inequality between couples by Verbakel, C.M.C.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/73433
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
  
 
The Partner as Resource or Restriction? 
Labour market careers of husbands and wives and 
the consequences for inequality between couples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover design In Zicht Grafisch Ontwerp (photo provided by Henriëtte Terburg) 
Printing PrintPartners Ipskamp Nijmegen 
 
ISBN  978-90-9023303-1 
 
© Copyright Ellen Verbakel, 2008 
 
  
 
The Partner as Resource or Restriction? 
Labour market careers of husbands and wives and 
the consequences for inequality between couples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied 
van de Sociale Wetenschappen 
 
Proefschrift 
 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann, 
volgens besluit van het College van Decanen 
in het openbaar te verdedigen op vrijdag 12 september 2008 
om 10.30 uur precies 
 
door 
 
Cornelia Martina Catharina Verbakel 
geboren op 10 september 1980 
te Deurne 
 
Promotores:   Prof. dr. P.M. de Graaf (Universiteit van Tilburg) 
    Prof. dr. W.C. Ultee 
 
Manuscriptcommissie: Prof. dr. P. Scheepers 
    Prof. dr. T.A. DiPrete (Columbia University, New York) 
    Prof. dr. ir. T. van der Lippe (Universiteit Utrecht) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
The moment has come to look back at the period I have worked on this thesis. I realize that I have 
enjoyed doing this job very much. Friends have envied me sometimes for doing something that I 
really love. It is the kind of work that has brought me so much pleasure, of course, but also the 
people that have surrounded me. I would like to take this opportunity to thank some of them. 
First of all, Paul de Graaf, I am very grateful that you were my daily supervisor. Your 
enthusiasm and optimism are contagious. You have the talent to explain things in clear and 
simple terms, and to think and work in a structured way. That, with your great personality and 
sense of humour, makes you great to work with. Thank you for leaving me free to do my job, 
while immediately being available when I needed some advice. 
Secondly, I would like to thank my promoter, Wout Ultee. I think you are inspiring and 
unbelievably well-read. My sociological socialization has largely been based on your ideas, and I 
am pleased with that.  
I would like to thank the members of the reading committee, Peer Scheepers, Tom 
DiPrete, and Tanja van der Lippe, for taking the time to read and assess this manuscript. I owe 
special thanks to Tom DiPrete for welcoming me at Columbia University in New York. Perhaps 
without knowing, you extended my ways of thinking about doing research. I am glad that our 
collaboration has been rewarded with a publication in Social Forces. Also thanks to Ruud Luijkx 
for introducing me to log-linear modelling. I highly appreciate your efficient approach when 
working together. 
Eva Jaspers and Nienke Moor, my year group colleagues, have been of great support in 
the little and important things in work and life. And Eva, I retain good memories of our trips 
during our time in the States. The two of you are inextricably linked with the process of writing 
this thesis, and it feels good that you want to stand beside me as my paranimfs at the final stage of 
it. All Nijmegen-colleagues deserve my thanks for offering such a great environment to work in. I 
especially appreciated the social, open, approachable, and helpful atmosphere, which have truly 
motivated me a lot. Although building an atmosphere clearly is a collective achievement, there 
are a few people that I would like to mention in particular for their assistance and their 
contribution to the fun at work: Wouter van Gils, Stijn Ruiter, Natascha Notten, and Rianne 
Kloosterman: thank you. I also appreciated Marijke Ristivojčević-Lefering for her fast and good 
work as the sociology secretary, but also for always being available for a chat while I was waiting 
for my cappuccino. 
 
I would like to thank members of the ICS and participants of the ISOL seminars for the 
interesting discussions and the feedback on my work. I enjoyed the dinners with Richard 
Zijdeman, Istvan Back, and Gijs Weijters, Eva Jaspers, and Nienke Moor, as members of the 
2003 ICS year group. 
Of course, I did not only find support at work. I am very grateful for the love and support 
of all my family and friends. Everyone is important to me in his or her own way: for giving me a 
great time, making me laugh, informing after my work, listening to me, supporting me, for just 
being there, or for all of them together. I would like to name three of them in particular. Mom and 
dad, thank you for giving me such a solid base in life and for your unconditional love and faith in 
me. I highly appreciate it that you are happy when I am. Elbert, thank you for your endless 
support during the time I was writing my thesis; our unforgettable Lapland-trip truly felt as the 
ultimate reward. Please know, one and one is sometimes more than two; without you, I would not 
be half as happy as I am. 
 
 
Ellen Verbakel 
Nijmegen, June 2008 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction           11 
1.1  Introduction            11 
1.1.1  The beginning           11 
1.1.2  Couple perspective          11 
1.1.3  Couples’ labour market careers from a historical perspective    13 
1.1.4  Couples’ labour market careers from a life course perspective    16 
1.2  Labour market careers: participation and job level       17 
1.3  Theoretical background: homogamy and partner effects      18 
 1.3.1  Introduction           18 
 1.3.2  Homogamy           19 
 1.3.3  Partner effects: contradicting hypotheses       19 
1.4  Data             21 
1.5  Structure of the book           22 
 
Chapter 2 The association between husbands’ and wives’ labour market positions 25 
 (cohorts 1940 – 1979) 
2.1  Introduction            25 
2.2  Data             28 
 2.2.1  Labour market participation, occupation, and control variables    29 
 2.2.2  Description of husbands’ and wives’ labour market participation    30 
 2.2.3  Description of husbands’ and wives’ occupations      32 
2.3  The association between husbands’ and wives’ labour market participation    34 
 2.3.1  Models            34 
 2.3.2  Results            36 
2.4  The association between husbands’ and wives’ occupations      37 
 2.4.1  Models            38 
 2.4.2  Results            40 
2.5  Conclusion            43 
 Appendix A            45 
 Appendix B            46 
 Appendix C            48 
 
Chapter 3 Partner effects on labour market participation and job level:    49 
 opposing mechanisms and their combined effect on income 
 (cohorts 1940 – 1974) 
3.1  Introduction            49 
3.2  Hypotheses on partner effects          51 
 3.2.1  Restriction, support, and values        51 
 3.2.2  Changes in partner effects         52 
3.3  Data             53 
 3.3.1  Labour market participation, job level, and monthly income     53 
 3.3.2  Independent variables          55 
3.4  Results             57 
 3.4.1  Labour market participation         57 
 3.4.2  Job level           60 
 3.4.3  Monthly income          62 
3.5  Conclusion            64 
 
Chapter 4 Partner’s resources and adjusting working hours (1940 – 2003)    67 
4.1  Introduction            67 
4.2  Theory             70 
 4.2.1  The economic hypothesis         70 
 4.2.2  Its dependence on historical period        70 
 4.2.3  Its dependence on individual human capital       71 
 4.2.4  Its dependence on presence of children       71 
4.3  Data             71 
 4.3.1  Changes in labour market participation       72 
 4.3.2  Relationship status, partner’s labour market resources,     73 
 and control variables 
4.4  Results             76 
4.5  Conclusion            84 
 
Chapter 5 Partner’s resources: support or restriction in the occupational career   87 
 (1940 – 2003)? 
5.1  Introduction            87 
5.2  Theory             90 
 5.2.1  Effects of relationship status for men and women      90 
 5.2.2  Effects of partner’s resources for men and women      92 
 5.2.3  Historical developments in partner effects       93 
 
 
 
5.3  Data             93 
 5.3.1  Upward and downward mobility        94 
 5.3.2  Relationship status and partner’s resources       94 
 5.3.3  Individual resources          95 
 5.3.4  Models            98 
5.4  Results             98 
 5.4.1  Relationship status and partner’s resources       99 
 5.4.2  Historical developments       102 
5.5  Conclusion          103 
 
Chapter 6 Couples’ cumulative incomes over the life course:    105 
 divergence or convergence? 
6.1  Introduction          105 
6.2  Arguments for accumulation        108 
6.3  Data           110 
6.4  Results           114 
 6.4.1  Maximum wage rate        116 
 6.4.2  Cumulative working hours       116 
 6.4.3  Cumulative income        119 
6.5  Conclusion          121 
 
Chapter 7 Conclusion         123 
7.1  Background and questions of the study       123 
7.2  The association between spouses’ labour market positions    125 
7.3  The partner: resource or restriction?       127 
7.4  Changing partner effects?        131 
7.5  Consequences for inequality        132 
7.6  This study’s contribution        133 
7.7 Suggestions for future research        134 
 
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)       137 
 
References            151 
 
Curriculum Vitae          159 
 
ICS dissertation series         161 
  
 
  
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
1.1.1  The beginning 
It was in the 1970s that the American Bureau of Labor Statistics published a homogamy table that 
cross tabulated employment statuses of husbands and wives for the first time. It showed a strong 
tendency of unemployed husbands to have unemployed wives, and employed husbands to have 
employed wives. Despite the major relevance of this finding, findings were not thought to be 
surprising. The tendency for two unemployed and two employed spouses1 to live together implies 
accumulation of resources within couples, and the greater this accumulation, the greater the 
inequality between couples. But scholars reasoned that, given the strong correlation between 
education and employment status and the high incidence of educational homogamy, employment 
status homogamy would simply be a by-product of educational homogamy, and therefore not a 
new and unexpected result with consequences that reach further than the often replicated finding 
of educational homogamy.  
These scholars proved to be wrong. Educational homogamy indeed explained part of the 
association between spouses’ employment statuses, but a considerable part of the original 
association remained, implying that there was more going on between spouses or within couples. 
And, moreover, what was going on between spouses or within couples seemed to have a 
stimulating effect on inequality. Interest in couples’ labour market careers was born. The present 
study aims at taking this line of research a step further. 
 
1.1.2  Couple perspective 
It was no coincidence that the first homogamy table on husbands’ and wives’ employment 
statuses was published in the 1970s. Before that time, female labour participation was low, 
                                                 
1 Throughout this book, I will use the term ‘spouse’ and ‘partner’ interchangeably, without suggesting a difference in 
marital status between the two. Similarly, when I use the word ‘wife’ I do not only refer to a married woman, but to a 
woman in whatever kind of relationship (idem for the word ‘husband’). 
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especially among married women and mothers. The socio-economic position of the household 
was, therefore, based on the occupation of the husband; studying male labour market careers 
provided conclusions about inequality between individual men and inequality between 
households at the same time. The steep rise in female labour participation changed this regularity, 
and for research on socio-economic inequality between households it became necessary to 
include husbands’ as well as wives’ occupations (DiPrete, 2002).  
The increase of working women extended research on determinants of labour market 
careers to women, often emphasizing women’s traditional caring and housekeeping role 
(Oppenheimer, 1977; Sørensen, 1983; Waite, 1976). On top of that, the couple perspective 
triggered new research interests. First of all, scholars have been interested in the association 
between spouses’ positions on the labour market. A positive association, like the one found in the 
American employment status homogamy table, leads to accumulation of favourable positions in 
the household, whereas a negative association flattens inequality between households since a 
negative association implies that someone with a favourable position is typically married to 
someone with a less favourable position. Much research in this line has focused on spouses’ 
employment statuses, distinguishing employed, non-employed, and unemployed husbands and 
wives (Davies, Elias, & Penn, 1994; de Graaf & Ultee, 2000; Henkens, Kraaykamp, & Siegers, 
1993; Ultee, Dessens, & Jansen, 1988), sometimes also inspired from a social policy point of 
view (Cooke, 1987; Dex, Gustafsson, Smith, & Callan, 1995; Irwin & Morris, 1993; McGinnity, 
2002). Results consistently showed a positive association between spouses. Others restricted 
themselves to two-earner couples and examined the association between spouses’ occupations 
(Hout, 1982; Smits, Ultee, & Lammers, 1999). The positive association found made clear that 
couples with two employed persons are likely to consist of either two high-level workers or two 
low-level workers. Again, the consequences for inequality in society are potentially large.  
A second line of research that emerges from the couple perspective is about mutual 
influences of partners during their relationship. In other words, does the labour market career of 
the husband influence the labour market career of the wife, and vice versa? (Bernardi, 1999; 
Bernasco, 1994; Bernasco, de Graaf, & Ultee, 1998; Blossfeld & Drobnič, 2001; Robert & 
Bukodi, 2002). With its emphasis on what is going on between spouses, this kind of research can 
potentially solve the puzzle of the American employment status homogamy table that did not just 
reflect educational homogamy. Conflicting hypotheses make this field of study very interesting in 
a theoretical sense (I will come back to this in more detail in Section 1.3), which is why the 
theoretical focus of this book will be on partner effects. Partner effects are another mechanism  
that can strengthen or weaken inequality between couples. If a highly educated or high-status 
husband boosts the labour market participation or occupational status of his wife (or vice versa), 
resources within couples are accumulated. However, there are good reasons to expect the 
opposite; namely, that a high-earning husband reduces the incentives of his wife to participate in 
the labour market. Such a negative mechanism has a dampening effect on inequality between 
couples, regardless the extent of homogamy. 
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This book contributes to both lines of research interests, aiming at a detailed description 
and understanding of the way spouses’ labour market careers are related in the Netherlands. The 
two broad research questions read as follows: 
 
1) To what extent are the labour market outcomes of husband and wife related, and has this 
relationship changed over time? 
2) To what extent are labour market outcomes restricted or supported by resources of the 
partner, and has this changed over time? 
 
In this study, I apply both a historical and life course perspective, as will be argued below. In the 
remainder of this introductory chapter I will go into the definition of labour market careers as 
used in this study, introduce the theoretical notions that will be tested in the subsequent empirical 
chapters, and give an outline of the book in which I unfold the relation between the following 
chapters. 
 
1.1.3  Couples’ labour market careers from a historical perspective 
The increase in female employment gave rise to a couple perspective in research on societal 
inequality. Compared to the United States and several European countries, the increase in 
working women started late in the Netherlands, as can be read from Figure 1.1. 
20
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Figure 1.1 Female labour market participation rate in several Western countries between 1960 and 2006 (age 15-64) 
 
Source: OECD Labour Statistics 
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In 1970, three out of ten Dutch women were employed, whereas about five out of ten women 
were employed in the United States, France, and Germany; the Scandinavian countries even had a 
female participation rate around 60 per cent. The participation rate started to increase in the 1970s 
and the process speeded up enormously in the 1980s; in 1989, 51 per cent of the Dutch women 
were employed, and the huge gap with surrounding countries had disappeared, although the 
Netherlands was still situated in the bottom regions. The number kept going up at a similar pace, 
and with a 69 per cent female participation rate in 2006 the Netherlands take up an intermediate 
position relative to other Western countries. With respect to female working hours, however, the 
Dutch average is still rather low as a result of the extremely high proportion of part-time work in 
the Netherlands compared to other Western countries (Blossfeld & Hakim, 1997). 
 
Economic modernization 
Western societies have been subject to extensive economic changes, in light of which the sharp 
rise in female labour participation can be understood. Firstly, the labour market structure has 
changed (Hakim, 2000). Generally, Western countries experienced a strong development of the 
industrial sector after the Second World War, and a strong emergence of the service sector from 
the 1960s onwards. The accompanying increase in labour demand was solved by bringing women 
into the labour force, especially because service sector jobs are relatively attractive for women. In 
contrast to neighbouring countries, the economic boom of the 1960s did not pull Dutch women to 
the labour market; instead relatively large numbers of migrant workers from the Mediterranean 
were attracted to solve the shortage of unskilled workers, while men occupied the growing 
number of service sector jobs. Only from the 1970s onwards was the growth of the service sector 
able to attract Dutch women to the labour market, probably because the cultural climate was 
ready then for such a development (de Graaf & Vermeulen, 1997). At the same time, the 
availability of part-time jobs increased drastically, which made it easier for women to combine 
paid and unpaid work.  
A second noticeable trend is the educational expansion (Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993). Both 
men and women have become more highly educated, and differences between men and women 
have disappeared; in the youngest generations women are even slightly more likely to reach a 
high-level diploma than men. Educational achievements make labour market participation more 
rewarding both in monetary (higher wage rate) and psychological (nicer jobs) terms. Female 
educational expansion is definitely not the only cause of the rise in labour participation since this 
rise also occurred within educational categories (Kalmijn & Luijkx, 2006). 
Consumerism has been mentioned as another reason for increased female labour market 
participation. The general notion of what is an acceptable standard of living has risen, and this 
has fuelled the need of a second income (Eggebeen & Hawkins, 1990). A typically Dutch 
situation that postponed the increase in female labour participation compared to neighbouring 
countries was, in this respect, the relative affluence of the Netherlands; for several decades, one 
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income per household was sufficient to have a decent living in the Netherlands (Henkens, Grift & 
Siegers, 2002; Plantenga, 1993).  
 
Cultural modernization 
Besides important economic changes, Western societies have experienced radical cultural 
changes that have contributed to the rise in female labour market participation. For a long time, 
religion has played a dominant role in people’s lives and in society as a whole; traditional values 
were generally embraced. An important cultural reason for the late rise in female labour market 
participation in the Netherlands is the system of pillarization (de Graaf & Vermeulen, 1997; 
Plantenga, 1993), which reached its peak after the Second World War. The Dutch society was 
strongly divided in a Protestant, Catholic, and socialist pillar, and this division reached far in 
several domains of public life, such as the educational system, political parties, leisure 
organizations, neighbourhoods, newspapers, and broadcasting companies. Religious norms were 
present in all Western countries at that time, but such norms, including the rejection of female 
labour market participation (and also birth control), were relatively easier to impose on the 
strongly integrated Dutch than on the more loosely connected populations in other countries. 
From the 1970s onwards, the religious proportion of the Dutch population declined 
sharply. Whereas more than 60 per cent of the population considered themselves church members 
in 1970, 36 per cent did so in 20042 (Becker & De Hart, 2006). This rapid trend towards 
secularization erased the strong religious influence that resulted from the system of pillarization, 
and fuelled a powerful modernization process. In the traditional breadwinner model, the husband 
is supposed to be responsible for the household income and is, therefore, active on the labour 
market, whereas the wife is responsible for household and caring tasks and, therefore, stays at 
home. This strong gendered division of labour is not endorsed in a modern view, which advocates 
an equal division of paid and unpaid labour between men and women. As a result, female labour 
market participation has become more and more accepted and even stimulated. One might even 
argue that, nowadays, there is some disapproval of non-working women, especially if they are 
highly educated. Approval of working mothers with children in pre-school age rose from 21 per 
cent in the beginning of the 1980s to 66 per cent in 2004 for women, and from 21 to 59 per cent 
for men. Support is even stronger where school-aged children are concerned: in 2004, 89 per cent 
of women and 85 per cent of men approved of female labour market participation (63 and 57 per 
cent for women and men respectively in 1981) (Kraaykamp, 2007). On the individual level, 
attitudes and employment behaviour coincide (Treas & Widmer, 2000). Women with modern 
values are more likely to be employed, to work full-time, and to continue working after child 
birth. 
                                                 
2 These numbers are based on a two-stage question: first, respondents are asked whether they belong to a church, and 
only if they do, they are asked which denomination they belong to. Lower numbers of non-church members are 
obtained by a one-stage question that offers the respondent the choice between no church and several denominations 
at the same time: 18% in 1960 and 41% in 2004. The two-stage question is generally considered as being most 
reliable (Becker & De Hart, 2006). 
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Cultural modernization is also expressed in the general trends towards emancipation and 
individualization. The emancipation movement is aimed at equal opportunities for men and 
women and has brought more equality within households, among others with respect to the 
division of labour. The process of individualization marks the tendency of people to live their 
lives more individualistically, more independent of their social environment. One of the outcomes 
is that more women prefer to be financially independent of their husbands, also motivated by the 
fast rising divorce rate (Davis, 1984), and that people strive for personal growth and fulfilment. 
Closely related to cultural changes are demographic changes of which the declining 
fertility rate is the most influential one when it comes to female working careers. The decline of 
the religious dominance together with the introduction of the contraceptive pill lowered the 
fertility rate drastically (de Graaf & Vermeulen, 1997; Hendrickx, Bernasco, & de Graaf, 2001). 
Rates started to fall from 1965, although the Dutch rate was still high compared to other Western 
European countries. In 1965, countries like Sweden, Germany, and Belgium had a fertility rate 
around 2.50, whereas the Netherlands still had a fertility rate of 3.04. In the next decade, the 
fertility rate declined rapidly, and in present-day society Dutch women have on average 1.70 
children. The average age at first child birth is 29, which gives women time to start a career 
before the birth of their first child (Eurostat, ec.europa.eu/eurostat. Date of extraction: December 
17, 2007). 
We can conclude that economic and cultural modernization have changed the Dutch 
society enormously. Since these changes are strongly related to labour market behaviour and 
gender issues, it is very relevant to examine couples’ labour market careers from a historical 
perspective. The association between spouses’ labour market careers as well as the way husbands 
and wives influence each others’ careers can be subject to change, and both can have 
consequences for the trend in societal inequality. In this book, the historical time frame will focus 
on the second half of the twentieth century. 
 
1.1.4  Couples’ labour market careers from a life course perspective 
Over the life course, people experience influential events and go through different stages. For an 
individual, finishing full-time education, starting a first job, and leaving the parental home are 
important milestones in early adult life. Finding a partner and forming a household are important 
transitions as well, and they mark the kick-off of the life course of the couple. The organization of 
a couple’s life is highly influenced by the birth of a child, and the life stages of their children (e.g. 
when they become independent from their parents). During the life course, labour market careers 
are subject to change as well: husbands or wives get promoted, are confronted with 
unemployment, decide to reduce working hours, find a new job, and so on. Career decisions 
largely depend on the situation in the household at that particular time because jobs are such 
strong determinants of the available income and time in the household, which are two basic needs 
to organize a household adequately. During the relationship, partners therefore need to harmonize 
their working lives, which leads us to expect that labour market careers are influenced by the 
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situation of the partner (Blossfeld & Drobnič, 2001). This life course perspective forms the basis 
of our theoretical ideas about partner effects, which will be further discussed in Section 1.3. 
I take the life course perspective a step further by studying couples’ labour market careers 
over a longer time span. This means that I will also shift the focus from single career events to the 
outcome of career events together. Accumulation of resources plays a central role. If labour 
market success or educational achievements accelerate later labour market success, for instance 
by increasing the probability of upward mobility, people with favourable ‘starting’ positions 
become better and better off in the course of their lives compared to people with less favourable 
‘starting’ positions. This accumulation can even be strengthened by the influence of the partner. 
If, for reasons that I will outline in Section 1.3, a highly educated husband stimulates the career of 
his wife, the sum of all positive effects during several years of their relationship implies a large 
positive effect in the long run. Accumulative mechanisms are capable of increasing inequality 
between couples in the course of their lives, even with unchanging associations between the 
labour market careers of husband and wife.  
 
1.2  Labour market careers: participation and job level 
In this book, I focus on two aspects of labour market careers in particular: participation and job 
level. Labour market participation refers both to the dichotomy of having or not having a job, and 
to the number of working hours, given that someone has a job. Job level refers to labour market 
success, in this study defined in terms of occupational status or wage rate. The choice for these 
two aspects is threefold. 
First of all, the combination of the two represents the actual socio-economic position of an 
individual or a couple since income is, in essence, the product of working hours and hourly wage. 
A focus on participation and job level, therefore, matches the background of this study, namely 
the consequences of couples’ labour market careers for socio-economic inequality. 
Secondly, participation and job level cover different dimensions of the working life, 
which makes it theoretically interesting to distinguish them. Job level predominantly refers to 
labour market success, what people achieve on the labour market. Participation is more connected 
to time issues, how much time do people spend on the labour market versus time spent at home. 
The distinction is not perfect, there is some overlap: on the one hand, the many responsibilities 
that come with a high-level job may have consequences for the time that needs to be spent on that 
job (and not at home); and on the other hand, being employed can also be seen as a measure of 
success on the labour market. Also, full-time work usually increases chances on later success. 
Nevertheless, different mechanisms may play a role when it comes to participation compared to 
job level, and our understanding of the mechanisms behind couples’ labour market careers will 
benefit from a separate study of these two aspects of the labour market career. 
Finally, the fact that participation and job level are strongly related to available time and 
income in the household makes them important for husbands’ and wives’ daily lives. On 
weekdays, full-time workers spend the majority of their waking hours on paid work and 
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commuting. Daily schedules of all household members (including children) are largely organized 
around the working hours of both partners. In broader terms, decisions on working hours can 
have consequences for the amount of time pressure, which is believed to be negatively correlated 
with quality of life (Jacobs & Gornick, 2001). The revenues of paid work determine what lifestyle 
a couple can afford, in what kind of house they can live, etcetera. Consequences of spouses’ job 
levels can even go further: the relative contribution of husband and wife to the household income 
is argued to partly determine patterns of influence between spouses; more specifically, the spouse 
who contributes most has the most influence in several household decisions (Sørensen & 
McLanahan, 1987).  
 
1.3  Theoretical background: homogamy and partner effects 
1.3.1  Introduction 
Figure 1.2 displays a simplified schematic overview of the theoretical explanations for the 
association between husbands’ and wives’ occupational careers, and will be used as the baseline 
of this theoretical outline. On the right-hand side, the relationship between spouses’ occupations 
is pictured, which is the subject of the first research question. The occupational association is for 
a large part caused by educational homogamy, and perhaps other forms of homogamy. On the 
individual level education positively affects occupation, so the positive correlation between 
spouses’ education, intentionally or not, leads to a positive correlation between spouses’ 
occupations (see continuous arrows in Figure 1.2). In this book, I will not pay much attention to 
arguments about the individual effect since this has been the subject of many studies before and is 
beyond the couple perspective. The next paragraph will sketch the main theoretical arguments 
about homogamy because it forms such an important component of the occupational association I 
am interested in. The main theoretical focus of this book, however, will be on partner effects (the 
interrupted arrows in Figure 1.2). Attributes of the partner may influence occupational outcomes, 
and this interest is reflected in the second research question. A theoretical overview of the, partly 
opposing, ways partners may affect each others’ careers is outlined in Section 1.3.3. 
 
education husband      occupation husband 
 
 
 
 
 
education wife       occupation wife 
 
Figure 1.2 Theoretical causal relationships between husband’s and wife’s education and occupation; homogamy mechanism expressed by 
continuous arrows, partner effects by interrupted arrows 
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1.3.2  Homogamy 
Homogamy, the similarity between spouses’ social characteristics, is the consequence of partner 
choice mechanisms. Kalmijn (1998) summarizes the main mechanisms behind partner choice that 
cause homogamy: preferences, third parties, and meeting opportunities. Firstly, partner choice is 
related to economic and cultural preferences (Kalmijn, 1994). People try to maximize their 
(chances on) economic well-being, and therefore prefer a spouse with favourable socio-economic 
resources or prospects. Candidates with the most attractive socio-economic resources cannot 
reach any higher and select amongst themselves, so that candidates with the least attractive 
resources end up together too. Moreover, people prefer a partner with similar cultural resources 
because similarity of values and opinions with respect to important things in life, like raising 
children, makes a relationship easier to maintain; similarity of interests enables joint activities 
and life style; and similarity of knowledge leads to conversations on a satisfactory level which, in 
turn, increase mutual understanding. Secondly, third parties have an interest in homogamous 
marriages because this, presumably, safeguards the internal group cohesion. Sanctions are used to 
impose their wish for a homogamous partner choice. Thirdly, meeting opportunities are a 
prerequisite for mating (Verbrugge, 1977), nicely phrased as “You can’t marry an Eskimo, if no 
Eskimo is around” (Blau & Schwarz, 1984). Potential spouses are often met at school, in the 
neighbourhood, at work, or in a leisure setting (Kalmijn & Flap, 2001). Such local marriage 
markets are often socially segregated, which implies that people are most likely to meet potential 
spouses with social characteristics similar to their own. 
Partner choice mechanisms lead to all kinds of homogamy of which educational, 
occupational, religious, age, and social origin homogamy are studied the most. Over time, a shift 
has taken place in their importance. Educational homogamy, and perhaps occupational 
homogamy, have gained importance relative to social origin and religion (Kalmijn, 1991a; 1991b; 
Uunk, Ganzeboom, & Robert, 1996). This trend is in line with the general shift from ascription to 
achievement and the process of secularization in modern industrialized societies. The increasing 
importance of educational homogamy might have consequences for trends in inequality between 
couples, although the absolute and relative rates of educational homogamy have declined in the 
Netherlands between 1959 and 1983 (Ultee & Luijkx, 1990); this in contrast to the United States, 
where a rise in educational homogamy has been reported (Kalmijn, 1991; Mare, 1991). 
 
1.3.3  Partner effects: contradicting hypotheses 
Economic perspective 
The general economic argument is that people strive for maximization of utility. In his new home 
economics, Becker (1981) applied this concept to the division of labour within households. The 
tasks that need to be done in the household are paid and unpaid labour, and task specialization is 
the way to reach maximum utility. The spouse who is most productive on the labour market 
should specialize in paid work, which automatically leaves the household and caring tasks to the 
other spouse. This economic idea has been translated into a more general hypothesis: human 
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capital or labour market resources of one spouse lower the other spouse’s financial incentives to 
work many hours or to put an effort into his or her career (Bernardi, 1999; Bernasco, 1994; 
Bernasco, de Graaf, & Ultee, 1998). To put it differently, someone can afford to be non-
employed, to work few hours, or to work on a low level if the spouse is very successful on the 
labour market. In sum, the economic perspective predicts a negative partner effect on labour 
market careers. Although, the argument can be applied to both labour market participation and 
job level, it seems probable that spouses have more difficulties in handling a high number of 
working hours because time is limited. Two high status jobs might be demanding too, but bring in 
money which can be used to outsource child care and time-consuming household tasks. 
Therefore, it is predicted that restrictive partner effects are primarily relevant for labour market 
participation. 
  
Social capital perspective 
In contrast, positive partner effects are derived from a social capital perspective. Social capital 
refers to resources that belong to persons in your network, and which you can use to your benefit 
(Bourdieu, 1986). The partner is an important person in people’s networks, and the strong ties 
between spouses makes them willing to help each other. In the context of labour market careers, 
partners can provide each other with information about job openings or opportunities; exploit 
each others’ useful contacts such as potential employers; they can transfer occupational skills, 
competences and experiences (i.e. transfer of human capital); they can share their knowledge 
about do’s and don’ts (i.e. transfer of cultural capital); or they can try to influence labour market 
outcomes of the spouse directly by putting in a good word (Bernardi, 1999). The quality of 
resources as mentioned above is positively related to human capital and occupational success, 
which means that labour market resources of the partner are expected to have a positive effect on 
labour market careers (Lin, Vaughn, & Ensel, 1981). It makes sense to expect that social capital 
can advance job levels more than working hours. Therefore, I expect the positive partner effect to 
be mainly relevant for job level and to a lesser extent for labour market participation. 
 
Value perspective 
Values concerning working women and mothers and the division of labour between men and 
women have become more liberal over time, but nevertheless, variation in values exists: some 
couples adhere to traditional values that advocate the breadwinner model, and other couples 
adhere to modern values that prefer a more equal division of labour between husband and wife. 
People usually try to harmonize their values and behaviour, but are also sensitive to the values 
and norms held by their social environment. In the decision process of spouses concerning the 
arrangement of their working and family lives, the values of both spouses will play a role 
(perhaps also the values of significant others, like family and friends, but here I want to focus on 
the influence of the partner) (Van der Lippe & Siegers, 1994). Unfortunately, I will not be able to 
test the influence of values directly due to lack of appropriate data. However, education is a 
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strong indicator of values; the highly educated have more modern ideas than the poorly educated 
(Alwin, Braun, & Scott, 1992; Treas & Widmer, 2000). I therefore assume that the effect of (the 
partner’s) education has a cultural interpretation too.  
The kind of behaviour that can be classified as modern differs for men and women. 
Whereas traditional values emphasize the caring role of women, modern values emphasize the 
importance of female independence. Modern women, therefore, have the preference to be active 
on the labour market. Moreover, one could say that full-time work is more modern than part-time 
work since it displays an even stronger attachment to the labour market. Not only with respect to 
labour market participation can we distinguish traditional from modern behaviour; with respect to 
job level, pursuing a successful career as opposed to ‘just’ having a job can be marked as modern. 
For men, the story is different. Both traditional and modern men are supposed to have a job, and 
striving for a high-level job is appreciated by both views. The important difference, however, is 
that in a modern view men do not only have a working role, but also a caring or family role. This 
implies that, if the couple has children, a man is stimulated to work part-time and, perhaps, to 
take a step down if his working career would appear to be incompatible with his duties as a 
father. The general hypothesis that can be derived from this, is that highly educated husbands will 
stimulate their wives’ working careers, whereas highly educated wives will restrict their 
husbands’ working careers. 
 
1.4  Data 
Two data sources form the basis of the empirical studies that follow in the next five chapters. The 
first source consists of the Labour Force Surveys. These are very large-scale recurring surveys 
conducted by Statistics Netherlands, which provide the national employment statistics on a yearly 
basis. They are performed since the 1970s (then called “Arbeidskrachtentelling”, since 1990 
named “Enquête Beroepsbevolking”), and they contain information on both spouses. Reliability 
and statistical power are very high. Together, these make the Labour Force Surveys an inevitable 
source for the longitudinal study of couples’ labour market careers. I will merge the data sets 
from 1977, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, 
and I will analyse all individual men and women to determine to what extent their labour market 
outcomes are dependent on characteristics of their partner and their own (and other important 
factors such as the presence of children). The downside of this data source is the limited range of 
independent variables; the focus is explicitly on labour market issues. 
The second data source is the Family Survey Dutch Population, and I use three waves 
collected in 1998, 2000, and 2003 by the Department of Sociology at the Radboud University in 
Nijmegen (de Graaf, de Graaf, Kraaykamp, & Ultee, 1998; 2000; 2003). These are large-scale 
surveys, repeated in a highly comparable manner. Both spouses are interviewed with the same 
face-to-face and on-paper questionnaire. The data sets contain very rich information about 
peoples’ life courses and living conditions. One of the main powers of the Family Survey is the 
retrospective setup. In contrast to the cross-sectional information in the Labour Force Surveys, 
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respondents and their partners have not only provided information on their present situation, but 
have constructed, with exact dates, their complete labour market, relational, and reproductive 
careers (among others). This makes the data extremely suitable for a life course perspective. On 
top of that, it is possible to reconstruct couples’ labour market careers as they were a long time 
ago, which enables the study of trends since the 1940s. Retrospective questions generally struggle 
with recalling issues, but since occupations, partners, and children are very salient issues in one’s 
life, and respondents have reported about their own lives instead of the lives of others (De Vries, 
2006), I believe the advantages of retrospective questions more than outweigh the disadvantages. 
A drawback of the Family Survey lies in a possible selection bias. The couples that can be studied 
are a selective group in the sense that they are (still) together; otherwise the partners would not 
have been in the interview together. Although this does not mean that only ‘happy couples’ are 
observed (a substantial part will presumably divorce in the future), I do not study the life courses 
of couples that did end their relationship before the moment of the interview. In sum, however, 
the strengths of the two data sets match the aims of this study very well. 
 
1.5  Structure of the book 
The next five chapters present empirical studies of couples’ labour market careers. The first 
general research question of this book about (changes in) the association between spouses’ labour 
market careers is central in chapter 2. The Labour Force Surveys are analysed with the help of 
log-linear models, resulting in a detailed description of the association between husband’s and 
wife’s employment statuses (non-employment, part-time employment, and full-time employment) 
and between husband’s and wife’s occupations, distinguishing 47 occupational categories. 
Educational homogamy is introduced as an important explanation for the occupational 
association, and the results will show to what extent the occupational association cannot be 
attributed to educational homogamy and must be the result of other processes; among others 
partner effects, which will be the subject of the next chapters. A cohort design is used to establish 
trends in the association. 
In chapter 3, I stay with the Labour Force Surveys, but I look into the relationship 
between husband’s and wife’s human capital and labour market outcomes. This implies that I 
shift attention from the overall association between spouses’ labour market careers to the 
dependence of spouses’ occupational outcomes on each others’ human capital. Multinomial 
logistic regressions will show to what extent the labour market participation (non-employment, 
part-time employment, full-time employment) and imputed wage rate (as indicator of 
occupational success) of husband and wife depend on the education, imputed hourly wage, and 
working hours of the spouse. Positive relationships point at accumulation of resources within 
households, whereas negative relationships point at a dampening development. Since positive and 
negative partner effects might be going on at the same time, I also analyse the total partner effect 
on income, which is the combination of labour market participation and hourly wage. 
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From chapter 4 onwards, I explicitly introduce a life course perspective and I will make 
use of the Family Survey Dutch Population. In chapters 4 and 5, I keep searching for the 
influence of the partner, but in these chapters, I analyse the influence of the partner on single 
labour market decisions: to what extent does a change in one’s labour market career at any 
moment during one’s career depend on the characteristics of the partner at that particular 
moment? This is in contrast to chapter 3, in which I examine the ‘total’ relationship between 
spouses’ characteristics at the moment of interview, which is actually the end result of many 
decisions in the couple’s life till that moment. The dynamic event-history approach of chapters 4 
and 5 implies a stronger test of partner effects because the temporal order of events is known: was 
the situation of the partner a (possible) cause or a (possible) result of the career change? Changes 
in working hours is the subject of chapter 4, whereas chapter 5 goes into changes in occupational 
success (i.e. upward and downward mobility). The retrospective data enable to observe career 
changes from 1940 onwards. 
In chapter 6, I am primarily interested in the long term consequences of the workings 
within a couple. The careers of both spouses develop over the life course, influenced by the 
human capital of both. The question that will be answered in this chapter, is whether the sum of 
these developments implies a divergence or a convergence of income between couples. The life 
course perspective is now used to explicitly study the accumulation of income in the first fifteen 
years of the relationship.  
Finally, chapter 7 presents the main conclusions of this study. Furthermore, I describe the 
contribution of this study to the literature, and give suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
The association between husbands’ and wives’ 
labour market positions (cohorts 1940 – 1979)* 
 
 
This chapter (1) describes the association between husbands’ and wives’ labour market 
participation and occupations in the Netherlands, (2) explores to what extent the association can 
be attributed to educational homogamy, and (3) establishes possible trends in that association. 
We use twelve waves of the Dutch Labour Force Survey (1994-2006), and use log-linear models 
to analyse the associations between the labour market positions of spouses. We find positive and 
considerably strong associations, implying that favourable positions are accumulated within 
households. For couples with children, the association between spouses’ labour market 
participation is negative, which means that they divide paid labour. Education is an important 
contributor to the occupational association, but still half of the association between spouses’ 
success cannot be attributed to spouses’ education. Over birth cohorts, the association between 
spouses’ labour market participation becomes stronger, and the association between spouses’ 
occupational success remains stable. 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter investigates the association between husbands’ and wives’ labour market positions 
in the Netherlands, specifically the associations between their labour market participation and 
between their occupations. It is important to investigate these associations since husbands’ and 
wives’ labour market participation and occupations are the two major labour market 
characteristics that affect couples’ income positions. The size of the association between spouses’ 
labour market positions has important consequences for the socio-economic inequality between
                                                 
* This chapter is a slightly different version of the following forthcoming publication: Verbakel, E., Luijkx, R., & de 
Graaf, P.M. The Association between Husbands’ and Wives’ Labor Market Positions in the Netherlands. Research in 
Social Stratification and Mobility (2008), doi: 10.1016/j.rssm.2008.05.002. 
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households. Positive associations imply an accumulation of favourable or unfavourable positions 
within households (Hout, 1982; Ultee, Dessens & Jansen, 1988). We set out (1) to describe the 
association between husbands’ and wives’ labour market participation and occupations in the 
Netherlands, (2) to explore to what extent the association between spouses’ labour market 
participation can be attributed to educational homogamy, and (3) to establish trends in that 
association. We use twelve waves of the Dutch Labour Force Survey (1994-2006), with 
information on 234,688 couples, and employ log-linear models to analyse the associations 
between the labour market positions of spouses. 
The first goal of this chapter is to present a detailed description of the association between 
the labour market positions of husbands and wives, distinguishing two aspects. The first aspect is 
the association between the labour market participation of husbands and wives. We distinguish 
employment and non-employment as well as the number of working hours. Economic theory 
argues that couples divide paid and unpaid work because of economic maximization (Becker, 
1981) and because of time constraints (Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2001). Couples divide their 
time over paid and unpaid work, and do this in such a way that they optimize family income and 
the quality of family life. The division of labour suggests a negative association between the 
labour market participation of husbands and wives. Empirical research, however, has sometimes 
led to opposite conclusions. Spouses of employed persons are more likely to be employed as 
well, and spouses of the non- or unemployed also tend to be non- or unemployed (Cooke, 1987; 
Davies, Elias, & Penn, 1994; de Graaf & Ultee, 2000; Halvorsen, 1999; Henkens, Kraaykamp, & 
Siegers, 1993; Irwin & Morris, 1993; Ultee, Dessens, & Jansen, 1988). The odds ratios that 
describe this association are substantial, and a European comparative study shows that odds ratios 
vary between 2.2 in the Netherlands and 5.7 in Belgium (de Graaf & Ultee, 2000). The interest in 
couples’ labour market participation often comes from a social policy point of view: does social 
security create disincentives to find employment for the spouse of an unemployed person (Dex, 
Gustafsson, Smith, & Callan, 1995; Irwin & Morris, 1993)? 
Our contribution to this line of literature is a further analysis of the association between 
the labour market participation of spouses by dividing the employed into full-timers and part-
timers. This distinction enables us to draw more detailed conclusions than those based on the 
overall odds ratio of employment versus non-employment. Economic theory may be proven 
wrong with respect to (non-)employment of spouses, but within dual worker couples the 
relationship between spouses’ working hours might be negative, as is the case when the spouses 
of full-timers are typically working in part-time jobs. In the Netherlands, as in other Western 
countries, a wide array of work arrangements is available, including ample opportunities to work 
part-time (Blossfeld & Hakim, 1997). Indeed, nowadays the most important decision to make, 
particularly for women, is not between participation and non-participation, but between non-
participation and part-time work or between part-time and full-time work. 
The second aspect of the description of the association between the labour market 
positions of husbands and wives refers to the occupations of spouses, and specifically to their job 
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levels. Job levels are a strong proxy for socio-economic positions. If high-level jobs tend to stick 
together within couples, and if low-level jobs do so too (i.e. a positive association), then 
inequality between couples is much higher than if people with high-level jobs typically have a 
spouse with a low-level job (i.e. a negative association). Despite the widely recognized relevance 
of the association between spouses’ job levels, research that directly links spouses’ occupations is 
relatively scarce. Instead, much attention has been paid to the similarity of spouses’ educational 
achievements that are a proxy for occupation. In studies on spouses’ occupations, Hout (1982) 
and Smits, Ultee, and Lammers (1999) find a positive and strong association between husbands’ 
and wives’ occupational statuses (in the United States and in eight European Union countries, 
including the Netherlands, respectively). 
In this chapter we extend this line of literature by modelling a detailed husband by wife 
cross-classification of occupations. We will employ a scheme with 47 occupational categories. 
The log-linear modelling of the 47 by 47 table will contribute to a better understanding of the 
complex relationship between the occupations of husbands and wives. We will investigate both 
the tendency of spouses to be employed in the same occupational category and, if they are not 
working in the same occupational category, we will investigate the association between the socio-
economic statuses of their occupations. 
The second goal in this chapter is to find out to what extent the association between 
spouses’ labour market positions can be ascribed to educational homogamy. Extensive literature 
on educational homogamy has produced the consistent finding that there is a strong positive 
association between spouses’ educational attainments (Kalmijn, 1998; Mare, 1991; Smits, Ultee, 
& Lammers, 1998; Ultee & Luijkx, 1990). Since education has strong effects on labour market 
participation as well as occupational success, the occupational association between spouses could 
be entirely the by-product of educational homogamy. There are sound arguments why the 
association between the occupations of spouses is more than just the result of educational 
homogamy and the effects of schooling on career opportunities. Firstly, not only educational 
attainment, but also occupational status affects the marital selection process (Kalmijn, 1994). 
Preferences and restrictions are at work here, leading to similarities in occupational status, and 
resulting in occupational homogamy on top of educational homogamy. Secondly, there are 
several plausible mechanisms that affect the association between the labour market positions of 
spouses during marriage net of the consequences of educational and occupational homogamy. 
Economic theory predicts that households follow the strategy of income maintenance, implying 
that, when one spouse is not doing well on the labour market, this will be counterbalanced by 
more career activity of the other spouse (Lundberg, 1985; Maloney, 1987). As a consequence, the 
association between spouses’ labour market positions is weaker than predicted by educational and 
occupational homogamy. In contrast, social capital theory argues that spouses can take advantage 
of each other’s labour market resources (Bernasco, de Graaf, & Ultee, 1998), which would result 
in a stronger association than predicted by homogamy. 
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The relevance of the answer to the question to what extent the occupational association 
cannot be fully attributed to educational homogamy is twofold. Firstly, assuming that households’ 
social positions are more directly measured by couples’ occupations than by their education, the 
conclusion that the occupational association is more than educational homogamy would justify 
and favour a focus on couples’ occupations in social inequality research. Secondly, this 
conclusion would encourage us to study alternative factors that affect the occupational 
association in subsequent chapters. 
The third goal in this chapter is to explore historical developments. We are not only 
interested in the association between the labour market positions of husbands and wives per se, 
but also in trends in this association. An increasing positive association between the labour 
market participation and job levels of spouses implies increasing inequalities on the household 
level. During the second half of the twentieth century, important economic and cultural 
developments have taken place in Western countries, among which the emergence of non-
traditional gender roles (Treas & Widmer, 2000), the rapid increase in female labour market 
participation (de Graaf & Vermeulen, 1997), and declining gender differences in educational 
achievement (Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993). All of these are supposedly strongly related to couples’ 
labour market decisions. To assess historical change, we will apply a cohort design, describing 
the association for couples born between 1940 and 1979. 
In summary, we will answer the following three research questions: 
1) To what extent are (a) labour market participation and (b) occupations of husbands and wives 
in the Netherlands related? 
2) To what extent can the relationships between (a) labour market participation and (b) 
occupations of husbands and wives be attributed to educational homogamy? 
3) Do the relationships between (a) labour market participation and (b) occupations of husbands 
and wives differ between birth cohorts?  
In the next section, we will introduce the data and give descriptions of couples’ labour 
market participation and occupations. We will explain the models and show the results with 
respect to the association between husbands’ and wives’ labour market participation in Section 
2.3 and between their occupations in Section 2.4. The results of this chapter are summarized in 
Section 2.5. 
 
2.2  Data 
We will use twelve waves of the Labour Force Surveys (1994-2006, except the 1999 survey 
because it has no information on children) collected by Statistics Netherlands. These data are 
representative of the Dutch non-institutionalized population of 15 years and older. Response rates 
are about 60 per cent. The Labour Force Surveys offer detailed occupational and educational 
information on large numbers of respondents and their spouses. This large statistical power is 
essential for answering our research questions. We selected couples in which both spouses were 
between 25 and 55 years old at the moment of the interview. Furthermore, we removed all cases 
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with missing information from the analysis. This resulted in 234,688 couples and 131,244 
couples in which both spouses have a job of minimally 12 hours a week at the moment of the 
interview.  
 
2.2.1  Labour market participation, occupation, and control variables 
Labour market participation of husband and wife has been defined according to the categorization 
of Statistics Netherlands: non-employed, 1-11 working hours, 12-19 working hours, 20-34 
working hours, and 35 hours or more a week. Occupations are classified into 47 occupational 
categories based on the two-digit Standard Occupational Classification 1992 of Statistics 
Netherlands. This categorization includes information on the level of occupation (low, medium, 
high, and academic jobs, based on the educational requirements of jobs) in addition to the field of 
occupation. Detailed information on the 47 occupational categories is presented in Appendix A. 
In this study, we include four variables that may affect the labour market positions of 
husbands and wives, and the association between their labour market positions: birth cohort, 
family stage, age group, and educational attainment. We compute the average birth year of both 
spouses, which ranges from 1940 through 1979, and construct four birth cohorts: 1940-1949, 
1950-1959, 1960-1969, and 1970-1979. We analyse historical developments in the association 
between husbands’ and wives’ labour market positions by comparisons between these birth 
cohorts. 
Family stage is categorized in two groups: couples with children and couples without 
children. Note that the childless couples can be couples who do not have a child yet, and couples 
whose children have left the household (empty nests). We lack the necessary information to 
distinguish between these two groups. Other data show that most couples in which both spouses 
are between 25 and 55 years old and who are living without children never had children (77 per 
cent), and thus that 23 per cent of these couples are in the empty nest situation (Family Survey 
Dutch Population 2003, own calculations). In the analysis of spouses’ labour market 
participation, family stage will be used to cover life course developments, which must be 
controlled because they are correlated with birth cohort.  
The average age of the couples is categorized in two age groups: couples younger than 40 
years and couples of 40 years or older. In the analysis of occupation we will use age groups to 
control for life course development because occupational status is more dependent on age than on 
family stage. 
Educational attainment has been measured in 15 categories, using both vertical and 
horizontal categorization. Vertically, education ranges from primary education to a university 
degree, and horizontally, we distinguish general, technical, economic, and care-taking sectors. 
We have chosen for this large number of educational categories because we want to have optimal 
control for educational homogamy in our multivariate analysis of the association between 
spouses’ labour market positions. This allows us to produce reliable estimates of the remaining 
association between spouses’ labour market positions after the effects of educational homogamy 
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have been controlled for. Table 2.1 shows descriptive values of the control variables. In the next 
section, we will first give a description of couples’ labour market participation and occupational 
levels in our data. 
 
Table 2.1 Descriptive values of independent and control variables for all couples and for dual worker couples 
  all couples dual worker couples 
  N % N % N % N % 
cohort         
1940-1949 25,731 11.0  9,852 7.5  
1950-1959 84,632 36.1  44,026 33.5  
1960-1969 94,113 40.1  55,322 42.2  
1970-1979 30,212 12.9  22,044 16.8  
family stage         
no child in household 59,402 25.3  42,916 32.7  
child in household 175,286 74.7  88,328 67.3  
age         
younger than 40 years 119,926 51.1  71,945 54.8  
40 years or older 114,762 48.9  59,299 45.2  
education husbands wives husbands wives 
primary education 18,908 8.1 20,655 8.8 6,534 5.0 5,743 4.4
intermediate secondary education (mavo) 10,431 4.4 20,443 8.7 5,523 4.2 9,680 7.4
low vocational education - technical (lbo) 31,828 13.6 3,131 1.3 14,490 11.0 1,213 0.9
low vocational education - economic (lbo) 2,441 1.0 7,246 3.1 1,323 1.0 3,209 2.4
low vocational education - care-taking (lbo) 2,171 0.9 25,517 10.9 1,073 0.8 8,971 6.8
high secondary education (havo/vwo) 10,382 4.4 15,755 6.7 6,208 4.7 9,064 6.9
intermediate vocational education - technical (mbo) 54,987 23.4 7,980 3.4 30,531 23.3 4,522 3.4
intermediate vocational education - economic (mbo) 23,769 10.1 28,338 12.1 14,128 10.8 18,771 14.3
intermediate vocational education - care-taking (mbo) 13,652 5.8 53,359 22.7 8,469 6.5 30,790 23.5
high vocational education - technical (hbo) 12,803 5.5 1,834 0.8 7,572 5.8 1,298 1.0
high vocational education - economic (hbo) 13,762 5.9 8,018 3.4 9,006 6.9 6,176 4.7
high vocational education - care-taking (hbo) 16,175 6.9 29,425 12.5 10,961 8.4 21,441 16.3
university education - technical (wo) 6,432 2.7 1,380 0.6 4,049 3.1 1,041 0.8
university education - economic (wo) 7,925 3.4 3,068 1.3 5,203 4.0 2,583 2.0
university education - care-taking (wo) 9,022 3.8 8,539 3.6 6,174 4.7 6,742 5.1
total 234,688 100 234,688 100 131,244 100 131,244 100
Source: Labour Force Surveys, 1994-2006 
 
2.2.2  Description of husbands’ and wives’ labour market participation 
Table 2.2 shows the distribution of work arrangements of husbands and wives, and in Table 2.3 
this distribution is broken down by birth cohort and family stage. The Netherlands are particularly 
well-known for their high number of part-time working women; indeed, the ‘Dutch model’ 
consisting of a full-time working husband and a part-time working wife is the most popular 
arrangement (47.7 per cent), both for couples with children (51.6 per cent) and couples without 
children (36.4 per cent). Within female part-time jobs, large part-time jobs are favoured the most, 
and there has been a further shift to large part-time jobs over cohorts. Full-time jobs, however, 
have not become more popular among mothers. Note that cohort change might be overestimated 
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since the average age of the couples in the youngest cohort is lower than the average age of the 
couples in the oldest cohort. 
On average, a quarter of the Dutch couples have a breadwinner arrangement with a full-
time working husband and a non-working wife. Whereas the breadwinner model is rather 
common in the oldest cohort both for couples with or without children (38.9 per cent versus 33.3 
per cent), this arrangement has lost its attractiveness, especially for childless couples in the 
youngest cohort (5.5 per cent). In turn, they predominantly consist of two full-timers (51.9 per 
cent), whereas couples with children still rarely decide to both work full-time (around 6 per cent 
in all cohorts). Variety between couples with and without children is predominantly due to 
different employment behaviour of the mothers: they scale back, whereas fathers work as much 
as childless husbands. Work patterns hardly differ between men. International comparisons show 
that Dutch men more often work part-time than others (Delsen, 1998), though our data show that 
this proportion is no higher than eight per cent. 
Equal division of labour between husband and wife is more widespread in younger 
cohorts than in older cohorts, but only where childless couples are concerned: one out of five 
childless couples born in the forties have an equal division of paid labour compared to over half 
of the couples born in the seventies. Strikingly, this development is not observed in couples with 
family responsibilities: in the older as well as in the younger cohorts, only one out of eight 
husbands and wives with children have the same level of labour market participation. The great 
majority of the rest have an arrangement in which the husband works more hours than the wife. 
 
Table 2.2 Distribution of husbands’ and wives’ labour market participation (percentages) 
  wife               
husband 
non- 
employed 
1-11 
hours 
12-19 
hours 
20-34 
hours 
35+ 
hours total     
non-employed 3.1 0.3 0.4 1.2 1.1 6.1 diagonal 18.9
1-11 hours 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 h>w 76.4
12-19 hours 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.5 w>h 4.7
20-34 hours 1.4 0.4 0.8 2.9 1.0 6.5   
35+ hours 25.7 9.7 12.1 25.9 12.8 86.3     
total 30.5 10.6 13.3 30.4 15.2 100 N=234,688 
Source: Labour Force Surveys, 1994-2006; N=234,688 
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Table 2.3 Distribution of husbands’ and wives’ labour market participation by birth cohort and family stage (percentages) 
  COUPLES WITHOUT CHILDREN  COUPLES WITH CHILDREN 
 wife                wife               
husband 
non- 
employed 
1-11 
hours 
12-19 
hours 
20-34 
hours 
35+ 
hours total      
non- 
employed
1-11 
hours
12-19 
hours
20-34 
hours 
35+ 
hours total    
all couples                                   
non-employed 3.1 0.3 0.4 1.5 1.9 7.2 diagonal 39.6 3.1 0.4 0.4 1.1 0.8 5.7 diagonal 11.9
1-11 hours 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.8 h>w 53.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 h>w 84.2
12-19 hours 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.7 w>h 7.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.5 w>h 3.9
20-34 hours 1.1 0.3 0.4 2.7 2.0 6.5    1.5 0.5 0.9 3.0 0.7 6.5   
35+ hours 14.6 3.5 4.7 28.2 33.8 84.9      29.5 11.8 14.6 25.2 5.7 86.8     
total 19.2 4.3 5.6 32.8 38.1 100 N=59,402  34.3 12.7 16.0 29.6 7.4 100 N=175,286 
cohort 1940-1949                                 
non-employed 7.9 0.9 0.8 1.8 1.4 12.8 diagonal 19.8 5.3 0.7 0.6 1.3 0.8 8.7 diagonal 13.2
1-11 hours 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.4 h>w 73.5 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.9 h>w 82.3
12-19 hours 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.0 w>h 6.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 w>h 4.5
20-34 hours 2.5 0.6 0.6 1.7 0.9 6.3    2.2 0.5 0.6 1.4 0.5 5.1   
35+ hours 33.3 8.3 7.6 19.6 9.9 78.6      38.9 11.7 9.0 18.7 6.4 84.7     
total 44.6 10.1 9.2 23.6 12.5 100 N=9,880  47.0 13.1 10.3 21.8 7.9 100 N=15,851 
cohort 1950-1959                                 
non-employed 4.1 0.4 0.6 2.3 2.2 9.6 diagonal 27.2 2.9 0.4 0.4 1.3 1.0 6.0 diagonal 12.1
1-11 hours 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.9 h>w 64.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 h>w 83.3
12-19 hours 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.9 w>h 8.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.6 w>h 4.5
20-34 hours 1.6 0.5 0.8 3.9 1.8 8.5    1.5 0.5 0.9 2.9 0.8 6.6   
35+ hours 19.2 4.9 7.5 29.4 19.2 80.1      29.3 12.3 13.2 25.2 6.2 86.3     
total 25.3 5.9 9.0 36.2 23.7 100 N=15,385  34.0 13.4 14.7 29.7 8.2 100 N=69,247 
cohort 1960-1969                                 
non-employed 1.6 0.2 0.1 1.1 2.1 5.1 diagonal 48.3 2.8 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.7 4.9 diagonal 11.2
1-11 hours 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 h>w 45.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 h>w 85.5
12-19 hours 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 w>h 6.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 w>h 3.3
20-34 hours 0.7 0.1 0.2 2.7 2.4 6.2    1.3 0.5 0.9 3.4 0.7 6.8   
35+ hours 8.4 1.8 3.0 30.8 44.0 88.0      28.8 11.9 16.4 25.4 5.0 87.5     
total 10.8 2.1 3.4 34.8 48.9 100 N=20,101  33.1 12.7 17.7 30.0 6.6 100 N=74,012 
cohort 1970-1979                                 
non-employed 0.7 0.1 0.1 1.0 1.7 3.6 diagonal 54.7 3.1 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.6 5.2 diagonal 12.7
1-11 hours 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 h>w 39.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 h>w 84.2
12-19 hours 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.6 w>h 6.1 0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 w>h 3.1
20-34 hours 0.4 0.1 0.2 2.0 2.2 5.0    1.2 0.4 0.9 3.6 0.5 6.7   
35+ hours 5.5 1.2 2.2 29.4 51.9 90.2      23.9 9.3 17.7 30.5 5.9 87.3     
total 6.7 1.5 2.5 32.7 56.6 100 N=14,036   28.5 9.9 19.1 35.3 7.3 100 N=16,176 
Source: Labour Force Surveys, 1994-2006; N=234,688 
 
2.2.3  Description of husbands’ and wives’ occupations 
The couples we observe in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 are dual earner couples only. In our data 55.9 per 
cent of all couples consist of two earners. Not included in the descriptions and analyses on 
spouses’ occupations are couples in which both spouses are non-employed (3.1 per cent), couples 
in which only the wife is non-employed (27.4 per cent), and couples in which only the husband is 
non-employed (3.0 per cent). Since the Dutch definition of the labour force excludes people who 
work less than 12 hours a week, persons with small part-time jobs are not asked detailed 
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occupational information. We therefore do not have information on the couples in which both 
spouses work less than 12 hours (0.1 per cent), couples in which only the wife works less than 12 
hours (10.5 per cent), and couples in which only the husband works less than 12 hours (0.5 per 
cent).  
It is important to note that dual earner couples are a selective sample with respect to their 
occupational achievement. Persons who have a job but whose spouse does not have a job (or has 
a job with less than 12 working hours), have a lower average socio-economic status than persons 
with a working spouse. Husbands with a non-employed wife have an average status of 47.0, 
which is significantly lower (p<.01) than husbands with a working wife (average status is 50.0). 
Wives with non-employed husbands have an average occupational status of 46.7, which is lower 
than the average of 49.2 for wives of employed husbands (p<.01). These differences are 
substantial, but we think that they will not have implications for our analysis of the association 
between spouses’ occupations. 
 
Table 2.4 Distribution of husbands’ and wives’ occupational level 
 (percentages, dual worker couples only) 
  wife             
husband low medium high academic total     
low 10.6 9.0 2.3 0.4 22.2 diagonal 43.0
medium 12.7 20.7 7.1 1.3 41.9 h>w 34.9
high 4.0 10.0 8.8 2.1 24.9 w>h 22.1
academic 1.0 3.3 3.9 2.8 11.0     
total 28.3 43.1 22.0 6.6 100 N=131,244 
Source: Labour Force Surveys, 1994-2006; N=131,244 
 
Table 2.4 displays the cross-classification of husbands’ and wives’ level of occupation, and Table 
2.5 shows this cross-classification by birth cohort and age group. Note that we now use age 
groups to control for life cycle effects because occupational status is more dependent on age than 
on family stage. Generally, medium-level jobs appear to be most common both for men and 
women. About ten per cent of the dual earner couples in the Netherlands have two low-level jobs, 
and less than three per cent of the couples have two jobs on the academic level. 
Table 2.4 also shows that in most couples the husband has a higher level of occupation 
than the wife, though 22.1 per cent of all wives in dual earner couples have a higher job level than 
their husbands. In Table 2.5 we can see that wives catch up in this respect: there is an increasing 
proportion of couples in which the wife has a higher job level than her husband. For couples 
between the ages of 25 and 40 (which are observed in the youngest three cohorts and not in the 
oldest cohort) the proportion increases from 20.3 to 29.0 per cent, and for couples between the 
ages of 40 and 55 (which are only observed in the oldest three cohorts) from 13.2 to 22.1 per 
cent. Increasing human capital of women is the main force behind this development.  
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Table 2.5 Distribution of husbands’ and wives’ occupational level by birth cohort and age group (percentages, dual worker couples only) 
  COUPLES AGED 25-39   COUPLES AGED 40-55   
  wife            wife             
husband low medium high academic total    low medium high academic total   
all couples                               
low 10.2 10.5 2.6 0.4 23.7 diagonal 43.7 11.2 7.1 1.8 0.3 20.4 diagonal 42.0
medium 11.5 22.5 7.9 1.6 43.5 h>w 31.0 14.2 18.6 6.1 1.1 39.9 h>w 39.8
high 3.0 9.7 8.4 2.2 23.3 w>h 25.3 5.2 10.4 9.2 1.9 26.7 w>h 18.2
academic 0.7 2.9 3.2 2.7 9.4    1.4 3.9 4.7 3.0 13.0   
total 25.3 45.7 22.1 6.9 100 N=71,945  32.0 39.9 21.8 6.3 100 N=59,299 
cohort 1940-1949                             
low         11.4 5.1 1.1 0.2 17.8 diagonal 40.4
medium         17.4 17.7 4.8 0.8 40.7 h>w 46.3
high         7.1 10.2 8.2 1.2 26.8 w>h 13.2
academic         1.9 4.2 5.5 3.1 14.7   
total         37.7 37.3 19.7 5.3 100 N=9,852 
cohort 1950-1959                             
low 10.4 8.4 2.0 0.3 21.2 diagonal 43.7 11.2 7.0 1.9 0.3 20.4 diagonal 42.2
medium 13.0 20.7 6.8 1.1 41.5 h>w 36.0 14.0 18.3 6.2 1.1 39.5 h>w 39.5
high 3.9 10.2 9.8 1.7 25.5 w>h 20.3 5.1 10.3 9.6 1.9 27.0 w>h 18.3
academic 0.8 3.8 4.4 2.9 11.8    1.4 4.0 4.8 3.1 13.2   
total 28.1 43.1 22.9 5.9 100 N=6,239  31.7 39.5 22.5 6.4 100 N=37,787 
cohort 1960-1969                             
low 10.5 10.5 2.3 0.3 23.7 diagonal 44.1 10.9 9.0 2.2 0.5 22.5 diagonal 42.8
medium 11.9 23.0 7.3 1.4 43.7 h>w 31.8 12.1 20.2 6.8 1.3 40.5 h>w 35.1
high 3.0 10.0 8.0 2.2 23.1 w>h 24.1 3.8 11.1 8.8 2.3 26.0 w>h 22.1
academic 0.7 3.1 3.1 2.6 9.5    1.1 3.2 3.9 2.8 11.0   
total 26.1 46.6 20.8 6.5 100 N=43,662  27.9 43.5 21.6 6.9 100 N=11,660 
cohort 1970-1979                             
low 9.4 11.2 3.4 0.6 24.5 diagonal 43.1        
medium 10.3 22.1 9.4 1.9 43.8 h>w 27.9        
high 2.6 9.0 8.7 2.6 23.0 w>h 29.0        
academic 0.5 2.2 3.1 2.8 8.7           
total 22.9 44.6 24.6 7.9 100 N=22,044                 
Source: Labour Force Surveys, 1994-2006; N=131,244 
 
2.3  The association between husbands’ and wives’ labour market participation 
2.3.1  Models 
The association between spouses’ labour market participation cannot be derived from the 
descriptive tables as presented in the prior section for its dependence on the margins. Therefore, 
we will rely on odds ratios to express the association between husbands’ and wives’ labour 
market participation. In order to answer our three research questions, we will present odds ratios 
that are not controlled and controlled for husband’s and wife’s education, and that are broken 
down by cohort and family stage. We use log-linear models that are estimated with the software 
program LEM (Vermunt, 1997). 
We start with simply estimating the parameters of a saturated model with two variables: 
husband’s labour market participation (Ph) and wife’s labour market participation (Pw), which 
gives us the overall odds ratio for all couples. These odds ratios are not controlled for educational 
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homogamy. The pattern of association will be presented by four odds ratios, contrasting (a) non-
employment and employment, (b) non-employment and part-time employment, (c) non-
employment and full-time employment, and (d) part-time employment and full-time employment.  
Before adding the controls for spouses’ education, we first add birth cohort (C) and family 
stage (F) and estimate the parameters of a saturated model with these four variables. This model 
reproduces the net association between the spouses’ labour market participation controlled for 
cohort and family stage. The odds ratios for all couples and the odds ratios broken down by 
cohort and family stage are shown in the upper panel of Table 2.6. The left column (labelled all 
couples) presents the four selected odds ratios between the labour market participation of spouses 
broken down by family stage but not by cohort. These results come from a model in which the 
table is collapsed over cohorts. The upper row for each contrast (labelled total) presents the odds 
ratios broken down by cohort, but not by family stage, based on a model in which the table is 
collapsed over the two categories of family stage. 
Finally, we add controls for husband’s and wife’s education to this model (Eh and Ew). 
We estimate all interactions of the four-way tables [PhPwCF] and [EhEwCF], which ensures that 
educational homogamy is included in the model together with variations in homogamy over the 
life cycle and over cohorts; we include [EhPhCF] and [EwPwCF] to control for the individual 
level associations between education and labour market participation (with variations of these 
associations over cohort and family stage); and we add [EhPwCF] and [EwPhCF], which control 
for cross-over effects of the educational attainment of one spouse to the labour market 
participation of the other spouse (and again variations). Figure 2.1 gives a schematic 
representation of the assumed causal relationships between husbands’ and wives’ schooling and 
labour market participation (for simplicity reasons, cohort and age are not included in the 
diagram). In short, this model presents the association between spouses’ labour market 
participation with controls for the by-product of educational homogamy (continuous arrows) and 
educational cross-over effects (interrupted arrows). 
 
education husband      labour market position husband 
 
 
 
 
 
education wife       labour market position wife 
 
Figure 2.1 Causal diagram with husband’s and wife’s education and labour market position; by-product expressed by continuous arrows, 
partner effects by interrupted arrows 
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2.3.2  Results 
Firstly, we discuss the odds ratios that are not controlled for spouses’ education, which are 
displayed in the upper panel of Table 2.6. The odds ratios validate earlier research that there is a 
positive association between the (non-)employment of husbands and wives. On average, wives of 
non-employed men have a 2.46 higher odds to be non-employed than employed when compared 
to wives of employed men. The association between non-employment and employment is 
particularly strong when we look at part-time employment (odds ratio is 4.23 on average), and 
smaller when we look at full-time employment (odds ratio is 1.44 on average). It is interesting to 
note that there is no association between part-time employment and full-time employment for all 
couples together, as a result of two opposite associations: the association is positive for couples 
without children and negative for couples with children. This resembles typical work 
arrangements: both spouses in couples without children tend to work in full-time jobs (odds ratio 
is 1.53 on average), whereas the working arrangements of couples with children are often one 
part-time job and one full-time job (odds ratio is 0.61 on average). In other words, economic 
theory that predicts a negative association between spouses’ working hours only finds support 
among dual worker couples with children; it is proven wrong when it comes to non-employment 
and employment and where childless couples are concerned. 
In the lower panel of Table 2.6, we present an answer to the question to what extent the 
association between spouses’ labour market participation is explained by educational homogamy. 
The evidence for the explanatory power of educational homogamy is mixed. The overall odds 
ratio between non-employment and employment, for example, drops from 2.46 to 1.86, which 
means that 24 per cent of the association is explained. The positive odds ratio between non-
employment and full-time employment disappears after controlling for education. For couples 
with children, however, this odds ratio becomes more negative; apparently, educational 
homogamy suppressed the association. The reason for this is that highly educated couples have a 
relatively high tendency to be dual full-time couples (Van Gils & Kraaykamp, 2008), also when 
they have children, though to a much lesser extent. The association between part-time and full-
time employment of husband and wife seems to be not so much a by-product of educational 
homogamy; the odds ratios do not differ much between the two panels. 
Finally, for conclusions about historical developments in the association between spouses’ 
labour market participation, we look at the four far-most columns. In general, the association 
between husbands’ and wives’ labour market participation increases over birth cohorts, also when 
we control for couples’ family stage. This indicates that spouses born in the seventies are 
becoming more similar to each other with regard to labour market participation than spouses born 
in the forties. It is clear that this has important consequences for social stratification; specifically, 
this entails that inequality between households is increasing.  
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Table 2.6 Observed odds ratios of husbands’ and wives’ labour market participation by birth cohort and 
 family stage, not controlled and controlled for education 
not controlled for education a) all couples 1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 
non-employed v. employed total 2.46 1.96 1.89 2.80 3.85 
 no child 3.55 2.22 2.39 4.19 3.76 
 child 2.34 1.81 1.85 2.80 3.89 
       
non-employed v. part-time total 4.23 2.40 3.49 6.35 5.73 
 no child 3.77 2.58 3.49 5.21 3.22 
 child 4.65 2.26 3.51 6.68 7.14 
       
non-employed v. full-time total 1.44 1.27 0.81 1.39 3.11 
 no child 3.68 1.70 1.82 3.89 4.00 
 child 0.74 1.04 0.64 0.71 1.18 
       
part-time v. full-time total 0.99 0.78 0.73 1.01 1.41 
 no child 1.53 0.89 1.21 1.54 1.48 
 child 0.61 0.73 0.61 0.55 0.81 
controlled for education b)           
non-employed v. employed total 1.86 1.64 1.55 2.02 2.51 
 no child 2.62 1.93 1.98 3.17 2.89 
 child 1.77 1.47 1.50 1.99 2.48 
       
non-employed v. part-time total 2.65 1.82 2.20 3.41 3.27 
 no child 2.81 2.11 2.63 3.95 2.85 
 child 2.58 1.60 2.10 3.36 3.44 
       
non-employed v. full-time total 1.01 1.03 0.69 0.99 1.92 
 no child 2.53 1.47 1.41 2.72 3.23 
 child 0.62 0.80 0.56 0.61 0.84 
       
part-time v. full-time total 1.10 0.83 0.81 1.14 1.70 
 no child 1.57 0.92 1.34 1.66 1.54 
  child 0.70 0.79 0.67 0.63 1.04 
a) [PhPwCF], with Ph=Labour market participation husband, Pw=Labour market participation wife, C=birth cohort, F=family stage 
b) [PhPwCF, EhEwCF, EhPhCF, EwPwCF, EhPwCF, EwPhCF], with Ph=Labour market participation husband, Pw=Labour market 
participation wife, C=birth cohort, F=family stage, Eh=Education husband, Ew=Education wife 
Source: Labour Force Surveys, 1994-2006; N=234,688 
 
2.4  The association between husbands’ and wives’ occupations 
We show the association between spouses’ occupations first in a descriptive manner by means of 
odds ratios and then in a more extended form (that also includes controls for age and education) 
by showing results of log-linear modelling. Table 2.7 presents observed odds ratios for spouses’ 
job levels, categorized in low, medium, high, and academic. The first observation is that all odds 
ratios are larger than one, which implies that favourable labour market positions are accumulated 
within households. The strength of the association is considerable, for example, compared to a 
woman with a medium-level job, a woman with a high job level is 2.56 times as likely to be 
married to a husband with a high job level than to a husband with a medium job level. Also, a 
woman with an academic-level job is more than 13 times as likely to have an academic husband 
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than a husband with a medium-level job, when compared to a woman with a medium-level job. 
The odds ratios are higher when the distance in occupational level becomes larger. Furthermore, 
the results in Table 2.7 suggest that the association in spouses’ job levels is stronger at higher 
levels than at lower levels (3.07 for high versus academic and 1.93 for low versus medium), 
which implies that there is more openness in the lower strata. 
The second observation based on the odds ratios presented in Table 2.7 is that there seems 
to be a downward trend in the association between spouses’ occupational levels over birth 
cohorts. The odds ratios that refer to adjacent categories (low versus medium, medium versus 
high, and high versus academic) have become weaker over time. We must be cautious with 
drawing strong conclusions based on these odds ratios because they do not control for the 
different age compositions of the cohorts in our data set. We will take care of this in the log-linear 
models that will be discussed below. 
 
Table 2.7 Observed odds ratios of husbands’ and wives’ occupational level 
 (dual worker couples only) 
  all couples 1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 
low v. medium 1.93 2.27 2.08 1.94 1.81 
medium v. high 2.56 3.00 2.80 2.48 2.28 
high v. academic 3.07 3.75 3.30 2.99 3.12 
low v. high 10.35 11.41 11.35 11.86 9.19 
low v. academic 82.81 115.68 81.12 97.57 90.90 
medium v. academic 13.23 15.75 13.35 13.60 14.49 
Source: Labour Force Surveys, 1994-2006; N=131,244 
 
2.4.1  Models 
We will first explain the log-linear models before turning to the results. We model the six-way 
table of husband’s and wife’s educational attainment, birth cohort, age, and husband’s and wife’s 
occupation (15x15x4x2x47x47) with log-linear scaled row-column association models (Hout, 
1984). These models provide a single parameter for the association between husbands’ and 
wives’ occupational statuses, denoted as (phi). We scale each of the 47 occupational categories 
with the standardized average ISEI score of all detailed occupations in that particular category. 
For this purpose we use the International Socioeconomic Index, as constructed by Ganzeboom, de 
Graaf, and Treiman (1992). Detailed information on the 47 occupational categories and its 
corresponding mean and standardized ISEI score is presented in Appendix A. The ISEI-scaling 
approach assumes a symmetric relationship between the occupations of husbands (Oh) and wives 
(Ow), which means that the relative propensity for a couple with occupations 1 and 2 is equal to 
the relative propensity for a couple with occupations 2 and 1, given the different marginal 
distributions for husbands and wives. The advantage of using the ISEI-scaling is that the 
association parameter can be interpreted in terms of spouses’ occupational levels. In addition, the 
association parameters can be compared straightforwardly between models and cohorts. 
In order to provide a detailed answer to our first research question about the association 
between spouses’ occupations, we use log-linear modelling to break down the occupational 
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association in several elements, as is the practice in much research on intergenerational 
occupational mobility (Hout, 1983). We consider three aspects of the association between 
husbands’ and wives’ occupations, which will be modelled in three subsequent steps: (a) a 
general association; (b) a tendency that both partners have occupations on a low, medium, high, 
or academic level (four level-diagonal); and (c) a tendency that both partners have occupations in 
the exact same occupational category (47 cells-diagonal). 
Our first model estimates one parameter for the association between husband’s and wife’s 
occupations. The four-way association between both spouses’ educational attainments, birth 
cohort, and age [EhEwCA], and the three-way associations between birth cohort, age, and 
occupation (of husband and wife) [CAOh] and [CAOw] are saturated, which implies that we 
allow for all interactions between cohort, age, and spouses’ education, and between cohort, age, 
and occupation. In this model, we define no relationship between educational attainment and 
occupation, which means that the association between spouses’ occupations is not controlled for 
educational homogamy. In formula: 
 
ln [...] EhEwCA CAOh CAOwijklmn ijkl klm kln m nF λ λ λ λ ϕ= + + + + + Oh Ow       (1) 
 
for all i = 1,…,15; j = 1,…,15; k = 1,…,4; l = 1,2; m = l,…,47; n = 1,…,47 
[...] all lower order terms are included, but only highest order terms are shown in (1) 
 
In the second step, this model is extended with diagonal effects. Model 2 includes four diagonal 
parameters for the occupational levels (1=low, 2=middle, 3=high, 4=academic), which are areas 
in the square table that represent the same job level (see appendix B for a presentation). In the 
final step, we also include parameters for all 47 diagonal cells in Model 3; the contrast with 
Model 2 will inform us whether the association between spouses’ occupations is not covered by 
the four level-diagonal model. In formula, Models 2 and 3 are as follows: 
 
 ln [...] EhEwCA CAOh CAOwijklmn ijkl klm kln m n qsF Oh Owλ λ λ λ ϕ= + + + + + +δ     (2) 
 
 ln [...] EhEwCA CAOh CAOwijklmn ijkl klm kln m n qs mnF Oh Owλ λ λ λ ϕ δ= + + + + + + +δ    (3) 
 
for all i = 1,…,15; j = 1,…,15; k = 1,…,4; l = 1,2; m = l,…,47; n = 1,…,47; q = 1,…4; s = 1,…4 
 if 
0 if otherwise
 if 
0 if otherwise
qs
qs
mn
mn
q s
m n
δδ
δδ
⎧ =⎪⎨⎪⎩
⎧ =⎨⎩
 
[...] all lower order terms are included, but only highest order terms are shown in (2) and (3) 
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In order to provide an answer to our second research question, we test to what extent the 
association between spouses’ occupations is the result of educational homogamy. For that 
purpose, we add parameters for the saturated relationship between the individual effects and 
cross-effects of husband’s and wife’s education and occupation [EhOh, EwOw, EhOw, EwOh] to 
Models 1 to 3 and test how much of the original association as estimated in all prior models is 
explained. Model 1, including the mechanism of educational homogamy, is presented in formula 
4; Models 2 and 3 are extended in the same way. 
 
 ln [...] EhEwCA CAOh CAOw EhOh EwOw EhOw EwOhijklmn ijkl klm kln im jn in jm m nF Oλ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ ϕ= + + + + + + + + + h Ow  (4) 
 
for all i = 1,…,15; j = 1,…,15; k = 1,…,4; l = 1,2; m = l,…,47; n = 1,…,47 
[...] all lower order terms are included, but only highest order terms are shown in (4) 
 
Finally, our third research question emphasizes our interest in trends in the association of 
husbands’ and wives’ occupations over cohorts. Therefore, we will estimate Models 1 to 3 again, 
but this time, we let the association parameter, the four level-diagonal parameters, and the 47 
cells-diagonal parameters vary over cohorts. We will explore all possible combinations of cohort-
constant and cohort-varying parameters in these three elements of the occupational association. 
Comparisons of the model fit will make clear whether significant differences between cohorts in 
one or more of these elements exist. Because differences in the association between cohorts 
reflect to some extent differences in association between age groups, we estimate the three 
models for couples of 40 years or older and couples younger than 40 years separately. In the 
oldest age group, birth cohorts 1940-1949, 1950-1959, and 1960-1969 are represented 
(N=59,299); the youngest age group covers the birth cohorts 1950-1959, 1960-1969, and 1970-
1979 (N=71,945).  
 
2.4.2  Results 
Table 2.8 presents the model fits of the log-linear models that refer to all couples. Since we 
analyse very large numbers of cases, we use BIC statistics to draw conclusions on model fits 
comparisons. Firstly, we discuss models without controls for educational homogamy. Adding the 
four level-diagonal (Model 2) and the 47 cells-diagonal (Model 3) improves the fit of Model 1 
that only specified a general association parameter. The BIC statistic of Model 3 is more negative 
than the BIC statistic of Model 2, and must therefore be preferred. In summary, the association 
between husbands’ and wives’ occupational association is best described as follows: husbands 
and wives have a tendency to work in the exact same occupational category, but if they are not, 
they are likely to work on the same occupational level, and—if they are not on the diagonals—
they tend to have status scores that are close to each other. 
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Table 2.8 Fit statistics for association models for husbands’ and wives’ occupational level, not controlled and controlled for 
 husbands’ and wives’ education (best fitting model according to BIC in boldface) 
    not controlled for education   controlled for education 
    G2 df BIC   G2 df BIC 
1 association with ISEI scaling 517,528 3,973,663 -46,311,350 191,244 3,971,087 -46,607,275 
         
2 1 + diagonal for 4 occupational levels 514,985 3,973,659 -46,313,845 190,958 3,971,083 -46,607,514 
         
3 2 + diagonal for 47 occupational cells 500,150 3,973,612 -46,328,126  179,274 3,971,036 -46,618,645 
Source: Labour Force Surveys, 1994-2006; N=131,244 
 
In Figure 2.2, we see the association parameters (phi) as estimated in Models 1 to 3. The 
association parameter represents the odds ratio of two occupations that are 1 scaling apart. The 
average low-level job and the average medium-level job are about one scaling apart, so husbands 
with an average low-level job are about 27 times more likely to be married to a wife with an 
average low-level job than to a wife with an average medium-level job, compared to husbands 
with an average medium-level job. If we consider that the imputed standardized mean ISEI scores 
range from -1.79 to 1.47, the association between spouses’ occupations is considerable: the 
maximum odds ratio between husbands and wives with the lowest and highest occupational level 
in terms of ISEI is 87 (3.26*26.8). 
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Figure 2.2 Estimated association parameters for husbands’ and wives’ occupational level, not controlled and controlled for husbands’ and 
wives’ education (Models 1, 2, and 3 correspond with the models defined in Table 2.8) 
 
If separate effects for four homogeneous levels are included, the association parameter logically 
drops: the association between spouses’ occupations is for twenty per cent due to spouses who 
both have a low, medium, high, or academic job (phi declines from 26.8 in Model 1 to 21.5 in 
Model 2). Another six per cent can be explained by spouses who work in the exact same 
occupational category (phi=19.9 in Model 3). The diagonal parameters (shown in appendix C) 
reveal that especially people in academic professions have a strong tendency to marry someone 
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with a similar occupational level (0.74), but this tendency is entirely the result of educational 
homogamy (-0.04 when controlled for education). People with a medium-level occupation are 
less likely to have spouses with the same job level than with another job level (-0.19). Despite the 
clear importance of the diagonal in our homogamy tables, the fact that three-quarters of the 
association remains after taking the diagonal effects into account, suggests that most of the 
association between spouses’ occupational achievement comes from the tendency to have job 
levels close to each other, but not exactly similar. 
Our second question concerns the degree in which the association between spouses’ 
occupations can be attributed to educational homogamy. In Figure 2.2, we can see the association 
between spouses’ occupational achievement if spouses’ education is held constant. Not 
surprisingly, spouses’ education is an important contributor to the association in occupational 
achievement: it explains about half of the association (from 26.8 to 12.9 in Model 1), and 63 per 
cent of the association that exists apart from the rough four level-diagonal and exact 47 cells-
diagonal (from 19.9 to 7.4 in Model 3). However, what is more interesting in our view is the fact 
that still forty to fifty per cent of the association between spouses’ occupational success is not due 
to educational homogamy or educational partner effects. This result implies that the occupational 
association between spouses covers much more than educational homogamy. And thus, we argue 
that research on couples’ occupations—occupation being a more direct indicator for social 
position—provides a more accurate picture of social inequality between households than research 
on couples’ education only. Further research is needed to explain the rest of the association 
between spouses’ occupations. 
Finally, the results of our test whether or not spouses’ occupational association has 
changed over birth cohorts are shown in Table 2.9. In contrast with our preliminary results from 
the descriptive odds ratios in Table 2.7, we have to conclude that there are no significant cohort 
differences in either the association parameter, the four level-diagonal, or the 47 cells-diagonal1. 
According to the fit statistics, Model 1a has to be preferred over Model 1b for both age groups, 
indicating that the difference in the association parameter between cohorts is non-significant; the 
same is true for the diagonal effects. The best fitting model remains the model in which we define 
a general association model on top of a four level-diagonal and the 47-cells diagonal. Conclusions 
are no different if the model controls for educational homogamy (not shown). We therefore have 
to conclude that these elements of the occupational association of spouses have not changed 
significantly when couples born between 1940 and 1979 are considered, and that the suggested 
decline in the odds ratios (based on only four occupational levels) as shown in Table 2.7 does not 
represent a truly significant trend. 
                                                 
1 A unidif model over cohorts indicates that there is a downward trend in the association between husband’s and 
wife’s occupation. For couples of 40 years or older, the association parameter in the 1950-1959 cohort is 90 per cent 
and in the 1960-1969 cohort 86 per cent of the association in the 1940-1949 cohort; for the younger age group, the 
association in the 1960-1969 cohort is 97 per cent and in the 1970-1979 cohort 90 per cent of the association in the 
1950-1959 cohort. This reduction appears to be significant when tested against a social fluidity model. Apparently, 
this trend is not sufficiently represented by the three elements of spouses’ occupational association that we study. 
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Table 2.9 Fit statistics for association models for husbands’ and wives’ occupational level by cohort for couples aged 25-39 and couples 
aged 40-55 (best fitting model according to BIC in boldface) 
    couples aged 25-39   couples aged 40-55 
    G2 df BIC   G2 df BIC 
1a association with ISEI scaling 279,586 1,490,123 -16,385,439 237,934 1,490,123 -16,139,036
1b association with ISEI scaling over cohorts 279,582 1,490,121 -16,385,421 237,929 1,490,121 -16,139,019
         
2a 1a + diagonal for 4 occupational levels 278,272 1,490,119 -16,386,708 236,702 1,490,119 -16,140,224
2b 1a + diagonal for 4 occupational levels over cohorts 278,260 1,490,111 -16,386,630 236,685 1,490,111 -16,140,153
2c 1b + diagonal for 4 occupational levels 278,268 1,490,117 -16,386,690 236,693 1,490,117 -16,140,211
2d 1b + diagonal for 4 occupational levels over cohorts 278,257 1,490,109 -16,386,611 236,678 1,490,109 -16,140,138
         
3a 2a + diagonal for 47 occupational cells 271,697 1,490,072 -16,392,758  228,215 1,490,072 -16,148,194
3b 2a + diagonal for 47 occupational cells over cohorts 271,494 1,489,978 -16,391,909 228,054 1,489,978 -16,147,322
3c 2b + diagonal for 47 occupational cells 271,689 1,490,064 -16,392,676 228,201 1,490,064 -16,148,120
3d 2b + diagonal for 47 occupational cells over cohorts 271,482 1,489,970 -16,391,832 228,028 1,489,970 -16,147,260
3e 2c + diagonal for 47 occupational cells 271,694 1,490,070 -16,392,738 228,209 1,490,070 -16,148,179
3f 2c + diagonal for 47 occupational cells over cohorts 271,493 1,489,976 -16,391,888 228,051 1,489,976 -16,147,303
3g 2d + diagonal for 47 occupational cells 271,686 1,490,062 -16,392,656 228,195 1,490,062 -16,148,105
3h 2d + diagonal for 47 occupational cells over cohorts 271,480 1,489,968 -16,391,812  228,023 1,489,968 -16,147,244
Source: Labour Force Surveys, 1994-2006; N=131,244 (N=71,945 younger than 40 years; N=59,299 40 years or older) 
 
2.5  Conclusion 
This study aims at describing the association between spouses’ labour market participation and 
occupational success, to detect possible trends in these associations, and to establish the extent to 
which the occupational association exists on top of educational homogamy. Its merits lie in the 
contribution to our knowledge about the association between labour market characteristics of 
spouses that have a decisive impact on the socio-economic inequality between households. 
Our first conclusion is that spouses’ labour market participation and occupational 
achievement are positively associated. The implication of this finding is that resources are 
accumulated within households, increasing the socio-economic distance between couples. 
Negative associations between spouses’ labour market participation are found among couples 
with children, indicating that couples divide paid labour when children are present. This means 
that economic theory is largely proven wrong, but finds some support as far as dual worker 
couples with children are concerned. 
Secondly, educational homogamy is responsible for a considerable part of the association 
between spouses’ labour market participation, for example because highly educated couples 
consist more often of two full-timers, and choose less often for a traditional breadwinner 
household when children are present. However, the tendency that either both persons in a couple 
are employed or non-employed is not merely a representation of educational homogamy; the 
unexplained association indicates that more factors play a role in the association between 
husbands’ and wives’ labour market participation, for instance partner effects during the 
relationship. In addition, educational homogamy explains about half of the association of 
spouses’ occupational status. Simultaneously, this means that half of the association between 
spouses’ occupational success cannot be attributed to their education. We interpret this result as 
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an encouragement to study couples’ occupational characteristics in research on social inequality, 
and to search for other mechanisms that drive this association. 
Thirdly, the association between spouses’ labour market participation seems to have 
become more positive over time, whereas the association between spouses’ occupational success 
has remained stable. In other words, the difference in the number of working hours between 
households becomes larger, but the degree of accumulation of labour market success remains the 
same. Together, these two processes form evidence of some increase in social inequality.  
There are several alternative explanations for the substantial part of the association 
between partners’ labour market positions that cannot be attributed to their educational 
achievements. We expect assortative mating on occupation to be a very important candidate. 
Other forms of homogamy, like age homogamy, may also explain part of the association. 
Furthermore, we believe that the ways in which partners affect each others’ careers might be 
important. In our models, educational partner effects are included, but there may be others as 
well, especially occupational partner effects. Spouses do not only benefit from each others’ 
educations, but from all possible resources, like each others’ social capital in a broader sense.  
Future research should investigate the importance of these alternative explanations in 
order to better understand the origin of the occupational association, and thus, of social 
inequalities between couples. A historical approach would be preferable; although the overall 
association between spouses’ labour market success has not changed over time, the impact of the 
underlying mechanisms might have. Extension of our knowledge about the association between 
spouses’ labour market participation and occupational success in other countries is another way 
of making progress in this field of study. Such comparisons can make clear whether the findings 
in this study are typically Dutch or whether the findings are generally true. On the one hand, the 
Netherlands are unique with respect to the huge number of part-time jobs. On the other hand, 
general economic and cultural developments that may influence spouses’ labour market 
characteristics are rather universal. Therefore, the picture that emerges from this study is perhaps 
not that country-specific. 
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Appendix A 
Occupational categories with corresponding (standardized) ISEI score and distribution for husbands and wives 
(dual worker couples only) 
            husbands  wives 
sbc92 a)   ISEI
standar-
dized ISEI   
average 
ISEI N %   
average 
ISEI N % 
  low occupations    33 29,182 22.2  38 37,153 28.3
11 (1) elementary occupations 28 -1.79   4,925 3.8   8,477 6.5
20 (2) without further information 39 -1.01   47 0.0   63 0.0
21 (3) not specialist 47 -0.44   74 0.1   136 0.1
22 (4) teachers 54 0.05   64 0.0   144 0.1
24 (5) agrarian 30 -1.65   1,607 1.2   1,292 1.0
25 (6) mathematic, physics 43 -0.73   27 0.0   71 0.1
26 (7) technical 32 -1.51   11,156 8.5   2,099 1.6
28 (8) transport 32 -1.51   5,904 4.5   775 0.6
29 (9) (para)medical 37 -1.15   98 0.1   691 0.5
31 (10) clerical, commercial 47 -0.44   3,496 2.7   17,954 13.7
33 (11) security 40 -0.94   1,057 0.8   179 0.1
37 (12) care-giving 30 -1.65   727 0.6   5,272 4.0
  medium occupations    46 54,951 41.9 46 56,533 43.1
40 (13) without further information 47 -0.44   215 0.2   190 0.1
42 (14) teachers 55 0.12   459 0.3   219 0.2
44 (15) agrarian 52 -0.09   3,666 2.8   1,587 1.2
45 (16) mathematic, physics 48 -0.37   280 0.2   274 0.2
46 (17) technical 41 -0.87   22,320 17.0  1,592 1.2
48 (18) transport 46 -0.51   1,283 1.0   659 0.5
49 (19) (para)medical 42 -0.80   1,335 1.0   12,661 9.6
51 (20) clerical, commercial 50 -0.23   18,484 14.1  26,375 20.1
53 (21) juridical, governmental, security 55 0.12   2,987 2.3   975 0.7
55 (22) linguistic, cultural 43 -0.73   523 0.4   644 0.5
56 (23) behaviour and society 48 -0.37   855 0.7   2,231 1.7
57 (24) care-giving 41 -0.87   2,544 1.9   9,126 7.0
  high occupations    62 32,628 24.9 62 28,861 22.0
60 (25) without further information 60 0.55   610 0.5   351 0.3
62 (26) pedagogical 68 1.05   4,411 3.4   8,936 6.8
64 (27) agricultural 61 0.55   488 0.4   127 0.1
65 (28) mathematic, physics 52 -0.09   245 0.2   159 0.1
66 (29) technical 60 0.48   4,108 3.1   456 0.3
68 (30) transport 59 0.41   477 0.4   49 0.0
69 (31) (para)medical 53 -0.02   1,431 1.1   5,602 4.3
71 (32) clerical, commercial 62 0.62   15,045 11.5  7,298 5.6
73 (33) juridical, governmental, security 72 1.33   791 0.6   277 0.2
75 (34) linguistic, cultural 61 0.55   1,040 0.8   1,239 0.9
76 (35) behaviour and society 62 0.62   2,309 1.8   3,693 2.8
77 (36) care-giving 47 -0.44   129 0.1   375 0.3
78 (37) managers 66 0.90   1,544 1.2   299 0.2
  academic occupations    71 14,483 11.0 72 8,697 6.6
80 (38) without further information 72 1.33   619 0.5   401 0.3
82 (39) pedagogical 71 1.26   1,933 1.5   1,769 1.3
84 (40) agricultural 74 1.47   94 0.1   42 0.0
85 (41) mathematic, physics 74 1.47   472 0.4   136 0.1
86 (42) technical 68 1.05   1,457 1.1   282 0.2
89 (43) (para)medical 80 1.90   1,708 1.3   1,478 1.1
91 (44) clerical, commercial, economic 71 1.26   2,997 2.3   1,122 0.9
93 (45) juridical, governmental, security 74 1.47   1,422 1.1   1,255 1.0
96 (46) behaviour and society 65 0.83   1,002 0.8   1,148 0.9
98 (47) managers 68 1.05     2,779 2.1     1,064 0.8
    total       50 131,244 100   49 131,244 100 
a) sbc92 = Standard Occupational Classification 1992, Statistics Netherlands 
Source: Labour Force Surveys, 1994-2006; N=131,244 
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Appendix B 
Design matrix for 4-level diagonal of husbands’ and wives’ occupational level 
 
See next page 
 46
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
1 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 0 
2 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 0 
3 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 0 
4 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 0 
5 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 0 
6 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 0 
7 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 0 
8 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 0 
9 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 0 
10 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 0 
11 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 0 
12 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 0 
13 0 0 0 0  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 0 
14 0 0 0 0  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 0 
15 0 0 0 0  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 0 
16 0 0 0 0  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 0 
17 0 0 0 0  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 0 
18 0 0 0 0  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 0 
19 0 0 0 0  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 0 
20 0 0 0 0  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 0 
21 0 0 0 0  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 0 
22 0 0 0 0  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 0 
23 0 0 0 0  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 0 
24 0 0 0 0  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 0 
25 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
26 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
27 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
28 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
29 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
30 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
31 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
32 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
33 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
34 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
35 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
36 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
37 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
38 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
39 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
40 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
41 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
42 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
43 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
44 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
45 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
46 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
47 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
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Appendix C 
Diagonal parameter estimates for husbands’ and wives’ occupational level (off-diagonal 
is reference category; parameter estimates of cells with fewer than 10 cases are not shown) 
    
not controlled for 
education a) 
controlled for 
education b) N diagonal
low 0.47 0.19 13,944 
medium -0.19 -0.13 27,214 
high 0.09 0.04 11,502 
academic 0.74 -0.04 3,723 
elementary occupations 0.46 0.53 1,083 
without further information   2 
not specialist   3 
teachers   1 
agrarian 1.21 1.19 102 
mathematic, physics   0 
technical 0.44 0.48 503 
transport 1.19 1.22 189 
(para)medical   5 
clerical, commercial 0.14 0.20 749 
security 2.20 2.06 19 
lo
w
 
care-giving 1.48 1.72 211 
without further information   4 
teachers 4.61 4.46 58 
agrarian 4.95 4.75 1,205 
mathematic, physics 3.23 2.82 15 
technical 0.92 0.99 641 
transport 2.45 2.47 72 
(para)medical 1.09 1.00 380 
clerical, commercial 0.37 0.27 5,233 
juridical, governmental, security 2.52 2.28 228 
linguistic, cultural 2.58 2.69 36 
behaviour and society 1.47 1.36 66 
m
ed
iu
m
 
care-giving 1.53 1.74 749 
without further information 1.77 1.82 13 
pedagogical 1.05 1.00 1,358 
agricultural   9 
mathematic, physics 3.51 2.16 11 
technical 1.31 1.22 67 
transport 4.12 3.73 12 
(para)medical 1.72 1.24 323 
clerical, commercial 0.49 0.50 1,817 
juridical, governmental, security  9 
linguistic, cultural 2.79 2.35 173 
behaviour and society 1.20 0.88 274 
care-giving   6 
hi
gh
 
managers 1.40 1.70 25 
without further information 1.75 1.14 37 
pedagogical 0.92 0.56 214 
agricultural   2 
mathematic, physics 2.23 1.27 16 
technical 1.80 1.28 51 
(para)medical 1.79 2.18 432 
clerical, commercial, economic 0.54 0.49 156 
juridical, governmental, security 1.47 1.32 196 
behaviour and society 1.74 0.84 109 
ac
ad
em
ic
 
managers -0.09 0.39 72 
a) based on Model 3, not controlled for education 
b) based on Model 3, controlled for education 
Source: Labour Force Surveys, 1994-2006; N=131,244 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Partner effects on labour market participation and job 
level: opposing mechanisms and their combined effect 
on income (cohorts 1940 – 1974) 
 
 
This chapter investigates how and to what extent the human capital of the spouse affects labour 
market participation (working hours), job level (wage rate), and income (the product of hours 
and wage). Theoretically, we expect that there are two mechanisms at work: a restrictive 
mechanism based on economic incentives and a supportive mechanism based on social capital. 
The large-scale Labour Force Surveys conducted by Statistics Netherlands from 1977 onwards 
indeed show that partner’s human capital has a negative influence on labour market 
participation and a positive influence on job level (imputed hourly wage). Over birth cohorts, the 
restrictive effect on labour market participation has become stronger for males and weaker for 
females, whereas the supportive effect on job level has decreased for both men and women. As a 
result, the association between spouses’ income levels has declined. 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Does human capital of the spouse or partner help or hinder one’s labour market career? The 
literature reports conflicting ideas on this subject: economic theory expects a negative 
relationship due to financial incentives, whereas a positive relationship can be expected from a 
social capital point of view. These opposing expectations make it unclear, beforehand, what 
consequences the human capital of the spouse has for labour market outcomes. In this study, we 
set out to unravel these conflicting mechanisms in order to better understand the 
interdependencies between spouses’ labour market careers. For this purpose, we argue that it is 
essential to decompose labour market outcomes into labour market participation (number of 
working hours) and job level (expressed by imputed hourly wage), because we expect negative 
partner effects to be particularly relevant for labour market participation and positive partner 
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effects for job level. Furthermore, we will examine the net result of these opposing effects by 
focusing on income, which is the product of working hours and job level. 
The extent to which spouses increase or decrease each others’ incomes is relevant with 
respect to social inequality between households. In earlier days, household income was 
determined by the husband’s career, because wives usually did not work. With the huge increase 
of working women, household income now is determined by the labour market careers of both 
spouses (Blossfeld & Drobnič, 2001). As a consequence, it is very important to take into account 
that inequality between households depends on the association between spouses’ incomes: a 
positive association between spouses’ income levels implies accumulation of income sources 
within the household. Moreover, the stronger the association, the higher the degree of inequality 
between couples. A negative income association flattens inequality on the household level. 
The association between spouses’ income levels is the sum of two different processes: (a) 
homogamy that leads to similarity in resources, and (b) the positive and negative effects partners 
have on each others’ career outcomes. Homogamy, especially with respect to education and 
occupation, contributes to a positive association between spouses’ income levels (ceteris paribus). 
The consequences of the effects partners have one each others’ career decisions are not clear. The 
existing literature offers arguments for both restrictive and supportive partner effects, which 
would result in a negative and positive association between spouses’ income levels, respectively. 
On the one hand, economic theory predicts restrictive partner effects, because a partner who is 
successful on the labour market reduces the financial incentives of the other partner to work long 
hours or to put effort into a career. On the other hand, it is also plausible to expect that there are 
some positive effects of the human capital of one’s partner, due to effects of social capital. 
Spouses, especially the ones with high levels of human capital, may be able to help each other to 
get better jobs (Lin, Vaughn, & Ensel, 1981). In addition, level of schooling might represent a 
non-traditional attitude towards the sexual division of labour. Therefore, a highly educated 
husband might stimulate his wife’s career, whereas a highly educated wife might hinder her 
husband’s career (Bernasco, 1994).  
We are interested in the extent to which these conflicting mechanisms are at work, and 
what the net effects of the spouse’s human capital are on the other spouse’s income level. 
Because we expect the negative influence mechanism to be mainly valid for labour market 
participation decisions, and the positive influence mechanisms for job level, we believe it is 
necessary to disentangle effects on working hours and job level. Our first research question reads: 
To what extent does spouse’s human capital positively or negatively affect labour market 
participation and job level, and what is the effect of spouse’s human capital on the product of 
working hours and job level (income)? 
In addition, we will perform a cohort analysis. The issue of interdependencies between 
spouses’ labour market careers has become more and more of interest because of the steep rise in 
female labour market participation and the greater importance of the association between 
spouses’ labour market careers for social inequality. By examining changes over time, we hope to 
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gain more insight into the historical development of the ways in which spouses affect each others’ 
labour market careers and into the importance of these partner effects for social inequality. 
Therefore, our second research question is: To what extent has the influence of spouse’s human 
capital on labour market participation and job level, and on the combination of the two, i.e. 
income, changed over time? 
 
3.2  Hypotheses on partner effects 
3.2.1  Restriction, support, and values 
Working hours and job level strongly determine available time and income, and it is exactly these 
two matters that are necessary for running a household. As a result, human capital of both 
partners is assumed to have an impact on individual labour market outcomes (Bernasco, 1994; 
Blossfeld & Drobnič, 2001). Conflicting hypotheses about the direction of this impact exist, and 
we propose three theoretical interpretations of the effect of partner’s human capital, referring to 
economic, social, and cultural interpretations. We will refine these general hypotheses by relating 
them to two specific career components: labour market participation and job level. We consider 
educational attainment and (imputed) hourly wage as indicators of partner’s human capital. 
Based on economic theory, we expect human capital of one partner to negatively affect 
the labour market career of the other partner. New home economists reason that specialization of 
tasks, in which the spouse with highest earning capacities does paid labour and the other unpaid 
labour, is the most optimal situation for a household (Becker, 1981). This implies that the partner 
with the highest level of human capital is a restriction to the labour market career of the other. 
The economic idea has also been translated into more general terms, which we will use in this 
study: if one partner is successful on the labour market (indicated by a high level of human 
capital), the other has no financial incentives to work long hours or to put much effort into his or 
her career; and also, someone whose partner has a successful career can afford to have a less 
successful career (Bernardi, 1999; Bernasco, de Graaf, & Ultee, 1998; Hendrickx, Bernasco, & de 
Graaf, 2001; Sørensen, 1983). Support for the restrictive effect of spouses on labour market 
careers has been found in earlier studies (Bernasco, de Graaf, & Ultee, 1998; Henz & Sundström, 
2001; Van der Lippe, 1993; Sundström & Duvander, 2002). 
 We suggest a refinement of this economic interpretation that helps us to better understand 
how labour market careers of spouses are interrelated. In general, the economic interpretation 
applies to all aspects of labour market careers, but we expect it to be especially relevant for the 
number of working hours and not so much for job level. Couples can handle only a maximum 
number of working hours (although this maximum can differ among couples with and without 
children), but there is no clear maximum in job level they can handle. As a result, the restrictive 
partner effect is supposed to be more compelling towards working hours. 
Secondly, the social interpretation assumes that human capital of the spouse acts as a 
support mechanism for one’s career. In this interpretation, human capital is regarded as an 
indicator of social resources. According to social capital theory, having a partner with social 
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resources can be beneficial to one’s labour market career because of useful social networks and 
effective information or advice on career development (Lin, Vaughn, & Ensel, 1981). The 
transfer of the positive effect of human capital on the labour market career of the partner has been 
found in several studies (Benham, 1974; Bernardi, 1999; Bernasco, de Graaf, & Ultee, 1998; 
Brynin & Francesconi, 2004; Brynin & Schupp, 2000; Henkens, Kraaykamp, & Siegers, 1993).  
We also like to propose a refinement of the social interpretation of spouse’s human 
capital. We expect the support mechanism to be mainly applicable to job level, since networks 
and useful information can help to get a better job, but can hardly influence the number of 
working hours of that job. Therefore, we expect that negative partner effects will be dominant in 
predicting husband’s and wife’s working hours, whereas positive partner effects will be dominant 
in predicting husband’s and wife’s job level. 
 The third interpretation of the effects of the spouse’s human capital is a cultural one, and 
is based on the observation that education is an important predictor of attitudes towards gender 
roles and division of labour (Alwin, Braun, & Scott, 1992). Traditionally, men have a 
breadwinner role and women a caring role, but in a modern view, husband and wife should divide 
paid and unpaid tasks equally. Therefore, we could hypothesize that a highly educated husband 
will positively affect his wife’s labour market career, whereas a highly educated wife will 
negatively affect her husband’s labour market career. We suppose this interpretation to be valid 
for predicting both husband’s and wife’s working hours and job level, since values refer to labour 
market participation (working hours) as well as to career pursuit (job level). 
In sum, theoretically we can expect positive and negative partner effects, different effects 
on labour market participation and job level, and different effects for husbands and wives. The 
economic interpretation predicts a restrictive partner effect, but particularly on working hours. 
The social capital interpretation predicts a supportive partner effect, but especially on job level. 
The cultural interpretation is applicable to both working hours and job level, and predicts a 
positive effect of partner’s human capital on wives’ labour market careers and a negative effect 
on husbands’ labour market careers. The net partner effect thus depends on the relative strength 
of the three interpretations of the workings of partner’s human capital. 
 
3.2.2  Changes in partner effects 
We will investigate to what extent the effects spouses have on each others’ careers have changed 
over time, by comparing the labour market careers of couples born between 1940 and 1974. The 
oldest birth cohort entered the labour market at the end of the 1950s, and the youngest birth 
cohort entered the labour market in the 1990s. We found our expectations about changes in 
partner effects on two major societal changes: individualization and secularization on the one 
hand, and cultural and economic modernization on the other hand. Individualization and 
secularization point at a tendency for people to live their lives more independently of the 
influence of others, and of their social environment in general. In line with this general trend, we 
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can expect that the influence that partners have on each others’ labour market careers will have 
diminished. 
The process of cultural and economic modernization may have had different 
consequences for men and women. We consider cultural modernization to have had an impact on 
the norms about the sexual division of labour towards more approval of working women and 
mothers and caring fathers (Treas & Widmer, 2000). For women, traditional norms coincide with 
the restrictive partner effect: women should stop working and building a career after they marry 
or have children. The supportive partner effect is more in line with the modern value that women 
should have a career of their own. Over birth cohorts, we therefore expect restrictive partner 
effects on female labour market careers to have declined in favour of supportive partner effects. 
This trend will be strengthened by the economic modernization that has led to rising levels of 
female educational attainment, labour market participation and success. As a consequence, it has 
increasingly become in the husbands’ interest to stimulate their wives’ careers (Oppenheimer, 
1977). For men, we expect the trend to be the other way around: traditional norms prescribe male 
responsibility for the household’s income, which means that male careers were maximally 
supported by their wives, whereas modern values emphasize men’s contribution to family life, 
which implies that their wives have more reason to restrict their husbands’ labour market careers. 
 
3.3  Data 
We use data from the Labour Force Surveys, as conducted by Statistics Netherlands in 1977, 
1991, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 20061. These 
surveys contain information on job characteristics of both spouses, together with information on 
their levels of education, and presence of children. The data are representative of the Dutch non-
institutionalized population of 15 years and older. Response rates are about 60 per cent. We have 
selected male-female couples between 25 and 55 years of age, born between 1940 and 1974, of 
which the number of working hours and job level (if employed) of both spouses is known. We 
have included married as well as cohabiting couples. After this selection we have information on 
the labour market situation of 272,570 couples. A disadvantage of the Labour Force Surveys is 
the absence of income information. However, this disadvantage is off-set by the high-quality and 
large-scale information they provide, and the detailed occupational information makes it possible 
to make reliable inferences about income. 
 
3.3.1  Labour market participation, job level, and monthly income 
The first part of our analysis focuses on effects of partner’s human capital on two separate 
components of labour market careers: labour market participation and job level. In the second 
part of the analysis, we are interested in the effects of partner’s human capital on monthly 
income, which is the product of the prior two dependent variables. 
                                                 
1 The large gap between the first (1977) and second (1991) survey has no consequences for the conclusions: an 
analysis in which the 1977 survey was not included did not lead to different conclusions. 
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We distinguish three categories of male labour market participation: non-employment, a 
part-time job (less than 35 hours a week), and a full-time job (35 hours or more a week). Note 
that in the Netherlands, non-working men in this age category consist mainly of disabled and 
unemployed men, and thus are involuntarily jobless. Since the variation in the group of part-time 
working women is larger and theoretically more interesting, we distinguish four categories of 
female labour market participation: non-employment, a small part-time job (1-19 hours a week), a 
large part-time job (20-34 hours a week), and a full-time job (35 hours or more a week). 
Reducing the number of working hours into a limited number of categories could be considered 
as a loss of information. However, the distinction between part-time and full-time jobs is an 
important threshold in the Netherlands, both for men and women, and the distinction between a 
small and a large part-time job is an important one for women. These distinctions are more 
meaningful than the precise number of working hours. In the second phase of the data analysis, 
we will use information on the exact number of working hours to construct monthly incomes. 
The Labour Force Surveys offer detailed information on occupations but do not include 
information on wages. Because occupational status is considered as a measure for lifetime or 
permanent income (Hauser & Warren, 1997, p. 198), we transform occupational status scores 
(expressed in ISEI) into hourly wages based on data from the Loonwijzer (Tijdens, 2005). The 
Loonwijzer provides information on job titles and hourly wages of almost 80,000 Dutch men and 
women interviewed between 2000 and 2004. We estimate a separate regression model for men 
and women, in which the net hourly wage in Euros is the dependent variable and ISEI is the 
independent variable. The estimated regression equations2 are used to compute male and female 
net hourly wages in the Labour Force Surveys (cf. de Graaf & Kats, 2007). The net hourly wage 
ranges from 7.24 to 13.25 Euros for men and from 6.73 to 10.33 Euros for women. Note that the 
range of these estimated hourly wages is more limited than in reality. Two thirds of the men and 
over half of the women in the Loonwijzer have real wages within the estimated ranges3. The 
advantage of a linear transformation of ISEI into hourly wages is that the zero point has a natural 
meaning, so that we can construct an income measure by simply multiplying the number of 
working hours and hourly wage. Note that we apply the hourly wage imputation based on the 
                                                 
2 For men: 4.910 + .097*ISEI; for women: 5.341 + .058*ISEI. 
3 As an alternative, we calculated average net hourly wages for men and women for each ISCO88 (International 
Standard Classification of Occupations, 1988) job category (3 digits) in the Loonwijzer, and linked these average 
hourly wages to the 3-digit ISCO categorization in the Labour Force Surveys. This approach provides ranges that are 
more in concordance with ranges in real incomes (6.06-15.16 Euros for men and 5.58-12.82 Euros for women, which 
means that 84 per cent of the men and 77 per cent of the women have real hourly wages that fall within the estimated 
ranges). However, this method does not use estimates, and is therefore very sensitive to the number of cases on 
which the average is based. If we stick to a reasonable minimum of 20 cases per category, we cannot impute hourly 
wages for 29 per cent of the working men and 27 per cent of the working women in the Labour Force Surveys. On 
top of that, the relationships between educational achievement and hourly wage and between age and hourly wage 
deviate more strongly from the relationships usually found when the ISCO-based hourly wage measure is used than 
when the ISEI-based hourly wage measure is used. If we impute the missing values with hourly wages based on 
ISEI, this does not change. Because of these disadvantages, we believe the ISEI-based imputation is preferable over 
the ISCO-based imputation. 
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2000-2004 Loonwijzer data to all jobs reported on in our data. This has the advantage that 
inflation does not play a role; thus, that we can compare birth cohorts. We thereby assume that 
the order of jobs according to their hourly wages is rather stable over time, corresponding to the 
underlying assumption of the ISEI measure which is widely used. In this chapter, we use the 
terms job level and hourly wage interchangeably. In the 1994 and 1995 surveys, respondents who 
work less than 12 hours a week are not asked to report on job characteristics since these small 
jobs are officially considered as non-employment. For these respondents (N=244 men and 
N=4,852 women), we impute the average wage of men and women in this employment category 
from the other surveys. 
Our estimates of the monthly incomes of husbands and wives are based on the product of 
the estimated hourly wage and the exact number of weekly working hours. Working hours are 
top-coded at 40. This weekly income is multiplied by factor 4.33 (52 weeks dived by 12 months).  
 
3.3.2  Independent variables 
The educational attainment of respondents and their spouses is measured in years of schooling: 
primary education (6 years), lower vocational training and lower secondary training (10 years), 
intermediate vocational training/intermediate and higher secondary training (12 years), vocational 
colleges (15 years), and university (17 years). Less than one per cent of the respondents lack 
information on educational attainment; in these cases the average male or female education has 
been imputed, and a dummy variable has been added to the analysis (1=originally missing 
information, coefficients are not shown in the tables). 
Partner’s and respondent’s working hours are top-coded at 40 hours a week, and job level 
and monthly income are defined as described in the prior section. Partners who do not have a job 
get a mean score on job level and monthly income, and a dummy variable indicating that the 
partner is non-employed is included in the analysis. This dummy variable indicates the difference 
between men or women with a non-employed partner and with a partner with an average job level 
or monthly income. 
In the models we use three control variables: presence and age of children, birth cohort, 
and age. Firstly, we distinguish between couples with and without children. The former consists 
of a category in which the youngest child is under four and a category in which the youngest 
child is four years or older. We do not have detailed information on children who do not live in 
the same household as their parents, but we distinguish couples of which the wife is younger than 
40 years, and couples of which the wife is 40 years or older. Most, but of course not all, childless 
couples of the first type will be in the pre-child phase, and most, but again not all, childless 
couples of the second type will be in the empty nest phase (de Graaf & Vermeulen, 1997). As a 
result, we distinguish four categories of the family cycle. Note that the information in the 1977 
survey is less precise, which forces us to classify four-year-old children in the ‘youngest child 
under four-category’ instead of in the ‘youngest child four years or older-category’. Of all the 
couples in the data, 14 per cent do not have children in the household while the wife is younger 
 55
Chapter 3 
than 40 years, 28 per cent have young children, 48 per cent have children of at least four years 
old, and 10 per cent do not have children in the household while the wife is 40 years or older. 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive information for males and females 
    males  females 
    N min max mean st dev  N min max mean st dev 
272,570      272,570     labour market participation 
 non-employed 6.2%           
 part-time job (1-34 hours) 7.3%           
 full-time job (>=35 hours) 86.5%           
 non-employed       36.5%     
 small part-time job (1-19 hours)       21.9%     
 large part-time job (20-34 hours)       27.6%     
 full-time job (>=35 hours)       14.0%     
           hourly wage 
estimated net hourly wage (in Euros) a) 255,633 7.24 13.25 9.54 1.43  173,091 6.73 10.33 8.00 0.80 
 mean-centred a) 255,633 -2.30 3.71 0 1.43  173,091 -1.27 2.33 0 0.80
           monthly income 
estimated net monthly income (in Euros) a) 255,633 32 2,297 1,578 289  173,091 29 1,790 828 404 
 mean-centred a) 255,633 -1,546 719 0 289  173,091 -799 963 0 404
           partner’s resources 
 partner’s education (in years) 272,570 6 17 11.51 2.73  272,570 6 17 11.98 2.88
 mean-centred 272,570 -5.51 5.49 0 2.73  272,570 -5.98 5.02 0 2.88
 partner no job 36.0%      6.2%     
partner’s estimated net hourly wage (in Euros) b) 173,091 6.73 10.33 8.00 0.80  255,633 7.24 13.25 9.54 1.43 
 mean-centred b) 173,091 -1.27 2.33 0 0.80  255,633 -2.30 3.71 0 1.43
partner’s estimated net monthly income (in Euros) b) 173,091 29 1,790 828 404  255,633 32 2,297 1,578 289 
mean-centred b) 173,091 -799 963 0 404  255,633 -1,546 719 0 289 
partner’s working hours b) 173,091 1 40 23.55 10.74  255,633 1 40 38.17 4.11 
 mean-centred b) 173,091 -13.96 25.04 8.60 10.74  255,633 -34.79 4.21 2.37 4.11
           individual resources 
 education (in years) 272,570 6 17 11.98 2.88  272,570 6 17 11.51 2.73
 mean-centred 272,570 -5.98 5.02 0 2.88  272,570 -5.51 5.49 0 2.73
working hours a) 255,633 1 40 38.17 4.11  173,091 1 40 23.55 10.74 
 mean-centred a) 255,633 -37.17 1.83 0 4.11  173,091 -22.55 16.45 0 10.74
control variables            
no children, wife <40 13.8%      13.8%      
youngest child <4 28.4%      28.4%      
youngest child >=4 48.3%      48.3%      
no children, wife >=40 9.5%      9.5%      
 age 272,570 25 54 40.18 7.58  272,570 25 54 37.93 7.57
 centred (25 years=0) 272,570 -10 19 5.18 7.58  272,570 -10 19 2.93 7.57
 age square 272,570 625 2,916 1,671.79 615.85  272,570 -10 19 2.93 7.57
 centred (25 years=0) 272,570 0 361 84.33 99.72  272,570 625 2,916 1,496.18 588.46
 average birth year 272,570 1940 1974 1958 8.50  272,570 1940 1974 1958 8.50
  centered (1940=0) 272,570 0 3.4 1.79 0.85   272,570 0 3.4 1.79 0.85
a) for employed respondents only 
b) for respondents with employed partner only 
Source: Labour Force Surveys 1977-2006 
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In order to analyse changes over time, we examine developments over birth cohorts. We have 
data on couples born between 1940 and 1974 in the age range of 25 to 54. The repeated cross-
sectional surveys (1977-2006) allow us to observe all birth cohorts at different ages, which makes 
it possible to disentangle them and estimate the effects of age and birth cohort. We transform 
spouses’ average birth year in such a way that 0 reflects birth year 1940, and divide the 
transformed birth year by factor 10 in order to interpret the effects of cohort as changes over 
decades. Finally, we control for age of the respondent by including age and age square into our 
models. We centre the independent variables to enable a meaningful interpretation of the 
intercepts. We centre age at 35, and (partner’s) education, (partner’s) job level, (partner’s) 
working hours, and partner’s income are mean-centred. Table 3.1 shows descriptive information 
on all (non-)centred variables used in the analysis for men and women. 
 
3.4  Results 
3.4.1  Labour market participation 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show, for husbands and wives respectively, to what extent their labour market 
participation depends on their human capital and that of their spouse, controlled for birth year, 
age, and the presence and age of children (Model 1). In addition, Model 2 includes the 
interactions with birth year, which show to what extent these effects have changed over time. 
Note that the reference category for men is part-time work, and for women a small part-time job 
(1-19 hours). For women, we also show the contrast between a full-time and large part-time job 
(Table 3.3). 
We find clear support for the existence of negative partner effects both on male and 
female labour market participation. As education and job level of the wife increase, the likelihood 
of having a full-time job instead of part-time job for a man decreases. For example, a husband 
whose wife has an average hourly wage is about 20 per cent less likely to have a full-time job 
instead of a part-time job than a husband whose wife earns one Euro per hour more (b=-0.237, 
exp(b)=0.789). Women are less likely to have large part-time jobs instead of small part-time jobs, 
and to have full-time jobs instead of part-time jobs (either small or large) if their husbands are 
highly educated and have a high job level. For example, a wife with the most highly educated 
husband is 35 per cent less likely to choose a full-time job than a job of 20 to 34 hours compared 
to a wife with the most poorly educated husband (exp(-0.039*11)). A different story applies to men’s 
probability to be non-employed: a wife with a lot of human capital prevents the husband from 
being non-employed, and thus has a supportive influence in this respect.  
Interestingly, full-time jobs are not always held by the most highly educated. Highly 
educated men and women are less likely to have a full-time job than a (large) part-time job. For 
men, this finding could be interpreted as an indication of modern values that are more strongly 
embraced by the highly educated. For women, this finding is surprising. Here, modern values do 
not seem to play a decisive role. Financial incentives in the form of job level, are a constant factor 
in stimulating labour market participation of both men and women; whatever contrast is chosen, 
wage rate increases labour market participation.  
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Although our main focus is on spouses’ human capital—expressed by educational level 
and job level—it is interesting to have a look at the relationship between husbands’ and wives’ 
working hours. After all, the number of hours spent on the labour market partly determines the 
income level, which we want to explain in the second stage of the analysis. In general, our results 
show a negative relationship: a partner who is employed for many hours lowers working hours of 
the other; this demonstrates couples’ tendency to divide labour, and is true for both husbands and 
wives. Again, we observe the exception where non-employment is concerned: there appears to be 
a positive relationship between non-employment of the spouse and the respondent. This finding 
confirms earlier studies that showed a positive association between spouses’ (non-)employment 
but negative associations between their working hours, given that they are employed (see Chapter 
2). 
 
Table 3.2 Male labour market participation: effects of individual and partner’s human capital  
 (multinomial logistic regression, effects on log odds) 
non-employed v. part-time  full-time v. part-time MALES 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
  b   se   b   se   b   se  b   se 
intercept -1.245 ** 0.061  -0.484 ** 0.074  3.142 ** 0.043 3.190 ** 0.048 
birth year a) 0.232 ** 0.018  -0.128 ** 0.032  -0.048 ** 0.013 -0.024  0.019 
age -0.002  0.003  -0.006 * 0.003  -0.039 ** 0.002 -0.043  0.002 
age2 0.002 ** 0.000  0.003 ** 0.000  0.000 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000 
no children, wife <40               
youngest child <4 -0.442 ** 0.042  -0.551 ** 0.044  -0.457 ** 0.028 -0.521 ** 0.030 
youngest child >=4 -0.271 ** 0.044  -0.383 ** 0.046  -0.203 ** 0.031 -0.264 ** 0.033 
no children, wife >=40 -0.160 ** 0.054  -0.281 ** 0.055  -0.374 ** 0.038 -0.437 ** 0.040 
               
education -0.195 ** 0.004  -0.279 ** 0.010  -0.065 ** 0.004 -0.103 ** 0.009 
  * birth year a)     0.049 ** 0.005     0.023 ** 0.005 
hourly wage n.a.    n.a.    0.108 ** 0.007 -0.014  0.017 
  * birth year a)     n.a.       0.067 ** 0.008 
               
wife’s education -0.138 ** 0.005  -0.053 ** 0.011  -0.066 ** 0.004 -0.018 * 0.009 
  * birth year a)     -0.051 ** 0.006     -0.028 ** 0.005 
wife’s hourly wage -0.205 ** 0.021  -0.102 * 0.051  -0.237 ** 0.013 -0.135 ** 0.034 
  * birth year a)     -0.041  0.026     -0.053 ** 0.017 
wife’s working hours 0.023 ** 0.002  0.013 ** 0.003  -0.019 ** 0.001 -0.009 ** 0.002 
  * birth year a)     0.006 ** 0.002     -0.006 ** 0.001 
wife no job 1.422 ** 0.046  0.426 ** 0.103  -0.137 ** 0.029 -0.039  0.068 
  * birth year a)         0.618 ** 0.057          -0.051   0.036 
** p<.01;  * p<.05;  n.a. not applicable 
a) birth year ranges from 0 (1940) to 3.4 (1974) 
Source: Labour Force Surveys 1977-2006, N=272,570 
 
Models 2 of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 inform us about trends in partner effects on labour market 
participation. We observe opposing developments for men and women. For men, the negative 
influence of wives’ educational attainment on their probability to work full-time instead of part- 
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non-employed v. small part-time  large part-time v. small part-time  full-time v. small part-time   full-time v. large part-time FEMALES 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  
  b   se   b   se   b   se  b   se   b   se  b   se  b   se  b   se 
intercept 1.964 ** 0.035  2.010 ** 0.037  1.714 ** 0.036 1.617 ** 0.038  2.158 ** 0.042 2.050 ** 0.043  0.443 ** 0.032 0.433 ** 0.034
birth year a) -0.704 ** 0.009  -0.728 ** 0.010  0.140 ** 0.011 0.195 ** 0.012  -0.029 * 0.013 0.022  0.015  -0.169 ** 0.012 -0.173 ** 0.013
age -0.073 ** 0.001  -0.073 ** 0.001  0.024 ** 0.002 0.024  0.002  -0.029 ** 0.002 -0.028 ** 0.002  -0.053 ** 0.002 -0.052 ** 0.002
age2 0.002 ** 0.000  0.002 ** 0.000  0.000 * 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000  0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000
no children, wife <40                             
youngest child <4 -0.074 * 0.030  -0.079 ** 0.030  -1.906 ** 0.028 -1.925 ** 0.028  -3.712 ** 0.031 -3.733 ** 0.031  -1.806 ** 0.022 -1.808 ** 0.022
youngest child >=4 -0.420 ** 0.032  -0.436 ** 0.032  -1.940 ** 0.031 -1.949 ** 0.031  -3.179 ** 0.034 -3.179 ** 0.034  -1.239 ** 0.024 -1.230 ** 0.024
no children, wife >=40 -0.168 ** 0.038  -0.169 ** 0.038  -1.344 ** 0.038 -1.355 ** 0.038  -1.801 ** 0.043 -1.809 ** 0.043  -0.458 ** 0.034 -0.455 ** 0.034
                             
education -0.096 ** 0.002  -0.086 ** 0.006  0.040 ** 0.003 0.003  0.007  0.032 ** 0.004 -0.032 ** 0.009  -0.008 * 0.004 -0.035 ** 0.009
  * birth year a)     -0.007 * 0.003     0.022 ** 0.004     0.038 ** 0.005     0.016 ** 0.004
hourly wage n.a.    n.a.    0.685 ** 0.010 0.665 ** 0.025  1.110 ** 0.013 1.114 ** 0.032  0.424 ** 0.011 0.449 ** 0.029
  * birth year a)     n.a.       0.009  0.013     -0.004  0.016     -0.013  0.014
                             
husband’s education -0.005  0.003  -0.005  0.006  -0.022 ** 0.003 -0.016 * 0.007  -0.061 ** 0.004 -0.086 ** 0.009  -0.039 ** 0.003 -0.070 ** 0.008
  * birth year a)     0.000  0.003     -0.002  0.004     0.015 ** 0.005     0.017 ** 0.004
husband’s hourly wage 0.016 ** 0.005  0.002  0.012  -0.014 * 0.005 -0.018  0.014  -0.049 ** 0.007 -0.139 ** 0.018  -0.034 ** 0.006 -0.121 ** 0.017
  * birth year a)     0.006  0.006     0.002  0.007     0.043 ** 0.009     0.041 ** 0.008
husband’s working hours 0.001  0.001  0.009 ** 0.003  -0.023 ** 0.001 0.011 ** 0.004  -0.024 ** 0.002 0.012 ** 0.005  0.000  0.002 0.001  0.004
  * birth year a)     -0.004  0.002     -0.020 ** 0.002     -0.021 ** 0.002     -0.001  0.002
husband no job 1.054 ** 0.063  0.509 ** 0.137  -0.395 ** 0.065 0.366 * 0.155  0.365 ** 0.080 0.922 ** 0.190  0.760 ** 0.066 0.556 ** 0.165
  * birth year a)         0.381 ** 0.080          -0.426 ** 0.085          -0.316 ** 0.102          0.110   0.082
** p<.01;  * p<.05;  n.a. not applicable 
a) birth year ranges from 0 (1940) to 3.4 (1974) 
Source: Labour Force Surveys 1977-2006, N=272,570 
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time has become more negative over cohorts (from -0.018 for the 1940-cohort to 
-0.018-(0.028*3.4)=-0.113 for the 1974-cohort). Also, wives’ job levels have become more and 
more a restriction to male full-time work over cohorts (-0.135 for the 1940-cohort, and 
-0.017-(0.053*3.4)=-0.315 for the 1974-cohort). Whereas for men negative partner effects on 
labour market participation have become stronger, the opposite is true for women: the restriction 
of husbands’ educational level on female labour market participation has weakened over cohorts, 
and the restrictive effect of husbands’ job levels in the older cohorts has disappeared in the recent 
cohort; the decision for women to work full-time instead of part-time is in young cohorts no 
longer dependent on the wage rate of the husband. The opposing trends for men and women are 
in line with our hypotheses based on the cultural and economic modernization. The overall 
conclusion is that a partner’s human capital restricts labour market participation of both men and 
women, and this restriction has increased for men and decreased for women. 
 
3.4.2  Job level 
Partner effects on job level are presented in Table 3.4 for men and women who have a job. In 
contrast with the predominantly negative partner effects on labour market participation, we find 
clear positive effects of partner’s human capital on job level: people with a highly educated or 
well-paid husband or wife have a higher job level. The net average hourly wage of a childless, 
35-year-old man, born in 1940, with an average educational level, and whose working wife has 
an average level of human capital, is 10.09 Euros. For every extra year of schooling of his wife, 
his hourly wage increases with 5 cents, which means a difference of 55 cents per hour between a 
man whose wife only has elementary schooling and a man whose wife has a university degree. 
For every extra Euro his wife earns per hour, his hourly wage increases with 23 cents. The effects 
are smaller for women, but still highly significant (2 cents for every extra year of husband’s 
schooling and 8 cents for every extra Euro of husband’s hourly wage). 
Respondent’s education and working hours contribute positively to job level as well, and 
are more important than resources of the partner. We would like to note that the causality 
between job level and number of working hours is difficult to assess: on the one hand, a high job 
level is an incentive to work many hours; on the other hand, especially for women, working many 
hours is rewarded by employers, who interpret this as work commitment. However, in order to 
prevent other effects to get confounded, we decided to include working hours into the models.  
Labour market participation of the partner influences job level, and again we see the 
ambivalent influence of partner’s (non-)employment and working hours (given employment). A 
non-working spouse negatively affects job level, presumably because such a spouse lacks 
resources that could help with getting a better job, but the more hours a spouse works the lower 
one’s job level, suggesting that people put less effort into their career if their spouses work more 
hours. 
Developments in partner effects on job level are presented in Models 2 of Table 3.4. In 
general, we see a decline in the positive influence of spouse’s human capital on job level over 
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birth cohorts, although they remain significantly positive in the youngest cohort; the effect of 
wives’ education on husbands’ job level has remained unchanged. On the basis of cultural and 
economic modernization, we expected a decline in supportive partner effects only for men, but 
we see a similar trend for women. This result is actually more in line with the idea that partners 
have become less influential in each others’ labour market decisions. If we combine the results 
with respect to trends on labour market participation and job level, we can conclude that for 
women both the negative partner effect on labour market participation and the positive partner 
effect on job level have decreased, whereas for men the negative partner effect on labour market 
participation has become stronger and the positive partner effect on hourly wage has weakened. 
 
Table 3.4 Male and female hourly wage: effects of individual and partner’s human capital 
 (OLS regression, unstandardized regression coefficients) 
  males   females 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  
  b   se   b   se   b   se   b   se 
intercept 10.091 ** 0.011  10.092 ** 0.013 8.061 ** 0.007 8.039 ** 0.008 
birth year a) -0.259 ** 0.003  -0.269 ** 0.005 -0.035 ** 0.003 -0.028 ** 0.003 
age 0.003 ** 0.001  0.003 ** 0.001 0.004 ** 0.000 0.004 ** 0.000 
age2 0.000 ** 0.000  0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 
no children, wife <40            
youngest child <4 -0.005  0.008  0.007 0.008 0.102 ** 0.005 0.101 ** 0.005 
youngest child >=4 -0.034 ** 0.008  -0.020 * 0.009 0.003 0.006 0.007  0.006 
no children, wife >=40 -0.057 ** 0.011  -0.044 ** 0.012 0.024 ** 0.008 0.026 ** 0.008 
            
education 0.292 ** 0.001  0.260 ** 0.002 0.142 ** 0.001 0.109 ** 0.002 
  * birth year a)     0.019 ** 0.001   0.018 ** 0.001 
working hours 0.008 ** 0.001  0.000 0.001 0.016 ** 0.000 0.017 ** 0.000 
  * birth year a)     0.005 ** 0.001   0.000 * 0.000 
            
partner’s education 0.052 ** 0.001  0.052 ** 0.002 0.021 ** 0.001 0.029 ** 0.002 
  * birth year a)     0.000 0.001   -0.004 ** 0.001 
partner’s hourly wage 0.232 ** 0.004  0.258 ** 0.010 0.080 ** 0.001 0.103 ** 0.004 
  * birth year a)     -0.016 ** 0.005   -0.012 ** 0.002 
partner’s working hours -0.002 ** 0.000  -0.004 ** 0.001 -0.003 ** 0.000 -0.003 ** 0.001 
  * birth year a)     0.001 ** 0.000   0.000  0.000 
partner no job -0.100 ** 0.008  -0.176 ** 0.019 -0.219 ** 0.015 -0.169 ** 0.037 
  * birth year a)         0.042 ** 0.010        -0.027   0.019 
R2 0.45    0.45  0.43  0.43   
N 255,633     255,633     173,091     173,091   
** p<.01;  * p<.05 
a) birth year ranges from 0 (1940) to 3.4 (1974) 
Source: Labour Force Surveys 1977-2006 
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3.4.3  Monthly income 
The negative effect of the partner’s human capital on labour market participation and the positive 
effect of the partner’s human capital on job level were predicted by our hypotheses. We will now 
address the descriptive question of what the net effect of spouses’ human capital is on the 
combination of working hours and job level: net monthly income. This final step in our analysis 
will make clear to what extent partner effects push the positive association between spouses’ 
income levels, that are due to educational and occupational homogamy, to a higher level, or to 
what extent the positive association is repressed. For this purpose, we have performed OLS 
regressions in which husbands’ and wives’ net monthly incomes are the dependent variables (see 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6). In Model 1a, effects of partner’s job level and working hours are included 
separately, next to partner’s educational attainment. In Model 1b, we replaced partner’s job level 
and working hours by partner’s income, which is the product of the two. Models 2a and 2b show 
the developments in the effects for cohorts born between 1940 and 1974. 
 
Table 3.5 Monthly income of males: effect of individual and partner’s human capital 
 (OLS regression, unstandardized regression coefficients) 
Model 1a   Model 1b   Model 2a   Model 2b MALES 
  b   se   b  se  b  se  b  se 
intercept 1710.20 ** 2.57  1,699.36 ** 2.41  1706.01 ** 3.01  1,693.97 ** 2.79 
birth year a) -52.31 ** 0.76  -53.78 ** 0.76  -50.99 ** 1.16  -52.28 ** 0.96 
age -1.67 ** 0.14  -1.64 ** 0.14  -1.66 ** 0.14  -1.61  0.14 
age2 -0.10 ** 0.01  -0.11 ** 0.01  -0.09 ** 0.01  -0.10 ** 0.01 
no children, wife <40                
youngest child <4 -15.69 ** 1.81  -9.31 ** 1.80  -15.59 ** 1.88  -9.25 ** 1.87 
youngest child >=4 -14.99 ** 1.97  -10.45 ** 1.97  -14.27 ** 2.03  -9.44 ** 2.02 
no children, wife >=40 -32.41 ** 2.62  -29.01 ** 2.63  -31.56 ** 2.68  -27.76 ** 2.67 
                
education 47.77 ** 0.20  48.53 ** 0.20  40.54 ** 0.45  41.24 ** 0.45 
  * birth year a)        4.30 ** 0.24  4.33 ** 0.24 
                
wife’s education 6.42 ** 0.24  8.81 ** 0.23  7.13 ** 0.53  8.76 ** 0.51 
  * birth year a)         -0.36  0.28  0.05  0.27 
wife’s hourly wage 26.48 ** 0.91      30.87 ** 2.33     
  * birth year a)         -2.84 * 1.13     
wife’s working hours -1.03 ** 0.07      -0.90 ** 0.16     
  * birth year a)         -0.08  0.08     
wife’s income (x1,000)    -4.99 ** 1.72      -0.56  4.06 
  * birth year a)             -3.38  1.99 
wife no job -18.10 ** 1.84  8.95 ** 1.14  -18.88 ** 4.41  7.03 ** 2.52 
  * birth year a)                 0.37   2.23   1.16   1.31 
R2 0.26    0.27    0.26    0.26   
N 255,633       255,633    255,633      255,633     
** p<.01;  * p<.05 
a) birth year ranges from 0 (1940) to 3.4 (1974) 
Source: Labour Force Surveys 1977-2006 
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The intercept in Model 1a in Table 3.5 represents the estimated monthly net income of a 35-year-
old, childless husband, born in 1940, with an average level of education, and a working wife with 
an average level of human capital: 1710 Euros. The strongest predictor variable is his educational 
attainment: every year of extra schooling yields 48 Euros per month. On top of that, a successful 
wife contributes to a man’s income as well: 6 Euros for every extra year of schooling and 26 
Euros for every extra Euro of hourly wage. We see similar results for women (although 
husband’s educational level has a slight negative effect on income in Model 1a). Obviously, 
positive partner effects on job level dominate negative effects on labour market participation, 
resulting in an overall positive influence of partner’s human capital on income. 
We concluded earlier that partner’s labour market participation negatively affects working 
hours and job level, and thus it is not surprising that the effect of partner’s working hours on 
income is negative. Partner’s working hours and job level can be combined in partner’s income 
which summarizes the total effect of the financial position of the partner. As we can see in 
 
Table 3.6 Monthly income of females: effect of individual and partner’s human capital 
 (OLS regression, unstandardized regression coefficients) 
Model 1a   Model 1b   Model 2a   Model 2b FEMALES 
  b   se   b   se  b   se  b   se 
intercept 1,138.87 ** 4.15  1,137.70 ** 4.14  1,120.76 ** 4.33  1,127.27 ** 4.21 
birth year a) 6.86 ** 1.47  3.22 * 1.47  13.31 ** 1.58  4.97 ** 1.49 
age -0.44  0.23  -0.18  0.24  -0.36  0.24  -0.03  0.24 
age2 0.03 * 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.05 ** 0.02  0.03  0.02 
no children, wife <40                
youngest child <4 -441.43 ** 2.68  -440.65 ** 2.69  -439.43 ** 2.68  -438.25 ** 2.69 
youngest child >=4 -414.22 ** 3.19  -415.10 ** 3.19  -410.05 ** 3.20  -410.51 ** 3.20 
no children, wife >=40 -220.52 ** 4.43  -219.94 ** 4.44  -216.16 ** 4.43  -215.76 ** 4.44 
                
education 41.35 ** 0.39  43.06 ** 0.38  30.97 ** 0.93  31.64 ** 0.93 
  * birth year a)         5.71 ** 0.46  6.30 ** 0.46 
                
husband’s education -1.36 ** 0.42  3.32 ** 0.39  -3.42 ** 1.03  -1.50  0.95 
  * birth year a)         1.21 * 0.51  2.67 ** 0.47 
husband’s hourly wage 14.72 ** 0.78      11.90 ** 2.01     
  * birth year a)         1.18  0.96     
husband’s working hours -4.66 ** 0.20      0.01  0.49     
  * birth year a)         -2.58 ** 0.25     
husband’s income (x1,000)    -7.81 * 3.31      19.89 * 8.34 
  * birth year a)             -15.85 ** 4.12 
husband no job -43.56 ** 8.60  139.26 ** 3.99  72.37 ** 21.10  70.85 ** 9.41 
  * birth year a)                 -63.03 ** 10.83   39.05 ** 4.92 
R2 0.28    0.28    0.28    0.28   
N 173,091       173,091       173,091       173,091     
** p<.01;  * p<.05 
a) birth year ranges from 0 (1940) to 3.4 (1974) 
Source: Labour Force Surveys 1977-2006 
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Models 1b in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, partner’s income is negatively related to individual income for 
males and females, whereas partner’s educational level remains an important positive contributor 
to income. Apparently, the human capital of the spouse, which we define as educational 
attainment and job level, boosts income, but we observe a negative association between 
husbands’ and wives’ income on top of the effects of their educational achievements. This is due 
to the negative association between partners’ working hours. Note that the income effects are 
very small: every 1000 Euros extra income of the wife decreases the income of the husband with 
5 Euros (this is 8 Euros for women). In terms of inequality between couples, this means that there 
is no additional accumulation of income resulting from mutual income benefits, and thus no 
enlargement of the income differences between couples, on top of the income differences that 
emerge from homogamy and educational benefits. 
What about trends in the effects on income? We will only consider the summarized model 
with partner’s income on respondent’s income (Model 2b in Table 3.5 and 3.6). The effect of 
wives’ level of education is unchangeably supportive for men, and the effect of wives’ income 
does not differ between cohorts. For women, husbands’ education did not make a difference for 
the oldest cohort, but has become a supportive force for women’s income in younger cohorts. In 
contrast, husbands’ income has become restrictive to the total amount of income the wife earns 
(from 19.89 Euros for every 1000 Euros extra income of the husband in the 1940-cohort to 
(19.89-3.4*15.85)=-34 Euros for the 1974-cohort), which means that women, from recent 
cohorts, with partners who make good money, earn less than their counterparts from earlier 
cohorts. The declining association between spouses’ income levels implies a reduction in the 
income inequality between couples over birth cohorts. 
  
3.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter we investigated how and to what extent human capital of the spouse affects the 
labour market position of the other spouse. We proposed arguments why partner effects could be 
positive and negative, and we used the strategy of decomposing income into labour market 
participation (working hours) and job level (wage rate), in order to understand how partners 
influence each others’ labour market careers. We measured job level in terms of imputed hourly 
wages. We found that partner’s human capital, expressed in educational attainment and job level, 
negatively affects labour market participation but positively affects job level. We interpreted the 
negative effect of spouses’ human capital on labour market participation as an economic 
mechanism: people have less incentive to work more hours if their spouses have higher levels of 
human capital. The positive effect on job level points at a social capital interpretation: male and 
female labour market careers benefit from the resources of the spouse. The results could also 
point at a cultural interpretation: highly educated women restrict working hours of their husbands, 
whereas highly educated men stimulate their wives’ careers out of normative reasons. The 
supportive influence of spouses’ human capital dominates when the two conflicting effects are 
combined in an analysis on income, implying that favourable positions are accumulated within 
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households. The fact that both supportive and restrictive mechanisms are at work at the same time 
implies a repressive effect on this accumulation, and thus on inequality between households. 
However, the conclusion about inequality between households needs to be refined. A 
closer look at the association between spouses’ income levels reveals that husbands’ and wives’ 
incomes are negatively correlated when educational homogamy has been taken into account. It is 
the negative effect of partner’s working hours on income that overrules the positive effect of 
partner’s job level. So, human capital of the spouse does increase income, but the spouse’s 
income does not. On the basis of this small but negative correlation, we can conclude that there is 
no additional accumulation of income within couples on top of the income accumulation that 
results from educational homogamy and the mutual influence of spouses’ educational levels. 
Besides the ways in which partners influence each others’ labour market careers, we are 
also interested in possible changes in these influences. For that purpose, we use a cohort design in 
which we compare couples born between 1940 and 1974. We find that (a) the restrictive effect of 
partner’s human capital has become stronger for men and weaker for women, and (b) that the 
stimulating impact of partner’s human capital on job level has decreased for men as well as for 
women. If we consider income, the total effect of these trends results in a stable support of 
partner’s human capital for men and an increasing support for women. These findings falsify the 
trend hypothesis based on the process of individualization: instead of a general weakening of the 
influence of the partner, we observe increasing influences in some respects. The findings are 
more in line with our expectations based on modernization. Men were thought to experience less 
support and more restriction from their wives’ human capital, which matches our results; women 
were thought to face more support and less restriction from their husband’s human capital, which 
is found to be true as far as labour market participation and monthly income are concerned. 
On the basis of the opposing trends for men and women, it is possible to infer conclusions 
about between-household inequality. The net association between spouses’ income levels 
(controlled for spouses’ educational levels) has declined and has even become negative; from this 
we can assume that the net association between spouses’ income levels has decreased over time. 
We like to stress that inequality between couples depends on more than just this association, but 
we can conclude that there seems to be an increasing tendency of a high income of the husband 
coinciding with a lower income of the wife. This conclusion is based on our observation that an 
individual works fewer hours when the other spouse has more human capital. 
The strategy to decompose the effects of one spouse’s human capital on the other spouse’s 
income into effects on labour market participation and on job level appears to be fruitful. Firstly, 
this strategy provides us with more insight into the processes of spouses’ mutual influences since 
opposing mechanisms are at work. Furthermore, it reveals that the influence of partner’s working 
hours opposes the influence of the partner’s human capital or, more particularly, the partner’s job 
level. The negative effect of the working hours of one partner on the working hours and job level 
of the other partner appears to cancel out much of the positive association between spouses’ job 
levels, which has important consequences for income inequality between households. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Partner’s resources and adjusting working hours 
(1940 – 2003) 
 
 
We study to what extent adjustments in labour market participation, defined as employment entry 
and exit, and as increases and reductions of weekly working hours, depend on resources of the 
partner. Moreover, we investigate whether the influence of the partner depends on historical 
period, human capital, or children. We are especially interested in the economic-based 
hypothesis that people are more likely to reduce working hours when their partners have more 
resources. We use retrospective information on labour market careers of 5,685 respondents and 
their (ex-)partners (Family Survey Dutch Population 1998-2003). Our results provide little 
support for the economic hypothesis, and we suggest that family formation and cultural factors 
are more important predictors for male and female labour market participation adjustments in 
the Netherlands. 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
A partner who is successful in the labour market is advantageous for an individual’s financial 
well-being because of the partner’s positive contribution to the household income, but might, at 
the same time, be disadvantageous for individual labour market outcomes, as a result of financial 
disincentives. This is the essence of the economic hypothesis based on the argument that couples 
divide labour with efficiency in mind. Households need time and money to function, and since 
decisions on labour market participation have strong consequences for the availability of time and 
income in the household, it is indeed plausible that labour market characteristics of both partners 
contribute to decisions on each spouse’s labour market participation (Bernasco, 1994; Blossfeld 
& Drobnič, 2001). New home economists argue that, to maximize household productivity, the 
spouse with the highest earning capacities specializes in paid work and that the other partner 
specializes in unpaid work (Becker, 1981). This hypothesis has been translated into the more
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general prediction that the incentive to work long hours is weaker for someone who has a 
successful partner; also, someone whose partner has a successful career can afford not to work or 
to work fewer hours (Bernasco, de Graaf, & Ultee, 1998; Hendrickx, Bernasco, & de Graaf, 
2001; Sørensen, 1983). 
The strength of this economic mechanism has important consequences for the level of 
social inequality between households since it may soften the effects of homogamy. As a result of 
educational and occupational homogamy, there is a strong tendency for labour market success to 
accumulate within households. However, if couples arrange their labour market participation 
during their relationship in such a way that there is a negative relationship between the labour 
market success of one spouse and the working hours of the other spouse, the accumulation of 
resources within households will be partly offset, and inequality between households will be 
lower than when predicted by homogamy alone. 
Earlier research showed mixed and weak support for the economic mechanism behind a 
couple’s labour division. There is some support for a restrictive influence of husbands’ human 
capital on female labour market participation, which is in concordance with the economic 
hypothesis (Bernardi, 1999; Bernasco, 1994; Davies, Elias, & Penn, 1994; Sørensen, 1983), 
although it is sometimes only found in couples with children (Hendrickx, Bernasco, & de Graaf, 
2001; Lundberg, 1988). However, it has also been concluded that wives’ labour market resources 
(education and income) do not affect husbands’ labour market entry or exit (Bernasco, 1994), and 
others concluded that wives’ education is a resource instead of a disincentive for husbands’ 
probabilities to find a job (Brynin & Francesconi, 2004). This challenges the economic 
hypothesis. 
In this chapter we set out to evaluate the economic hypothesis in the Dutch context, and 
aim to sort out the inconclusiveness of earlier findings. We expect this inconclusiveness about the 
effect of spouse’s resources on labour market participation to be due to a lack of specification. 
Firstly, we believe the historical context needs to be considered. Much research has shown that 
over the last decades, attitudes towards working women and mothers have become less traditional 
(Treas & Widmer, 2000). The traditional male breadwinner model is more and more replaced by 
other arrangements, also in the Netherlands (see Chapter 2). Since female labour is considered to 
be both desirable and necessary from both women’s and men’s point of view (Oppenheimer, 
1977), the negative incentive of husbands’ resources on wives’ working hours may have become 
weaker, whereas the modern view of equal division of labour might have increased the impact of 
wives’ resources on husbands’ working hours adjustments. If the way spouses influence each 
others’ working hours has indeed been subject to change, results depend strongly on the 
observation window considered. The neglect of a historical perspective in earlier studies might, 
therefore, be an important reason for the discrepancies between the findings so far. A second 
condition that may affect the way in which the labour market resources of the spouse influence 
working hours adjustments is individual human capital. A successful husband might reduce 
working hours of a poorly educated wife, whereas a successful husband is not enough reason for 
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a highly educated wife to lower her working hours since this would harm her future career 
opportunities. The third condition we investigate is the presence of children in the household. We 
expect that the influence of the spouse’s resources is stronger when there are young children in 
the household, since the presence of young children requires another balance of time and money 
in the household (Van der Lippe, 2001). 
We think that investigating the case of the Netherlands increases the chance of finding 
support for the economic hypothesis. The Netherlands, known as a part-time working country, 
has a very large variety in working hours, both for women and for men (Blossfeld & Hakim, 
1997). In 2006, 40 per cent of Dutch women between the ages of 15 and 65 are non-employed 
and are not looking for a job. Of all employed women, a third works full-time and two thirds have 
part-time jobs ranging from 12 to 34 hours a week. One out of seven Dutch working men has a 
part-time job, mainly over 20 hours a week (www.cbs.nl/statline), which is high compared to 
other countries (Delsen, 1998). It is obvious that a cultural climate that allows individual choices 
is well suited to allow economic grounds to be decisive. 
An alternative to economic theory is a more cultural approach. People behave in a certain 
way because they follow the societal norm or because they act according to their own values. 
With respect to labour market participation of men and women, societal norms are best described 
by gender role theory. The role specialization hypothesis suggests that men are responsible for 
household income, especially if they have a family, and therefore work full-time. Women usually 
follow an employment pattern that corresponds with the traditional female role: women work 
full-time until they marry or have children, then they are responsible for the caring tasks until the 
youngest child is old enough, and finally they often increase working hours again (Myrdal & 
Klein, 1956; Sørensen, 1983; Van der Lippe & Siegers, 1994). Besides general norms in society, 
personal values may determine labour market participation decisions. Based on a panel study, 
Jansen and Kalmijn (2000) found that modern values with regard to young women’s 
emancipation lead to more working hours for women in the Netherlands after the first child is 
born. 
We set out to put the economic hypothesis to a new test. We believe the right test is an 
analysis of the partner’s human capital on the probability of the spouse’s entering or leaving the 
labour market, or increasing or reducing working hours in a time-dependent setup. We will 
extensively control for individual human capital and the family cycle, and we will consider 
several kinds of labour market participation adjustments: transitions into and out of employment 
(entry and exit) and changes in weekly working hours (increase and reduction) of both men and 
women. Moreover, we will investigate three conditions under which the restrictive effect of 
spouses’ resources is more likely to show up: historical period, the level of individual human 
capital, and the presence of children. For this purpose, we pooled three waves (repeated cross-
sections) from the Family Survey Dutch Population (1998, 2000, and 2003), which include 
detailed retrospective information on the labour market careers of 5,685 respondents and their 
spouses. We address the following research questions: (1) To what extent are working hours 
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adjustments determined by labour market resources of the partner? (2) Under which conditions, 
specified as historical period, individual human capital, and the presence of children, do partner’s 
resources influence working hours adjustments? 
 
4.2  Theory 
4.2.1  The economic hypothesis 
The economic hypothesis that we will test can be summarized as follows. If one’s spouse has a 
favourable position on the labour market, one has economic incentives to work less or to stop 
working completely and has no economic incentives to enter the labour market or to increase 
working hours (Bernasco, 1994; Hendrickx, Bernasco, & de Graaf, 2001; Sørensen, 1983). We 
think that the restrictive influence of spouse’s resources on adjustments of labour market 
participation depends on several factors, and we will put forward three expectations in this 
respect. 
 
4.2.2  Its dependence on historical period 
We hypothesize that the role of the spouse in labour market participation decisions has changed 
over time. According to traditional values about the sexual division of work in marriage, married 
women should not work—at least not work full-time—and women should make the decision to 
reduce working hours as soon as the household can afford it, i.e. when the husband makes enough 
money. These traditional values coincide with the idea of restrictive partner effects, so we expect 
the restrictive partner effect to be particularly strong for women in earlier decades. Nowadays, the 
traditional norms about female labour market participation have weakened, so it has become less 
important for women whether or not a reduction in working hours can be realized. On top of that, 
due to emancipation processes, women want to work nowadays, regardless of their husbands’ 
position (Bielby & Bielby, 1992; Sørensen, 1983). In sum, we expect that for women, support for 
the economic hypothesis has become weaker over time. The existence of such a trend has been 
shown in Britain with respect to female labour market participation after the birth of the first 
child (Joshi & Hinde, 1993). 
With respect to men, we expect the opposite to have occurred. In a traditional view, men 
are supposed to work full-time, regardless of the household situation, leaving no room for a 
wife’s influence on the number of working hours. The modern view upon the sexual division of 
work is that there should be more equality between husband and wife. This does not only imply a 
stimulation for women to work more, but also a stimulation for men to work somewhat less in 
order to have time to care for children. Moreover, emphasis on a more equal division of labour 
between husband and wife has loosened the standard of a full-time job, which leaves room for 
reactions to incentives that come from the wife’s labour market situation (Bielby & Bielby, 
1992). Therefore, we predict that for men, support for the economic hypothesis has become 
stronger over time. 
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4.2.3  Its dependence on individual human capital 
We argue that the degree to which the resources of the partner impose work-related incentives 
depends on the human capital of the individual. We think that men and women with higher levels 
of human capital make decisions more independently of their spouses’ situation. Following the 
economic argument on the individual level, people with more human capital and corresponding 
earning capacity have stronger economic incentives to spend time on paid labour and have more 
to lose if they decide to work less or to stop working completely. That is why they are more 
inclined to let the impact of their own human capital prevail and act more independently of their 
spouses. High levels of human capital do not only make division of labour unattractive for 
individuals; new home economists reason that, also for the household, division of labour becomes 
less beneficial if the earning capacities of the wife are high (Blossfeld & Huinink, 1991). These 
arguments lead us to expect that the economic hypothesis will be supported more strongly for 
people with little human capital than for people with a lot of human capital. 
 
4.2.4  Its dependence on presence of children 
We expect the presence of children to be a condition for restrictive partner effects. Childless 
couples do not experience strong time demands in the household. They will probably not prefer to 
cut down their working hours at the cost of household income, and thus the economic hypothesis 
applies only weakly. Couples with children, however, value time more highly at the expense of 
income. In the Netherlands, couples dislike ‘outsourcing’ their children for five days a week 
(Portegijs, Hermans, & Lalta, 2006), so the presence of young children induces a preference for 
fewer working hours. In such a situation, it becomes important whether or not one of the two 
spouses is successful enough to make it affordable for the other spouse to work less. In other 
words, when children are born, the economic incentives become more prevalent, and thus we 
argue that the economic hypothesis will find stronger support for couples with children than for 
couples without children. Hakim (2000) argued that women do not make a choice between work 
and family until they get married or have children. This might imply that the labour market 
situation of the husband has no influence before the couple has children, and becomes of 
influence only when children are born. Indeed, Lundberg (1988) found a negative effect of the 
husband’s income on his wife’s labour market participation only if the couple had children, and 
Hendrickx et al. (2001) showed that the husband’s income lowers his wife’s likelihood to re-enter 
the labour market if the couple has children. 
 
4.3  Data 
We use three waves of the Family Survey Dutch Population: 1998, 2000, and 2003 (de Graaf, de 
Graaf, Kraaykamp, & Ultee, 1998; 2000; 2003). The surveys cover the Dutch population between 
the ages of 18 and 70 with an overrepresentation of couples, and are representative with respect to 
region, sex, age, and education. The data are based on structured face-to-face interviews and self-
completion questionnaires, which were identical for primary respondents and their cohabiting or 
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marital partners (secondary respondents). The net response rate varies between 40.6 and 52.6 per 
cent, which is normal for this kind of survey design in the Netherlands. In total, 5,764 
respondents (primary respondents and their partners) have been interviewed. Our analyses will be 
based on a sample of 5,685 individuals who are 20 years or older at the moment of the interview. 
A retrospective design has been used in which respondents were asked to reconstruct, with exact 
dates, their careers in several domains. This means that every change in these domains of life, and 
the times of these changes, are recorded. As a result, the data contain complete labour market and 
demographic careers of the respondent and his or her partner until the moment of interview. On 
the basis of this retrospective information we construct a person-month file. We start observing 
each respondent in the month after one finished school, and end observing him or her at the 
moment of survey. We analyse working hours adjustments of all women and men in our data, 
regardless of whether they were primary or secondary respondents, and we base the analysis on 
the months in which respondents were between 20 and 55 years of age. 
 
4.3.1  Changes in labour market participation 
We are interested in four possible changes in labour market participation: employment entry, 
employment exit, increase of working hours, and reduction of working hours. We apply logistic 
regression analyses on the person-month file to establish effects of independent variables on the 
probability to experience each of these four events. Employment entry is defined as finding a job 
after a period of non-employment, and we record the transition into employment in the month the 
respondent found a job. The risk set for the analysis on employment entry consists of all months 
in which respondents do not have a job. Employment exit is defined as exactly the opposite: a 
transition from an employment situation to a non-employment situation, and the risk set consists 
of all months in which respondents have a job. Working hours represent actual working hours, 
and changes therein can be either within a job or between jobs, which are both recorded in our 
data. An increase of at least eight hours a week is considered as a transition into more working 
hours. This means that we only regard at least one working day more a week as a substantial 
change in the total number of working hours for the household. We top-coded the number of 
working hours at 40 hours a week, so obviously, only in months that the respondent works 32 
hours at the most, he or she is at risk to increase working hours. Analogously, a reduction of eight 
or more hours a week is regarded as a transition into fewer working hours, and respondents are 
only at risk in the months they work at least 9 hours a week. In a sensitivity analysis, we top-
coded the number of weekly working hours at 60 instead of 40. A major consequence is the 
strong increase of the number of events, especially for males. Apparently, increases and 
reductions of actual working hours often take place in the top of the hours distribution. We 
decided to set the maximum at 40 hours a week, since this is the usual maximum number of 
working hours since the 1970s. Results from the sensitivity analysis will be discussed. 
Descriptive information on the events is displayed in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Number of events for females and males by the extent to which their labour market 
 participation changed 
  entry into… exit from… a)     more hours fewer hours 
  females males females males     females males females males 
1 day 126 8 46 3  8-15 hours 282 108 437 109 
2 days 289 5 129 2  16-23 hours 161 45 335 40 
3 days 287 24 252 16  24-31 hours 48 23 115 20 
4 days 201 36 216 29  32-39 hours 19 11 45 11 
5 days 338 763 1199 679       
total 1241 836 1842 729   total 510 187 932 180 
 a) for 3 women and 1 man, it is not known how many days they worked before they left the labour market 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003 
 
4.3.2  Relationship status, partner’s labour market resources, and control variables 
There are two general approaches to analyse the influence of independent variables on events. 
The first approach is based on the idea that the decision to change one’s working hours is a 
response to another change in the couple’s life. For example, the reduction of working hours of 
the wife may be the consequence of an increase in the husband’s occupational status. In this 
approach, both the independent and the dependent variables are measured as events. We did not 
choose this approach because we think that people do not react instantly to an event, and because 
it is difficult to determine or estimate how long the time lag between the events will be. To 
overcome this problem, we have chosen for a second approach, i.e. to model the independent 
variables as states (or situations). For example, we will estimate a model in which the 
occupational status of the husband is the independent variable and the reduction of working hours 
of the wife is the dependent variable. 
We distinguish four categories of relationship status: singleness, non-cohabiting 
relationship, unmarried cohabitation, and marriage. This time dependent variable is based on the 
start and end date of the relationship between the respondent and his or her (ex-)partner, and on 
the dates that they moved to another relational category, for example from a non-cohabiting 
relationship to unmarried cohabitation. For former relationships, only cohabiting or married 
relationships could be distinguished. 
Information on partner’s labour market resources has been added in all months that the 
respondent had a relationship (non-cohabiting, cohabiting, or married) with that specific partner. 
Our information on the respondent’s partner at the moment of interview is complete; for ex-
partners, educational attainment is known in the 1998 and 2000 surveys, and last occupation only 
in the 1998 survey. We consider three partner characteristics. Education has been measured in 
years of schooling, varying from six years for elementary education to 20 years for a postgraduate 
degree1. A dummy variable indicates whether or not the partner has a job (employed=0 and non-
                                                 
1 primary education=6 years, lower vocational education and lower secondary education=10 years, intermediate 
secondary education and reduced intermediate vocational education=11 years, higher secondary education=12 years, 
intermediate vocational education=13 years, higher vocational education=15 years, university=17 years, post-
academic education=20 years. 
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employed=1). We also tested a measure of spouse’s labour market participation that distinguishes 
between non-employment, a small part-time job (1-19 hours), a large part-time job (20-34 hours), 
and a full-time job (35-40 hours). Because we found that the effects of the three employment 
categories did not differ significantly from each other, we decided to use the dichotomized 
measure of spouse’s employment. If the spouse has a job, we measure his or her occupational 
status by ISEI. As an alternative way to measure the impact of the partner’s resources, we have 
constructed difference scores between the respondent’s and the partner’s educational level and 
ISEI. This approach shows to what extent it matters whether the partner is higher educated or has 
a higher occupational status than the respondent, which is more closely related to the ideas of new 
home economics. Results of this sensitivity analyses will be discussed; results reported in the 
models refer to the general way of measuring partner’s resources. All partner variables are time 
dependent. Missing values on partner’s educational level and occupational status have been 
imputed with mean scores. For the partners for whom missing values are the result of the absence 
of a job, the dummy variable with score 1 for partner’s joblessness takes account of the missing 
cases. For the partners for whom missing values indicate real missing information, dichotomous 
indicators have been included in the models (coded 1 for missing); the effects of these indicators 
are not shown in the tables. 
We have a relatively large set of indicators of individual human capital to ascertain that 
effects of the spouse’s labour market resources are not confounded with the effects of one’s own 
human capital. Educational attainment has been measured in years of schooling (6-20 years). 
Occupational status has been measured by the International Socioeconomic Index (ISEI) 
(Ganzeboom, de Graaf, & Treiman, 1992). In the months in which people are non-employed (and 
thus at risk of experiencing employment entry), we used the occupational status of the last job (if 
any, otherwise we have a missing case). Work experience is the total number of months 
(transformed into years) that a person has been employed at a particular moment. During non-
employment spells, the amount of work experience remains unchanged, and continues to rise 
again in the month a new employment spell starts. We added a quadratic term of work experience 
as well, so that the duration effect is well covered. A dummy variable indicates whether or not 
people have any supervisory authority over other employees. In case of non-employment, we 
again included the information on the last job. Finally, the number of weekly working hours 
ranges from 1 up to 40. Missing values on education, (last) occupational status, and working 
hours have been imputed with mean scores, and dummy variables (score 1 if initial value is 
missing) have been added to the models (but will not be shown in the tables); missing values on 
(last) supervisory authority have been captured in an extra category. All five human capital 
indicators are time dependent except for education, since people start to be at risk after finishing 
education. Religiosity is included as a proxy for traditional values. If either the respondent or the 
partner (if any) is religious, we assume the couple to be religious.  
The presence and age of children is classified in four categories and vary over the life 
course: no children, youngest child is under the age of four, youngest child is four years or older 
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and still living in the household, and children have left the parental home (empty nest). A fifth 
category comprises missing values. This information is based on the dates of birth of all children, 
the dates that each child has left the parental home (if there is missing information, we assume the 
child left home at age 18) and, in exceptional cases, the dates of children’s death. We do know 
whether respondents have children from prior relationships, but we have no information on where 
they are living. These children are assumed to have left the home of the father after the divorce, 
and to live in the household of widowed fathers and divorced or widowed mothers (until the age 
of 18). 
In all models we include controls for historical period and duration of being at risk. 
Historical period is controlled for by means of five dummy variables: 1940-1959, 1960-1969, 
1970-1979, 1980-1989, and 1990-2003. To test whether partner effects have changed over time, 
we construct linear interaction terms between, for example, partner’s education and year, in 
which year has been recoded to 0 for the first period, and to 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, and 4.7 for the four 
other periods. This implies that historical changes can be interpreted in decades. The duration of 
being at risk of experiencing employment entry, employment exit, or an increase or reduction in 
working hours, respectively, has been divided into five categories: less than two years, two to 
four years, five to nine years, ten years or more, and a category that comprises missing values. 
We will not control for age because it correlates strongly with work experience, especially for 
men. In addition, we believe that the effects of the life course are captured sufficiently by the 
relationship status and the age of the children. 
All independent variables, apart from historical period and duration, are lagged one month 
to ascertain that they represent the situation before the transition took place. The analyses will be 
done separately for men and women. Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics for all independent 
variables for females and males. 
 
Table 4.2 Statistics of independent variables for females and males, based on the sample of months in which they are aged between 20 and 
55 and the respondent is at risk of labour market entry and exit respectively (average of all months per respondent) 
    at risk of labour market entry   at risk of labour market exit 
    females males  females  males 
    N mean st dev  N mean st dev  N mean st dev   N mean st dev 
historical period              
 year 1940-1959 1,890 0.02  1,113 0.07   2,519 0.05   2,542 0.03  
 year 1960-1969 1,890 0.08  1,113 0.08   2,519 0.09   2,542 0.07  
 year 1970-1979 1,890 0.17  1,113 0.14   2,519 0.13   2,542 0.14  
 year 1980-1989 1,890 0.28  1,113 0.32   2,519 0.22   2,542 0.24  
 year 1990-2003 1,890 0.47  1,113 0.40   2,519 0.52   2,542 0.52  
duration at risk               
 duration < 2 years 1,890 0.32  1,113 0.64   2,519 0.22   2,542 0.13  
 duration 2-4 years 1,890 0.15  1,113 0.12   2,519 0.19   2,542 0.12  
 duration 5-9 years 1,890 0.25  1,113 0.13   2,519 0.39   2,542 0.29  
 duration >= 10 years 1,890 0.27  1,113 0.12   2,519 0.20   2,542 0.46  
  missing value duration 1,890 0.00    1,113 0.01     2,519 0.01     2,542 0.01   
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Table 4.2 Continued… 
    at risk of labour market entry at risk of labour market exit 
    females males females  males 
    N mean st dev  N mean st dev  N mean st dev   N mean st dev 
human capital               
 education in years (6-20) a) 1,879 11.11 3.07 1,110 12.05 3.28  2,510 11.80 3.00  2,533 12.09 3.26
 occupational status (10-88) a) b) 1,539 45.56 14.31 678 42.45 14.37  2,503 47.05 14.04  2,530 48.06 14.10
 work experience (0-39) a) 1,890 6.34 5.91 1,113 5.92 9.65  2,519 7.53 5.03  2,542 11.67 6.17
 work experience square (0-1521) a) 1,890 77.56 150.24 1,113 131.21 297.14  2,519 102.48 124.55  2,542 220.25 181.43
 supervising b) 1,890 0.10  1,113 0.11   2,519 0.15   2,542 0.35  
 not supervising b) 1,890 0.69  1,113 0.46   2,519 0.82   2,542 0.64  
 missing value supervising b) 1,890 0.21  1,113 0.43   2,519 0.03   2,542 0.01  
 working hours (3-40) a)        2,507 31.74   2,536 38.62  
religiosity               
 respondent and/or partner religious 1,890 0.59  1,113 0.53   2,519 0.57   2,542 0.55  
 respondent and partner not religious 1,890 0.37  1,113 0.43   2,519 0.39   2,542 0.41  
 missing value religiosity 1,890 0.04  1,113 0.04   2,519 0.04   2,542 0.03  
children               
 no children in household 1,890 0.25  1,113 0.69   2,519 0.66   2,542 0.51  
 youngest child < 4 1,890 0.39  1,113 0.11   2,519 0.12   2,542 0.22  
 youngest child >=4 1,890 0.30  1,113 0.15   2,519 0.17   2,542 0.23  
 empty nest 1,890 0.06  1,113 0.06   2,519 0.04   2,542 0.04  
 missing value children 1,890 0.00  1,113 0.00   2,519 0.00   2,542 0.00  
relationship status               
 single 1,890 0.10  1,112 0.30   2,517 0.15   2,542 0.15  
 non-cohabiting relationship 1,890 0.05  1,112 0.25   2,517 0.22   2,542 0.14  
 unmarried cohabitation 1,890 0.08  1,112 0.10   2,517 0.15   2,542 0.12  
 marriage 1,890 0.76  1,112 0.35   2,517 0.48   2,542 0.58  
partner’s resources               
 partner’s education (6-20) a) c) 1,659 11.85 3.31 810 11.58 3.23  2,216 12.22 3.18  2,289 11.54 3.03
 partner job c) 1,766 0.79  863 0.49   2,366 0.79   2,395 0.53  
 partner no job c) 1,766 0.13  863 0.44   2,366 0.13   2,395 0.39  
 missing value partner job c) 1,766 0.07  863 0.08   2,366 0.08   2,395 0.08  
  partner’s occupational status (10-88) a) d) 1,490 48.14 14.92  535 47.37 15.47   2,033 48.46 14.68   2,044 47.01 14.07
N respondents 1,890  1,113   2,519   2,542  
N months 324,859  90,267   381,022   634,233  
N events 1,241    836     1,845     730   
a) only from non-missing observations 
b) in analysis on labour market entry, occupational status and supervising refer to last job 
c) average of the months in which respondent has a partner (N respondents: female entry 1766; male entry 863; female exit 2366; male exit 2395) 
d) average of the months in which respondent has a working partner (N respondents: female entry 1500; male entry 540; female exit 2045; male 
exit 2054) 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003 
 
4.4  Results 
Before we consider the impact of partner’s resources on changes in labour market participation, 
we first pay attention to the impact of having a partner. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the results of 
relationship status for females and males respectively. Married women are clearly less likely to 
extend their labour market participation—that is to enter the labour market or to increase their 
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weekly number of working hours—than single women, but also compared to women with a 
(non-)cohabiting relationship. At the same time, labour market exit and reduction of working 
hours are much more common among married women, followed by unmarried cohabiting 
women, non-cohabiting, and single women. The differences are substantial: compared to single 
women, married women are about half as likely to enter the labour market and to increase their 
working hours, almost 4.5 times as likely to leave the labour market, and over three times as 
likely to reduce their working hours. This pattern perfectly corroborates the role theory that 
emphasizes women’s caring role if they have a family. 
Adjustments in male labour market participation depend on relational status as well, 
although to a lesser extent than women’s. Exit chances are lowest for married men, but also 
(non-)cohabiting men are less likely to leave the labour market than single men. Furthermore, 
married men and men in a non-cohabiting relationship have higher probabilities of increasing 
their working hours and lower probabilities of reducing their working hours than single men, and 
they do not differ significantly from cohabiting men. This is in line with male role expectations: 
men who are responsible for a family show stronger labour market attachment2. 
The models in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 that are only based on respondents with a partner, reveal 
to what extent adjustments in labour market participation of women and men depend on the 
resources of the partner. If people make such decisions on economic grounds, there should be a 
negative relationship between partner’s education, occupational status, and employment on the 
one hand, and increases in labour market participation on the other hand, and a positive 
relationship between partner’s resources and decreases of labour market participation. Overall, 
we have to conclude that such a relationship is not found, and that our results do not support the 
economic hypothesis. Among many non-significant effects, we do however find two exceptions: 
women with highly educated husbands are more likely to work one day or more a week less 
(b=0.050; exp(b)=1.051), and the higher the education of his wife, the less likely it is for a man to 
increase his weekly working hours (b=-0.077; exp(b)=0.926). Furthermore, there are some 
indications of opposite partner effects. This means that a resourceful spouse does not restrict the 
other spouse’s labour market participation, but enhances it. We find, for example, that a woman 
whose husband has a high occupational status is less likely to leave the labour force, and is more 
likely to increase her working hours. To put it differently, male success on the labour market 
coincides with a high female labour market participation. For men, we observe a supportive effect 
of wives’ employment status on the likelihood of labour market exit: men with non-employed
                                                 
2 A sensitivity analysis, in which we set the maximum number of working hours to 60, shows partly different effects 
of relationship status. The higher probability to reduce working hours for women with a partner does apply to all 
kinds of relationships when a maximum of 40 hours is considered, but does not apply to women with a non-
cohabiting relationship when a maximum of 60 is considered. The smaller probability to reduce working hours for 
men who are married or have a non-cohabiting relationship and the higher probability of married men to increase 
working hours, is not replicated in the analysis with a maximum of 60 hours. 
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 Table 4.3 Logistic regression coefficients on females’ probability of labour market entry and exit and transitions into more and fewer hours 
FEMALES entry   exit   more hours    fewer hours 
 all respondents with partner  all respondents with partner  all respondents with partner  all respondents with partner 
  b   se   b   se  b   se  b   se  b   se  b   se  b   se  b   se 
intercept -5.318 ** 0.208  -6.255 ** 0.230  -5.007 ** 0.192 -3.361 ** 0.201  -4.217 ** 0.399 -5.243 ** 0.473  -11.680 ** 0.380 -10.825 ** 0.408
year 1940-1959 -0.117  0.248  -0.516  0.358  0.031  0.123 0.144  0.132  -0.783  0.766 n.e.    -0.250  0.395 -0.224  0.452
year 1960-1969 0    0    0   0   0   0    0   0   
year 1970-1979 0.366 ** 0.133  0.433 ** 0.147  -0.478 ** 0.079 -0.609 ** 0.082  0.325  0.330 0.363  0.382  0.399 * 0.203 0.413  0.217
year 1980-1989 0.451 ** 0.129  0.525 ** 0.144  -0.920 ** 0.081 -1.105 ** 0.085  0.502  0.306 0.630  0.355  0.838 ** 0.190 0.807 ** 0.206
year 1990-2003 0.905 ** 0.126  1.014 ** 0.141  -0.962 ** 0.082 -1.168 ** 0.086  0.677 * 0.302 0.801 * 0.351  1.268 ** 0.188 1.222 ** 0.204
duration < 2 years 0    0    0   0   0   0    0   0   
duration 2-4 years -0.563 ** 0.091  -0.506 ** 0.101  -0.140  0.088 -0.035  0.095  -0.215  0.125 -0.131  0.138  -0.124  0.117 -0.092  0.124
duration 5-9 years -0.862 ** 0.080  -0.777 ** 0.087  -0.101  0.086 -0.049  0.092  -0.154  0.130 -0.071  0.141  -0.162  0.119 -0.163  0.125
duration >= 10 years -1.842 ** 0.100  -1.717 ** 0.108  -0.309 * 0.122 -0.233  0.128  -0.182  0.195 -0.021  0.209  -0.206  0.165 -0.210  0.173
human capital                                                            
education 0.082 ** 0.011  0.089 ** 0.013  -0.052 ** 0.009 -0.057 ** 0.011  0.041 * 0.019 0.054 * 0.022  0.053 ** 0.014 0.030  0.016
occupational status a) 0.004  0.002  0.003  0.002  -0.006 ** 0.002 -0.005 ** 0.002  0.001  0.003 0.002  0.004  -0.013 ** 0.002 -0.014 ** 0.003
work experience -0.003  0.017  -0.006  0.018  -0.038 * 0.016 -0.035 * 0.017  -0.117 ** 0.022 -0.116 ** 0.024  -0.007  0.021 -0.005  0.023
work experience square -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001  0.002 ** 0.001 0.002 ** 0.001  -0.001  0.001 -0.001  0.001
supervising a) 0.074  0.095  0.051  0.101  -0.253 ** 0.070 -0.246 ** 0.075  -0.235  0.155 -0.194  0.166  -0.303 ** 0.092 -0.319 ** 0.096
working hours b)         0.026 ** 0.003 0.028 ** 0.003  -0.053 ** 0.006 -0.061 ** 0.006  0.120 ** 0.007 0.127 ** 0.007
religiosity                                                            
respondent and/or partner 
religious -0.161 ** 0.061  -0.144 * 0.066  0.050  0.051 0.130 * 0.054  -0.070  0.093 -0.099  0.102  0.005  0.070 0.016  0.074
children                                                            
no children 0    0    0   0   0   0    0   0   
youngest child < 4 -0.776 ** 0.091  -0.720 ** 0.098  0.307 ** 0.067 0.315 ** 0.068  -1.086 ** 0.176 -1.135 ** 0.185  0.917 ** 0.090 0.940 ** 0.092
youngest child >= 4 0.254 ** 0.095  0.280 ** 0.105  -0.791 ** 0.094 -0.771 ** 0.097  -0.249  0.137 -0.265  0.146  -0.353 * 0.137 -0.337 * 0.143
empty nest -0.482 ** 0.170   -0.552 ** 0.192   -0.123  0.147  -0.167  0.161   -1.132 ** 0.314  -1.254 ** 0.344   -0.615 * 0.279  -0.602 * 0.302
relationship status                                                            
single 0    n.a.    0   n.a.   0   n.a.    0   n.a.   
non-cohabiting relationship 0.253 * 0.125  0.898 ** 0.120  0.100  0.105 -1.529 ** 0.086  0.158  0.168 0.865 ** 0.164  0.312 * 0.155 -0.890 ** 0.121
unmarried cohabitation -0.072  0.125  0.535 ** 0.111  0.747 ** 0.117 -0.722 ** 0.089  -0.046  0.162 0.612 ** 0.146  0.874 ** 0.144 -0.298 ** 0.098
marriage -0.556 ** 0.098  0    1.491 ** 0.092 0    -0.630 ** 0.152 0    1.166 ** 0.133 0   
partner’s resources                                                            
partner’s education     0.018  0.012     0.008  0.010     -0.027  0.019     0.050 ** 0.015
partner no job     -0.169  0.098     0.012  0.077     0.159  0.149     -0.013  0.110
partner’s occupational status         -0.001   0.003          -0.004 * 0.002          0.009 * 0.004          -0.005   0.003
N respondents 1,890    1,766    2,519   2,366    1,637   1,561    2,492   2,342   
N respondent-months 324,869  302,838  381,042 324,099  176,688 164,855  358,358 303,085 
N events 1,241       1,076       1,845      1,685       510      432       932      859     
** p<.01;  * p<.05;  n.a. not applicable;  n.e. not estimated 
a) in the analysis on labour market entry, occupational status and supervising authority refer to last job 
b) in the analysis on labour market entry, working hours are not included 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003 
 
  
Table 4.4 Logistic regression coefficients on males’ probability of labour market entry and exit and transitions into more and fewer hours 
MALES entry exit more hours fewer hours 
 all respondents with partner all respondents with partner all respondents with partner all respondents with partner 
  b   se   b   se  b   se  b   se  b   se  b   se  b   se  b   se 
intercept -3.218 ** 0.213  -3.128 ** 0.351  -4.488 ** 0.450 -4.925 ** 0.603  -3.311 ** 0.580 -2.127 ** 0.772  -9.253 ** 0.885 -9.275 ** 1.111
year 1940-1959 -0.082  0.160  -0.187  0.232  0.161  0.196 0.227  0.296  0.127  0.576 -0.490  0.732  -0.059  0.594 0.238  0.820
year 1960-1969 0    0    0   0   0   0    0   0   
year 1970-1979 0.018  0.141  0.016  0.188  0.051  0.155 0.092  0.203 -0.149  0.417 -0.246  0.459  0.125  0.390 0.193  0.479
year 1980-1989 0.057  0.127  0.135  0.176  0.340 * 0.141 0.492 ** 0.189 0.199  0.375 0.134  0.415  0.749 * 0.349 0.658  0.446
year 1990-2003 0.144  0.131  0.168  0.179  0.234  0.144 0.371  0.193 0.157  0.367 0.212  0.415  0.885 * 0.344 0.686  0.445
duration < 2 years 0    0    0   0   0   0    0   0   
duration 2-4 years -0.416 ** 0.090  -0.442 ** 0.113  -0.588 ** 0.120 -0.770 ** 0.162 -0.075  0.191 -0.122  0.219  -0.147  0.262 0.083  0.321
duration 5-9 years -1.706 ** 0.125  -1.872 ** 0.154  -1.107 ** 0.133 -1.170 ** 0.158 -0.231  0.223 -0.236  0.247  -0.630 * 0.271 -0.538  0.333
duration >= 10 years -3.532 ** 0.271  -3.703 ** 0.327  -1.814 ** 0.197 -1.875 ** 0.216 -0.541  0.370 -0.464  0.381  -1.416 ** 0.368 -1.046 * 0.429
human capital                                                            
education 0.010  0.013  0.016  0.017  -0.020  0.014 -0.030  0.018 0.064 * 0.031 0.075  0.038  0.159 ** 0.030 0.129 ** 0.037
occupational status a) 0.000  0.003  0.002  0.004  -0.012 ** 0.003 -0.013 ** 0.004 -0.022 ** 0.006 -0.015 * 0.007  -0.007  0.006 -0.006  0.007
work experience -0.023  0.019  -0.005  0.022  -0.064 ** 0.021 -0.055 * 0.024 -0.063  0.038 -0.057  0.042  0.098 * 0.044 0.054  0.050
work experience square -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.002 ** 0.001 0.002 ** 0.001 -0.001  0.001 -0.001  0.001  -0.003 * 0.001 -0.002  0.001
supervising a) 0.089  0.119  0.009  0.140  -0.375 ** 0.093 -0.268 ** 0.104 -0.831 ** 0.258 -0.733 ** 0.276  -0.578 ** 0.181 -0.571 ** 0.201
working hours b)         0.003  0.010 0.000  0.011 -0.037 ** 0.008 -0.044 ** 0.010  -0.002  0.017 -0.018  0.018
religiosity                                                           
respondent and/or partner 
religious -0.093  0.075  -0.071  0.093  0.010  0.080 -0.054  0.095 -0.055  0.164 0.026  0.189  -0.265  0.160 -0.335  0.183
children                                                            
no children 0    0    0   0   0   0    0   0   
youngest child < 4 -0.305 * 0.147  -0.386 * 0.160  0.114  0.143 0.054  0.155 -0.464  0.257 -0.509  0.278  -0.198  0.246 -0.207  0.261
youngest child >= 4 -0.563 ** 0.179  -0.651 ** 0.192  0.175  0.164 0.037  0.182 -0.310  0.342 -0.428  0.363  -0.040  0.280 -0.041  0.308
empty nest -0.721 ** 0.277   -0.872 ** 0.309   0.203  0.233  -0.018  0.265  -0.342  0.776  -0.408  0.796   -0.450  0.570  -0.502  0.671
relationship status                                                            
single 0    n.a.    0   n.a.   0   n.a.    0   n.a.   
non-cohabiting relationship 0.341 ** 0.090  0.178  0.135  -0.331 ** 0.111 0.399 ** 0.148 0.707 ** 0.233 0.204  0.246  -0.622 * 0.270 -0.155  0.293
unmarried cohabitation 0.269 * 0.130  0.119  0.147  -0.414 ** 0.149 0.314  0.163 0.303  0.260 -0.168  0.260  -0.488  0.271 0.031  0.273
marriage 0.113  0.127  0    -0.683 ** 0.131 0   0.522 * 0.259 0    -0.561 * 0.245 0   
partner’s resources                                                            
partner’s education     -0.003  0.019     0.011  0.019    -0.077 * 0.036     0.062  0.038
partner no job     -0.138  0.095     0.355 ** 0.098    -0.074  0.200     -0.040  0.201
partner’s occupational status         0.000   0.004          -0.006   0.005         -0.001   0.008          -0.002   0.008
N respondents 1,113    863    2,542   2,395    351   290    2,534   2,391   
N respondent-months 90,273  71,319  634,253 556,966  28,901 24,546  627,726 551,637 
N events 836       559       730      523       187      150       180      138     
** p<.01;  * p<.05;  n.a. not applicable 
a) in the analysis on labour market entry, occupational status and supervising authority refer to last job 
b) in the analysis on labour market entry, working hours are not included 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003 
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wives are more likely to leave the labour market; or, in other words, men with employed wives 
are less likely to become non-employed3 4. 
If we measure the effect of partner’s resources as a difference score between partner’s and 
respondent’s education and occupational status, all partner effects reported above become non-
significant except for the effect of husbands’ education on the probability of reducing working 
hours for women: a woman is more likely to reduce working hours if her husband is higher 
educated than she is. We have to conclude that neither way of measuring partner effects leads to 
clear support for the economic hypothesis.  
A brief look at other interesting results from our analysis shows that individual human 
capital enhances labour market participation of women and restrains them from lowering their 
working hours (except for the positive effect of female education on the odds of reducing 
working hours), whereas for men results are mixed: highly educated men are both more likely to 
increase and reduce their working hours, and occupational status reduces the likelihood of both 
labour market exit and increasing working hours. Furthermore, women are found to be more 
likely to stop working and are less likely to become employed if they (and/or their partner) are 
religious. Finally, the presence of young children has a strong positive effect on labour market 
exit and reduction of working hours of women, while it negatively affects women’s labour 
market entry and increase of working hours. When children are at a school-going age, it is the 
other way round: women are more likely to increase their labour market participation and less 
likely to reduce it. Children hardly affect male decisions with respect to labour market 
participation, except for the finding that men are less likely to become employed when they have 
children. 
Although we find no strong support for the economic mechanism so far, we think it is too 
early to reject it completely. We suggested that the restrictive effect of partners’ resources might 
very well be present only in certain situations. To test these hypotheses, we include interaction 
terms between partner’s resources on the one hand, and historical period, human capital, and 
children on the other hand. The results are displayed in Table 4.5 for women and in Table 4.6 for 
men. The upper panel considers the historical perspective. We had expected that the economic 
mechanism was mainly important for women in earlier decades. Evidence is not very convincing; 
we only find that the negative relationship between husbands’ employment status and women’s 
odds of becoming non-employed in earlier decades has turned positive in recent decades. The 
trend for the odds of reducing working hours is similar, but the negative effect of husbands’ 
employment status has never been significant in our observation period. The hypothesis that men 
would experience more restriction from their partners’ resources nowadays than they did in the 
                                                 
3 Additional analyses have revealed that the economic hypothesis would not get more support if partner’s education 
and partner’s occupational status are included separately, instead of together. Although the two effects are mostly 
non-significant, the effects go in different directions; so the one does not serve as an explanation for the other. 
Effects of partner’s education or partner’s occupational status on adjustments of female labor market participation all 
become non-significant if the other variable is left out. 
4 Conclusions about effects of partner’s resources do not alter if the maximum number of working hours is set to 60. 
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past needs to be rejected completely. It is surprising that, despite the major societal changes with 
respect to attitudes towards division of labour, the way spouses affect each other has not changed 
that much. The neglect of a historical perspective in most earlier research does not seem to be the 
reason for the inconclusiveness of the findings. 
A second condition we study is individual human capital, and we expect that decisions 
concerning labour market participation of people with a lot of human capital are less influenced 
by their partners’ resources, and that the economic mechanisms will mainly apply to people with 
little human capital. In general, support is very meagre again. There are hardly any significant 
interaction terms in the second panel of Tables 4.5 and 4.6. Indeed, there is some proof that men 
and women with much human capital make labour market participation decisions more 
independently of their spouses’ resources than their counterparts with little human capital. 
However, it usually seems that partners’ resources enhance instead of restrict labour market 
participation of people with little human capital, which contradicts our hypothesis. For example, a 
highly educated wife increases the odds of entering and decreases the odds of leaving the labour 
force of a poorly educated man, but wives’ education does not affect the same odds of highly 
educated men (0.151-14*0.012=-0.017 for entry; -0.125+14*0.012=0.043 for exit). The sole 
finding that is in line with our hypothesis is that poorly educated men are hindered in increasing 
their working hours when their wives have higher occupational status, whereas highly educated 
men with comparable wives are not. 
Finally, we test whether the economic mechanism holds under the condition that the 
couple has children. Child birth often requires more time investments in the household at the 
expense of time investments on the labour market. It seems likely that this is the moment for 
couples to base working hours adjustments on economic considerations. This hypothesis finds 
partial support (see lowest panel in Tables 4.5 and 4.6). Childless women’s decisions to leave the 
labour force are independent of their husbands’ educational achievement, but mothers are more 
likely to leave the labour force if they have highly educated husbands. Not exactly the same, but 
in the same direction, are the effects on women’s probability to enter the labour market: whereas 
childless women can benefit from their husbands’ education and occupational status, mothers 
find no support from their husbands’ resources. Although these results do not indicate that 
mothers’ entry chances are restricted by the resources of their husbands, they do show that 
mothers benefit less from their partners’ resources than childless women. Men appear to be less 
likely to increase their working hours as their partners’ occupational status increases, but only if 
they have young children, which supports our hypothesis too. However, we would like to note 
that many of the interaction effects are non-significant, and that the restrictive partner effect for 
couples with children is predominantly found for women. We will come back to the latter in the 
next section. With respect to the effect of an empty nest, the results for women suggest that in this 
life stage, the tendency to stop working or to diminish working hours is higher if the partner is 
(already) non-employed. We interpret this effect as couples’ tendency to jointly start retreating 
from the labour market at the end of their working lives. 
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Table 4.5 Influence of the spouse by individual human capital, children, and year on females’ probability 
 of labour market entry or exit and the transition into more or fewer hours a) 
FEMALES entry   exit   more hours  fewer hours 
  b   se   b   se  b  se  b   se 
partner’s resources * year                             
partner’s education 0.037  0.034  0.039 * 0.020  -0.080  0.073  0.015  0.047 
  * year (0-4.7) -0.005  0.009  -0.010  0.006  0.013  0.017  0.009  0.012 
partner no job 0.277  0.355  -0.774 ** 0.207  0.999  0.663  -0.973  0.502 
  * year (0-4.7) -0.117  0.091  0.246 ** 0.057  -0.207  0.161  0.240 * 0.120 
partner’s occupational status -0.005  0.008  -0.001  0.005  0.018  0.018  0.003  0.011 
  * year (0-4.7) 0.001  0.002  -0.001  0.001  -0.002  0.004  -0.002  0.003 
partner resources * human capital                         
partner’s education 0.064  0.038  0.045  0.031  0.060  0.074  0.149 ** 0.056 
  * education -0.004  0.003  -0.003  0.003  -0.007  0.006  -0.008  0.004 
partner’s education 0.059  0.034  -0.003  0.026  0.079  0.051  0.013  0.038 
  * occupational status b) -0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.002 * 0.001  0.001  0.001 
                
partner no job -0.319  0.380  -0.484  0.284  0.273  0.678  -0.054  0.492 
  * education 0.013  0.031  0.043  0.024  -0.008  0.051  0.003  0.038 
partner no job -0.081  0.340  -0.090  0.242  0.625  0.426  0.071  0.352 
  * occupational status b) -0.002  0.007  0.002  0.005  -0.010  0.008  -0.002  0.007 
                
partner’s occupational status 0.002  0.009  -0.005  0.008  0.020  0.017  -0.002  0.012 
  * education 0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001 
partner’s occupational status 0.008  0.008  -0.006  0.006  0.023 * 0.011  -0.009  0.008 
  * occupational status b) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
partner’s resources * child situation                         
partner’s education 0.071 ** 0.021  -0.011  0.012  -0.027  0.026  0.041 * 0.018 
  * no child (ref)                
  * child <4 -0.070 * 0.027  0.048 * 0.019  -0.025  0.053  0.039  0.027 
  * child >=4 -0.068 ** 0.025  0.055 * 0.024  0.001  0.034  -0.031  0.039 
  * empty nest -0.065  0.052  0.013  0.043  0.069  0.096  0.082  0.086 
                
partner no job -0.143  0.159  -0.090  0.101  0.048  0.195  -0.169  0.140 
  * no child (ref)                
  * child <4 0.397  0.240  0.127  0.188  -0.110  0.561  0.482  0.252 
  * child >=4 -0.331  0.244  0.242  0.254  0.306  0.329  0.056  0.423 
  * empty nest -0.289  0.450  0.723 * 0.318  0.972  0.735  1.187 * 0.604 
                
partner’s occupational status 0.011 * 0.004  -0.004  0.003  0.011 * 0.005  -0.004  0.004 
  * no child (ref)                
  * child <4 -0.017 ** 0.006  -0.003  0.004  -0.018  0.012  -0.005  0.006 
  * child >=4 -0.015 ** 0.005  0.001  0.006  0.002  0.008  0.013  0.009 
  * empty nest -0.008   0.012   -0.003   0.011   -0.003   0.024   0.004   0.021 
** p<.01;  * p<.05 
a) every interaction term has been added separately to the baseline model; interactions with having a partner are based on the sample of months 
with all respondents, interactions with partner’s resources are based on the sample of months in which respondents have a partner 
b) in the analysis on labour market entry, occupational status refers to last job 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003 
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Table 4.6 Influence of the spouse by individual human capital, children, and year on males’ probability of 
 labour market entry or exit and the transition into more or fewer hours a) 
MALES entry   exit   more hours  fewer hours 
  b   se   b   se  b   se  b  se 
partner’s resources * year                            
partner’s education -0.028  0.044  -0.020  0.051  -0.025  0.101  0.218 0.116 
  * year (0-4.7) 0.007  0.012  0.009  0.014  -0.014  0.025  -0.041 0.029 
partner no job -0.123  0.264  -0.263  0.304  -0.967  0.712  0.135 0.705 
  * year (0-4.7) -0.004  0.073  0.170 * 0.079  0.235  0.178  -0.050 0.179 
partner’s occupational status 0.006  0.010  -0.006  0.014  0.028  0.031  0.053 0.034 
  * year (0-4.7) -0.002  0.003  0.000  0.004  -0.008  0.008  -0.013 0.008 
partner’s resources * human capital                        
partner’s education 0.151 * 0.060  -0.125 * 0.051  -0.073  0.125  -0.005 0.127 
  * education -0.012 ** 0.005  0.012 ** 0.004  0.000  0.009  0.005 0.009 
partner’s education 0.024  0.053  -0.004  0.049  -0.030  0.103  -0.040 0.100 
  * occupational status b) -0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.001  0.002  0.002 0.002 
               
partner no job 0.229  0.362  0.420  0.354  -1.196  0.891  -0.336 0.841 
  * education -0.030  0.029  -0.006  0.030  0.080  0.061  0.022 0.061 
partner no job 0.272  0.319  0.484  0.306  0.043  0.603  -0.309 0.640 
  * occupational status b) -0.010  0.007  -0.003  0.007  -0.002  0.011  0.005 0.012 
               
partner’s occupational status 0.019  0.016  -0.001  0.017  -0.091 ** 0.035  -0.016 0.034 
  * education -0.002  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.006 ** 0.002  0.001 0.002 
partner’s occupational status 0.017  0.014  0.011  0.015  -0.021  0.026  -0.019 0.025 
  * occupational status b) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 
partner’s resources * child situation                        
partner’s education -0.017  0.022  0.026  0.026  -0.043  0.047  0.061 0.052 
  * no child (ref)               
  * child <4 0.066  0.040  0.019  0.041  -0.113  0.072  0.084 0.077 
  * child >=4 0.070  0.049  -0.061  0.040  -0.019  0.084  -0.022 0.076 
  * empty nest -0.166  0.092  -0.038  0.067  -0.072  0.204  -0.433 0.243 
               
partner no job -0.234 * 0.114  0.363 ** 0.136  -0.072  0.254  -0.112 0.321 
  * no child (ref)               
  * child <4 0.275  0.291  -0.075  0.268  0.362  0.513  -0.047 0.488 
  * child >=4 0.462  0.301  -0.069  0.231  -0.437  0.561  0.107 0.479 
  * empty nest 0.351  0.708  0.567  0.465  0.590  1.478  1.045 1.268 
               
partner’s occupational status -0.003  0.005  -0.010  0.006  0.012  0.010  0.006 0.011 
  * no child (ref)               
  * child <4 -0.003  0.014  0.010  0.014  -0.060 * 0.024  -0.022 0.021 
  * child >=4 0.026 * 0.013  0.005  0.011  -0.019  0.022  -0.015 0.019 
  * empty nest 0.014   0.044   0.035   0.022   0.012   0.080   0.002  0.062 
** p<.01;  * p<.05 
a) every interaction term has been added separately to the baseline model; interactions with having a partner are based on the sample of months 
with all respondents, interactions with partner’s resources are based on the sample of months in which respondents have a partner 
b) in the analysis on labour market entry, occupational status refers to last job 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003 
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4.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we extensively tested the economic hypothesis in the case of the Netherlands. We 
did this by examining the impact of partner’s labour market resources on adjustments in labour 
market participation of men and women. We estimated the effects of partner’s educational level, 
employment status, and occupational status on transitions into and out of employment, and on 
changes in the number of weekly working hours. We set out to solve the inconclusiveness of 
earlier findings, and tested the influence of the partner’s resources under several conditions: 
historical period, level of human capital, and presence and age of children. The general 
conclusion is that labour market participation is not restricted by partner’s resources, even not 
under specific conditions. It is clear that this result refutes the economic hypothesis. Apparently, 
men with highly educated wives are as likely to work a day a week less than men with poorly 
educated wives, and women with high-status husbands are as likely to enter the labour market as 
women with low-status husbands. We did not solve the inconclusiveness of earlier findings, but 
our results lead us to believe that, at least as far as the Netherlands are concerned, the division of 
paid work within households is not dependent on economic factors. Particularly, we want to 
stress that, although there is a strong variety in the number of working hours of women in the 
Netherlands, adjustments in these working hours are not affected by the husband’s human capital 
at all. 
We think that cultural factors (general norms and individual values or attitudes) are much 
more important. Firstly, the results in this chapter show that the patterns in the division of labour 
market participation are in concordance with traditional gender roles: married (or cohabiting) 
women are more likely to reduce work time and less likely to increase it, whereas the presence of 
a partner makes men more attached to the labour market. Furthermore, young children clearly 
hinder female labour market participation, whereas mothers with school-age children are more 
likely to enter the labour market than childless women, which is all in concordance with the role-
specialization hypothesis. 
A second indication of gender role behaviour shows from the findings concerning the 
interaction effects between partner’s resources and the presence and age of children. Our 
conclusion that there is a stronger negative relationship between resources of the partner and 
labour market participation when children are present, mainly refers to women: whereas the 
impact of partner’s resources is the same for men with or without children, for women with 
children, labour market participation is more restricted by their husbands’ resources than for 
women without children. The fact that children make a difference in the decision structure of 
women but not in that of men, can be considered to support the idea of gender role behaviour as 
well: women’s labour market behaviour is more receptive to partner effects than male labour 
market behaviour, possibly because of the difference between the male labour role and the female 
labour and caring role. 
Finally, the results on religiosity show that women are more likely to leave the labour 
market and less likely to become employed if the couple (at least one of the two spouses) is 
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religious. In the Netherlands, religiosity is an important proxy for traditional values with regard to 
women’s labour market participation and the gender specific division of labour, and our findings 
show that personal values and attitudes influence labour market participation decisions, at least as 
far as women are concerned. 
If we conclude that cultural factors seem more important than economic factors when it 
comes to couples’ division of labour market participation, a paradox arises: the Netherlands are 
usually characterized as a country with progressive values and attitudes concerning female labour 
market participation and division of labour, but with relatively traditional behaviour on these 
issues (Kalmijn & Luijkx, 2006; Treas & Widmer, 2000). Hakim claims that personal preferences 
are the most important determinants of decisions (Hakim, 2000; Hakim, 2002). We believe that 
this claim helps us to understand the paradox. In this respect, it is important to note that values 
and attitudes are general (e.g. all women should be allowed to work, or there is nothing against it 
when mothers work, or fathers are as capable as mothers to raise children), whereas preferences 
are individual and refer to the personal context (e.g. in my case I rather stay at home—regardless 
of my attitudes on working in general). Although values and preferences are correlated, we think 
that traditional labour market outcomes in the Netherlands might be the result of relatively 
traditional preferences despite relatively progressive values in general. Dutch women (and men) 
generally believe that women should be free to be active on the labour market, also if they have 
children; but women prefer to lower their own labour market participation if they have children, 
and men do not. We are strengthened in this belief by findings about actual and preferred 
working time by Dutch men and women which show that a large majority of the Dutch couples 
are happy with their current (on average low) working hours (Portegijs, Hermans, & Lalta, 2006). 
We encourage future research to test the strength of these alternative cultural mechanisms versus 
the economic mechanism; not only in the Netherlands, but in other countries as well, in order to 
understand its true merits. 
We like to emphasize that, in testing and falsifying the economic hypothesis, we have 
focused on the economic mechanism within households, especially whether resources of one 
spouse are negatively related to labour market participation of the other spouse. This might be the 
case either because financial incentives to work are low, or because the household can afford to 
work less. The relationship between individual human capital and labour market participation is 
often assumed to rely on economic mechanisms too. However, the direction of this effect is not 
obvious. On the one hand, people with high levels of human capital have a high earning capacity 
and therefore have financial incentives to work more hours, but on the other hand, such a high 
earning capacity makes it financially more easily affordable to work less. In our opinion, it is 
therefore not clear what findings would corroborate economic mechanisms on the individual 
level, and thus, the right test is on the household level. 
In the introduction we touched on the hypothetical power of the economic mechanism to 
weaken inequality between households. What are the consequences of our findings for inequality 
between households? Although we understand that spouses’ occupational level is a stronger 
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determinant for the household’s socio-economic position than spouses’ labour market 
participation, the absence of the economic mechanism behind couples’ labour market 
participation suggests that inequality between households largely results from assortative mating 
and is not suppressed during the relationship. The wives of successful husband are not inclined to 
work fewer hours than the wives of less successful husbands, and husbands are not going to work 
more if their wives have low levels of human capital.  
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Partner’s resources: support or restriction in the 
occupational career (1940 – 2003)?∗ 
 
 
This study investigates the role of the partner in career mobility in the Netherlands from the 
1940s to the present. Mobility has been defined as upward and downward moves in occupational 
status. Firstly, we hypothesize that having a partner restricts the labour market career of women, 
whereas it supports labour market advancement of men. Secondly, we formulate opposing 
hypotheses about the effect of partners’ resources: social capital notions predict positive partner 
effects, whereas economic theory predicts negative partner effects. Thirdly, we propose trend 
hypotheses: the process of individualization makes us predict declines in partner effects, but the 
processes of cultural and economic modernization lead us to hypothesize a shift from negative to 
positive partner effects on female career mobility. We use event history analysis techniques 
covering the complete labour market careers of 5,068 respondents and their partners (Family 
Survey Dutch Population 1998-2003). We find no evidence for the idea that having a partner has 
an effect on career mobility of women, and we find a small positive effect on men’s mobility. 
Labour market resources of the partner positively affect upward career moves, whereas non-
employment of the partner prevents downward career moves for both men and women. The data 
provide no evidence for historical developments in the influence of the partner on individual 
career mobility. 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Do people have better career chances if they have a partner, and does it matter what resources the 
partner has? This chapter investigates the role of the partner in career mobility over the last six 
                                                 
∗ This chapter is a slightly different version of the following publication: Verbakel, E., & de Graaf, P. M. (2008). 
Resources of the Partner: Support or Restriction in the Occupational Career? Developments in the Netherlands 
between 1940 and 2003. European Sociological Review, 24(1), 81-95. 
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decades in the Netherlands. More precisely, we examine to what extent the relationship status 
(singleness, non-cohabiting relationship, unmarried cohabitation, and marriage) has an impact on 
individual upward and downward mobility chances, and to what extent these chances are 
increased or reduced by labour market resources of the partner, which we define as partner’s 
education, occupational status, supervisory authority, working hours, and whether or not the 
partner is working in the same field. Furthermore, we will investigate whether these dependencies 
have changed since the 1940s. 
Earlier research showed that the occupations of spouses are correlated positively (Hout, 
1982; also see Chapter 2). Such a positive association results in higher social inequality between 
households compared to individuals since it means that either favourable or unfavourable social 
positions are accumulated in households. For a large part, the positive association between 
spouses’ occupations is due to educational and occupational homogamy, but Chapter 2 has also 
shown that about half of the association cannot be attributed to educational homogamy. This 
chapter focuses on another process that may influence the association between partners’ labour 
market success: the effects that partners have on each other’s occupational career during the 
relationship. If, on top of homogamy processes, the resources of one partner positively affect the 
labour market outcomes of the other partner, resources in ‘favourable’ households are 
accumulated to an even larger extent, compared to the resources in ‘unfavourable’ households. 
Therefore, positive partner effects might lead to higher inequality between households than can 
be expected on the basis of homogamy alone. Moreover, if partner effects have become more 
positive over time, inequality between households might have grown, while a reduction of 
positive partner effects or a trend towards more negative partner effects might point at declining 
inequality. 
The idea that labour market resources of one partner might affect labour market outcomes 
of the other partner is not new (Blossfeld & Drobnič, 2001; Bernasco, de Graaf, & Ultee, 1998). 
The central argument is that partners have to arrange household issues together, and that paid 
labour is strongly related to the availability of time and money, the two most important needs for 
running a household. In order to provide the household with the necessary financial resources and 
time for household tasks and child care, partners have to adjust their paid and unpaid labour 
activities. The household approach has seemingly been fruitful in cross-sectional designs on 
labour market participation, but has not often been applied to dynamic research on upward and 
downward labour market mobility. A major reason for this neglect is, probably, a lack of 
appropriate data, which should contain detailed career information on both partners. 
Hypotheses and empirical results on the influence of the partner on labour market 
outcomes can be found in two lines of research. The first line of research examines whether 
marital status has a positive or negative effect on labour market outcomes. These effects are often 
referred to as marriage premiums or penalties. Generally, it is hypothesized and found that being 
married leads to higher wages for men (Korenman & Neumark, 1991; Waite, 1995). Higher 
productivity due to increased feelings of responsibility or employer favouritism are mentioned as 
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possible reasons for the male marriage premium, next to selection and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Human capital theory predicts opposite effects of marriage for women. Because married women 
retreat from the labour market more often than single women, the former are assumed to have less 
human capital than the latter. Despite the well-founded theoretical arguments, the presumed 
marriage penalty for women has not often been empirically found (Waldfogel, 1997; Hill, 1979; 
Waite, 1995; Korenman & Neumark, 1992).  
The second line of research does not simply look at the presence of a partner but tries to 
understand how the partner influences labour market outcomes. It is argued that resources of the 
partner may act as a restrictive or supportive means for labour market outcomes, such as labour 
market participation or occupational status. Usually, a highly educated partner helps people in 
achieving good labour market positions, independently of their own educational level (Benham, 
1974; Brynin & Schupp, 2000), and partner’s occupational status is sometimes found to be 
helpful too (Robert & Bukodi, 2002; Bernardi, 1999). These positive revenues can be explained 
by social capital theory. From economic theory (Becker, 1981), however, one would expect 
negative partner effects: if one partner has a favourable labour market position, the other has no 
incentive to work or to work on a high level. Evidence for restrictive effects of partners’ 
economic resources have been reported (Bernardi, 1999). For the Netherlands, Bernasco and 
colleagues (Bernasco, de Graaf, & Ultee, 1998) found a negative effect of husband’s income on 
wife’s occupational attainment, but a positive effect of husband’s education. 
The hypotheses that are put forward in the two lines of literature on partner effects are not 
often tested in dynamic studies of career mobility. The existing literature on career mobility, or 
job mobility in general, predominantly studies individuals and their occupational careers without 
paying much attention to the partner or the partner’s career as possible determinants. Instead, 
when analysing the probability of changing jobs and the probability of upward versus downward 
mobility, much attention has been paid to the role of segmented industries or the dual economy 
(Carroll & Mayer, 1986; Mayer & Carroll, 1987; Beck, Horan, & Tolbert, 1978; Tolbert, Horan, 
& Beck, 1980), segmentation of the labour market (Blossfeld & Mayer, 1988), and moves within 
and between firms (Felmlee, 1982; Valcour & Tolbert, 2003). In her overview article on job 
mobility and career processes, Rosenfeld (1992) notices the neglect of family issues in this line of 
literature, especially when it comes to male careers.  
This study’s contribution to the research literature is twofold. The first contribution lies in 
the inclusion of the role of the partner and his or her resources in dynamic research of labour 
market transitions, especially on upward and downward mobility. The second contribution of this 
study is the application of a long term historical perspective. In the post-war era, Western 
societies experienced a general shift from traditional to modern values about the sex specific 
division of labour. Our data enable us to examine to what extent the role of the partner in career 
mobility has changed since the 1940s. We hypothesize that the historical context serves as a 
condition to predict whether the partners’ influence on career mobility is predominantly 
supportive or restrictive, especially for women. 
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To summarize, the first question we will answer is to what extent upward and downward 
job moves of men and women depend on (a) relationship status, and (b) on the labour market 
resources of the partner. The second question is to what extent the influence of (a) relationship 
status, and (b) the labour market resources of the partner has changed between 1940 and 2003. 
For this purpose, we make use of three editions of the Family Survey Dutch Population collected 
between 1998 and 2003. These data contain over one million months with detailed information on 
labour market careers of 5,068 individuals, their partners’ labour market careers, relational and 
family careers, and other relevant variables. 
 
5.2  Theory 
We present our theoretical expectations in three parts. Firstly, we hypothesize whether the 
relationship status supports or restricts career opportunities. Secondly, we formulate hypotheses 
about the impact of partner’s resources. Finally, we hypothesize about historical developments in 
the effects of relationship status and resources of a partner on career mobility. It is important to 
note that we focus on occupational status as the indicator of labour market success, and not on 
labour market participation. Although labour market participation and labour market success are 
closely related, we think that the theoretical mechanisms of effects of the family on participation 
and success are quite different. Effects on labour market participation have to do with the time 
budget and gender roles, whereas effects on career success primarily have to do with economic 
and social resources. 
 
5.2.1  Effects of relationship status for men and women 
We predict opposing hypotheses with respect to relationship status for men and women. In 
concordance with Jessie Bernard’s well-known hypothesis that men benefit from marriage, and 
women do not (Bernard, 1972), we hypothesize that having a partner has a positive effect on 
men’s labour market careers, and a negative effect on women’s labour market careers. 
Theoretically, we will not distinguish between several types of relationships, and we think that 
the so-called marriage premium or penalty refers to both unmarried cohabiting and non-
cohabiting relationships. We will empirically test whether this is the case. 
The main argument why marriage has a positive effect for men is expressed in the 
breadwinner hypothesis (Kalmijn & Luijkx, 2005). Men with families feel a stronger financial 
responsibility which makes them invest more in their work. This investment makes them more 
productive, which is rewarded by employers with higher pay or promotions (Korenman & 
Neumark, 1991). A second argument for hypothesizing a marriage premium for men is based on 
employers’ behaviour towards married and single men. Employers might discriminate against 
unmarried men or fathers for different reasons (Kalmijn & Luijkx, 2005; Korenman & Neumark, 
1991; Hill, 1979). Firstly, they might have a preference for married men or fathers instead of 
single or childless men because they believe the former will be more productive than the latter. 
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Secondly, employers might act out of paternalistic beliefs: they believe men with a family 
deserve better chances. 
It is important to note that the marriage premium might be the result of selection processes 
as well: there might be factors that explain success of men on both the marriage market and the 
labour market (Korenman & Neumark, 1991; Kalmijn & Luijkx, 2005). After controlling for 
work characteristics before marriage, Kalmijn and Luijkx (2005) concluded that selection bias 
does not play an important role, and that it does not explain the positive effect of marriage on 
male labour market outcomes. The positive effect of marriage on labour market outcomes for 
men, the marriage premium, has consistently been found for occupational attainment (Korenman 
& Neumark, 1991; Kalmijn & Luijkx, 2005; Waite, 1995), but not for career mobility (Kalmijn & 
Luijkx, 2005). 
 For women, having a partner is supposed to have negative consequences for career 
advancement. Gender-role specialization (Becker, 1981) makes wives more attached to the home 
than to the labour market (Sørensen, 1983). Although values with respect to working women 
have become more modern, it is still the women who are primarily responsible for caring tasks in 
the home in most families (Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2001; Shelton, 1996). As a result, 
marriage has a negative effect on female labour market careers. The result of this process is that 
married women have fewer opportunities to increase their human capital, which reduces their 
odds of career improvement even further. Career breaks are the main explanation for this lower 
amount of human capital (Waldfogel, 1997; Korenman & Neumark, 1992; Davies & Pierre, 
2005). An additional and related factor is that opportunities for training are less likely when 
employment is discontinuous. Lower investment in training can also be the result of anticipation: 
women who expect that they will interrupt their career reason that the costs of the investments 
will not outweigh future benefits (Davies & Pierre, 2005). Fewer possibilities to build human 
capital are also argued to be related to part-time work, work below one’s level, and jobs that are 
convenient with respect to flexible work hours (Avellar, 2003). All of these job characteristics are 
more common among married than single women. 
Regardless of the strong theoretical expectations, most studies do not find support for a 
marriage penalty for female labour market success (Waldfogel, 1997; Hill, 1979; Waite, 1995; 
Korenman & Neumark, 1992). Waldfogel (1997) proposes some explanations for this finding. 
The marriage bonus for both men and women is consistent with the household production model 
that states that living in a household is easier than living alone, which makes household members 
more productive compared to singles. If this is true, it should show up in our models that people 
with a non-cohabiting relationship have similar mobility probabilities than singles, and that 
married and unmarried cohabiting people are similar in this respect too. In addition, a selection 
process could be going on, which implies that successful women are both more likely to get 
married and more likely to get a good career.  
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5.2.2  Effects of partner’s resources for men and women 
Given that one has a partner, does he or she stimulate or restrict one’s career outcomes? If 
partners balance their activities in order to provide the household with enough income and 
enough time for household and caring tasks, it is very plausible that the partner’s labour market 
resources will affect one’s labour market decisions, and thus will affect transitions into higher or 
lower status jobs. We put forward two opposing mechanisms: partners’ labour market resources 
could positively or negatively affect career outcomes. 
The hypothesis that the partner’s resources have a positive effect on upward career 
mobility is based on the general idea that partner’s labour market characteristics are resources 
that can be used in a positive way to reach a better position. This idea is usually known as the 
notion of social capital (Lin, Vaughn, & Ensel, 1981). Resourceful contacts in one’s network can 
help with reaching higher positions. In general, these contacts can give information on companies 
or people, or even on how to behave at a job interview. More particularly, contacts can give 
useful information on job openings or they can put in a good word. The quality of a contact’s 
resources is generally indicated by several labour market characteristics that imply success, like 
high occupational status, supervisory authority and a high level of education. A more specific 
way of how a contact—or in our study, the partner—can help, is by working in the same 
occupational field. A partner working in the same field can have very specific contacts or job 
information that can be useful if one aims at career improvement in one’s field. 
Stimulation can be another reason for positive partner effects. People with a favourable 
labour market position might transfer their positive attitude towards career advancement to their 
partners, and stimulate their partners to put an effort into their career. The attitudes that cause this 
stimulating effect are partly connected with attitudes towards the sex specific division of labour 
and towards working women or mothers. In a modern view, pursuing a career is a good thing for 
both men and women; it stimulates personal development, boosts self-respect, and it offers a rich 
social network. Since educational level appears to be strongly related to modern values 
concerning career pursuit (Alwin, Braun, & Scott, 1992), we expect partner’s educational level, 
being one of the indicators of labour market resources, to lead to more stimulation, and therefore 
to a positive partner effect on labour market transitions. Both the idea of social capital and 
stimulation lead us to the hypothesis that partner’s labour market resources have a positive effect 
on transitions into better labour market positions. Positive partner effects, in particular that of the 
partner’s education, are often found in cross-sectional research (Bernasco, de Graaf, & Ultee, 
1998; Bernardi, 1999; Brynin & Schupp, 2000). 
We do not only expect positive partner effects, but also negative partner effects. Someone 
with a successful labour market position might restrict the labour market career of the partner. If 
the labour market position of one’s partner is favourable, there are fewer incentives to be 
successful (Becker, 1981; Bernasco, 1994; Bernasco, de Graaf, & Ultee, 1998; Felmlee, 1982). 
This economic argument leads to the hypothesis that labour market resources of the partner have 
a negative effect on the probability of getting a more successful job. Negative partner effects are 
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found in earlier research, both in attainment studies (Van der Lippe & Siegers, 1994) and in 
career studies (Bernasco, de Graaf, & Ultee, 1998; Bernardi, 1999; Van der Lippe & Siegers, 
1994). 
 
5.2.3  Historical developments in partner effects 
We derive a general trend hypothesis for men and women, and a more specific one for women 
alone, which will also formulate a context in which positive or negative partner effects on female 
careers are supposed to prevail. Firstly, we expect that general societal changes as secularization 
and individualization have led to a decline in the importance of the relationship status and 
partner’s resources. The processes of secularization and individualization refer to changes in the 
way people live their lives; they live more individualistically, are less influenced by religion and 
social environment, and, in general, make their own decisions. This implies that the influence of 
the partner should also have declined. 
Secondly, we observe that female employment has increased dramatically in the 
Netherlands. Until the 1970s, women left the labour market when they married, but if they did not 
leave then, they did when they had children (de Graaf & Vermeulen, 1997). Nowadays, however, 
the majority of new mothers continue to work (although they often have part-time jobs). This 
development is the result of cultural and economic modernization processes, and we think that 
this may have changed the way husbands influence their wives. The cultural modernization refers 
to the well-known shift from traditional to modern values about the sex specific division of labour 
and working women or mothers (Treas & Widmer, 2000). In a traditional view, men are supposed 
to build a career, while women are supposed to take care of the unpaid household and caring 
tasks. Modern values consider career-orientation to be suitable for both men and women. 
Traditional gender roles and the economic incentive mechanism both predict negative partner 
effects on career mobility for women. However, when the normative restriction weakens and is 
replaced by liberal values that promote female careers, the balance might swing to supportive 
partner effects. At the same time, economic modernization has made support for the wife’s career 
to become more in a man’s interest: the potential contribution of the wife’s career to the family’s 
living standard has increased considerably (Oppenheimer, 1977), mainly because of the increased 
levels of female education (Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993). These changes lead us to predict that 
negative partner effects on female career mobility as expected by economic theory have 
decreased, and that the positive partner effects have become more important in present times. 
 
5.3  Data 
We use three waves of the Family Survey Dutch Population: 1998, 2000, and 2003 (de Graaf, de 
Graaf, Kraaykamp, & Ultee, 1998; 2000; 2003). The surveys cover the Dutch population between 
the ages of 18 and 70 with an overrepresentation of couples. The data are based on structured 
face-to-face interviews and self-completion questionnaires, which are identical for primary 
respondents and their cohabiting or marital partners. The net response rate varies from 40.6 to 
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52.6 percent, which is very reasonable for such a survey design in the Netherlands. In total, 5,764 
respondents (primary respondents and their partners) have been interviewed. Our analyses will be 
based on a sample of 5,086 individuals who are 20 or older and who, at one time or another, had a 
job. A retrospective design has been used in which respondents are asked to reconstruct their 
careers in several domains, such as their occupational and demographic careers. Respondents 
report the start and end date, as well as additional information on the content of the job for each 
job he or she ever held. This set up makes the data extremely useful for analysing partner effects 
on career mobility. For ex-partners, information on labour market careers is less extensive, but 
the existence of prior relationships themselves and, in two out of three surveys, the educational 
level of ex-spouses are known. 
 
5.3.1  Upward and downward mobility 
To be able to estimate event history models (see Models section), we reconstruct the data into a 
person-month file. People who are employed can make three possible career moves, and this is 
true for each job spell they have and have had: they can switch to a higher-status job, to a lower-
status job, or to a job with the same status level. In this study, we are especially interested in the 
former two, upward and downward mobility, because these moves directly influence the socio-
economic position of the household. We will, therefore, pay no further attention to lateral 
mobility. Obviously, people who are employed also have the chance of leaving the labour force. 
However, we consider transitions out of the labour force not as much as a dimension of career 
mobility, but as a dimension of labour market participation since, in most cases, labour market 
exit is voluntary. 
We speak of upward mobility if a new job scores at least 5 points higher on the 
International Socioeconomic Index (ISEI) for all occupations (Ganzeboom, de Graaf, & Treiman, 
1992) compared to the prior job. A decrease of 5 or more points is considered as downward 
mobility. In order to test the robustness of our results, we performed a sensitivity analysis in 
which we defined upward and downward mobility as an increase or decrease of at least 10 points. 
Overall, the results do not lead to different conclusions; in the results section we will discuss the 
differences in more detail when relevant. We record 1,897 upward moves for men (1,569 for men 
with a partner) and 883 upward moves for women (708 for women with a partner). In 
comparison, downward moves occur less often: 1,229 for men (1,011 for men with a partner) and 
651 for women (546 for women with a partner). 
 
5.3.2  Relationship status and partner’s resources 
Relationship status is a time dependent variable based on the dates the relationships between the 
respondent and his or her (ex-)partner started, ended, and moved to another stage. We distinguish 
four relationship categories: singleness, non-cohabiting relationship, unmarried cohabitation, and 
marriage. Information on partner’s resources has been added in all months that the respondent has 
a relationship. First of all, we consider partner’s educational attainment that has been measured in 
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years of education, varying from 6 years for elementary education to 20 years for a postgraduate 
degree1. The employment status of the partner is indicated by a dummy variable (job=0 and no 
job=1). If the partner has a job, we record four specific labour market resources that are all time-
dependent: (1) occupational status according to the International Socioeconomic Index (ISEI) 
(Ganzeboom, de Graaf, & Treiman, 1992), (2) whether or not the job implies supervisory 
authority, (3) number of weekly working hours, (4) whether or not the occupational field is 
identical to that of the respondent’s.  
In the months that the respondent is non-employed, the occupational status has been 
mean-imputed (separately for men and women) and the weekly number of working hours has 
been set to zero. The dummy variable that indicates whether or not the partner has a job prevents 
this intervention from affecting the results. In a limited number of cases, partner information is 
completely absent. For these cases, occupational status (N=1.3 per cent) and education (N=5.6 
per cent) are mean-imputed, and dummy variables that indicate whether or not the original 
information is missing, are added. For supervisory authority and same occupational field, a third 
category comprises all missing cases. The coefficients of the dummy indicators of missing 
variables will not be reported in the tables. 
 
5.3.3  Individual resources 
In order to estimate partner effect models, it is necessary to control for individual characteristics 
that may be of importance in making transitions into jobs with higher or lower occupational 
status. Education has been measured in years of schooling (6-20 years) and is time constant, since 
people start being at risk after they have finished their education. Furthermore, we consider five 
occupational characteristics, which are all time dependent. The occupational status has been 
measured with the International Socioeconomic Index (ISEI). Work experience indicates the total 
number of years one has worked during one’s career. A quadratic term has been included into the 
models as well. We do not consider age because it correlates strongly with work experience, 
especially for men. Supervisory authority is a dummy variable differentiating between no 
supervisory authority at all and some or much supervisory authority. Working hours express the 
actual number of working hours per week. The maximum number has been top-coded to 602. In 
order to test the influence of having a partner in the same occupational field, we distinguish six 
occupational fields on the individual level. This distinction is a further classification of the two-
digit occupational code provided by Statistics Netherlands. Occupations can belong to the cultural 
field (teaching, linguistic, and social occupations), the care-giving field (medical, personal, and 
social care), the technical field (exact and technical occupations), the economic field (transport, 
                                                 
1 primary education=6 years, lower vocational education and lower secondary education=10 years, intermediate 
secondary education and reduced intermediate vocational education=11 years, higher secondary education=12 years, 
intermediate vocational education=13 years, higher vocational education=15 years, university=17 years, post-
academic education=20 years. 
2 In a sensitivity analysis, we top-coded working hours at 40 hours per week. This increased the individual effects of 
working hours on male upward mobility, but did not alter the general conclusions of this study. 
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communication, administrative, commercial, juridical, and managerial occupations), the agrarian 
field, or to another, more general field.  
Missing values on individual characteristics are scarce (about 1 per cent of the months 
have missing values). For cases with missing values on education, occupational status, and 
working hours, we impute mean scores (separately for men and women). In addition, dummy 
indicators for missing variables have been added to the models, but the effects will not be 
reported. An extra category takes care of missing values on the categorical variable supervisory 
authority.  
 
Table 5.1 Statistics of independent variables for females and males, based on the sample of months in which the age is between 20 and 55 
 and the respondent is at risk of experiencing upward mobility 
    females males 
  total a) with partner b) total a) with partner b)   
    N mean st dev N mean st dev  N mean st dev N mean st dev 
            historical period 
 year 1940-1959 2,487 0.05  2,334 0.04   2,512 0.03  2,367 0.02  
 year 1960-1969 2,487 0.09  2,334 0.08   2,512 0.07  2,367 0.06  
 year 1970-1979 2,487 0.13  2,334 0.13   2,512 0.14  2,367 0.14  
 year 1980-1989 2,487 0.22  2,334 0.21   2,512 0.24  2,367 0.24  
 year 1990-2003 2,487 0.52  2,334 0.54   2,512 0.52  2,367 0.55  
             duration at risk 
 duration < 2 years 2,487 0.27  2,334 0.25   2,512 0.20  2,367 0.16  
 duration 2-4 years 2,487 0.21  2,334 0.20   2,512 0.15  2,367 0.14  
 duration 5-9 years 2,487 0.35  2,334 0.36   2,512 0.30  2,367 0.30  
 duration >= 10 years 2,487 0.14  2,334 0.16   2,512 0.32  2,367 0.36  
 missing value duration 2,487 0.03  2,334 0.03   2,512 0.03  2,367 0.03  
             children 
 no children in household 2,487 0.67  2,334 0.64   2,512 0.51  2,367 0.44  
 youngest child < 4 2,487 0.12  2,334 0.13   2,512 0.22  2,367 0.26  
 youngest child >= 4 2,487 0.17  2,334 0.19   2,512 0.23  2,367 0.26  
 empty nest 2,487 0.04  2,334 0.04   2,512 0.04  2,367 0.04  
 missing value children 2,487 0.00  2,334 0.00   2,512 0.00  2,367 0.00  
             individual resources 
education in years (6-20) d) 2,479 11.78 2.97 2,326 11.75 2.96  2,503 12.06 3.22 2,359 12.07 3.20 
occupational status (10-85) d) 2,487 46.69 13.63 2,334 46.78 13.74  2,512 47.67 13.68 2,367 48.12 13.75 
work experience (0-36) d) 2,487 7.52 5.13 2,334 8.12 5.56  2,512 11.71 6.22 2,367 12.99 6.64 
work experience square (0-1268) d) 2,487 103.34 129.85 2,334 113.93 145.21  2,512 221.24 183.21 2,367 252.71 206.69 
 supervising 2,487 0.15  2,334 0.15   2,512 0.35  2,367 0.38  
 not supervising 2,487 0.85  2,334 0.85   2,512 0.65  2,367 0.62  
 missing value supervising 2,487 0.00  2,334 0.00   2,512 0.00  2,367 0.00  
working hours (3-60) d) 2,486 32.62 9.28 2,333 31.98 9.37  2,510 41.21 6.47 2,365 41.21 6.46 
 occupational field: cultural 2,487 0.13  2,334 0.13   2,512 0.09  2,367 0.09  
 occupational field: care-giving 2,487 0.28  2,334 0.28   2,512 0.04  2,367 0.04  
 occupational field: technical 2,487 0.07  2,334 0.07   2,512 0.33  2,367 0.33  
 occupational field: economic 2,487 0.45  2,334 0.45   2,512 0.46  2,367 0.46  
 occupational field: agrarian 2,487 0.01  2,334 0.01   2,512 0.03  2,367 0.03  
  occupational field: other 2,487 0.06   2,334 0.06     2,512 0.05   2,367 0.05   
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Table 5.1 Continued… 
    females males 
  total a) with partner b) total a) with partner b)   
    N mean st dev N mean st dev  N mean st dev N mean st dev 
             relationship status 
 single 2,486 0.15      2,512 0.15     
 non-cohabiting relationship 2,486 0.22  2,334 0.28   2,512 0.14  2,367 0.18  
 unmarried cohabitation 2,486 0.15  2,334 0.18   2,512 0.12  2,367 0.15  
 marriage 2,486 0.47  2,334 0.54   2,512 0.58  2,367 0.67  
             partner’s resources 
partner’s education (6-20) d)    2,186 12.20 3.17     2,262 11.50 3.00 
 partner job    2,334 0.79      2,367 0.53  
 partner no job    2,334 0.13      2,367 0.39  
 missing value partner job    2,334 0.08      2,367 0.08  
partner’s occupational status (10-88) c) d)  2,003 48.29 14.56     2,014 46.76 13.88 
 partner supervising c)    2,016 0.34      2,025 0.15  
partner not supervising c)    2,016 0.63      2,025 0.82   
missing value partner supervising c)   2,016 0.03      2,025 0.03   
partner’s working hours (3-60) c) d)   1,973 41.28 6.71     1,989 31.89 9.56 
partner in same field c)    2,016 0.33      2,025 0.33   
partner not in same field c)    2,016 0.66      2,025 0.65   
missing value same field c)       2,016 0.01           2,025 0.02     
N respondents 2,487  2,334   2,512  2,367  
N months 364,943  310,437   619,468  544,646  
N events 883   708     1,897   1,569   
a) average of all months 
b) average of the months in which man/woman has a partner 
c) average of the months in which man/woman has a working partner 
d) only from non-missing observations 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003 
 
The possible presence of any children, and their age, are expressed in four categories and vary 
over the life course: no children, youngest child is under age four, youngest child is four years or 
older and still living in the household, and children have left the parental home (empty nest). A 
fifth category comprises missing values. The information has been based on the date of birth of 
every child, date of leaving the parental home of every child (if unknown, we assume the child 
left home at the age of 18) and, in exceptional cases, date of death of the child. Children from 
prior relationships are assumed to leave the home of the father after divorce, whereas children are 
assumed to stay in the household of widowed fathers and divorced or widowed mothers. 
Finally, we model a duration effect by four dummy variables which indicate the number 
of years one is at risk of experiencing a transition: less than 2 years, 2-4 years, 5-9 years, 10 or 
more years. Since we are dealing with labour market transitions made between 1940 and 2003, 
we control for period by means of 5 dummy variables: 1940-1959, 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-
1989, and 1990-2003. To test whether the effects of relationship status and resources of the 
partner have changed over time, we construct linear interaction terms between each partner 
characteristic and year. For this purpose, year has been recoded to 0 for the first period, and to 
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1.5, 2.5, 3.5, and 4.7 for the four other periods. Thus, historical changes in the partner effects can 
be interpreted in decades. Table 5.1 shows descriptive values of the independent variables for 
males and females with and without a partner for the months in which respondents are at risk of 
being upwardly mobile. The descriptive values for the months in which respondents are at risk of 
being downwardly mobile are almost similar and, therefore, not shown. 
 
5.3.4  Models 
We perform event history analyses on the person-month file (discrete time models), starting with 
the month after the respondent left full-time education for the first time. We focus on career 
mobility, which means that the months in which a respondent is not working are not included in 
the analysis. In addition, if the respondent has an ISEI score of 86 or higher, he or she cannot be 
upwardly mobile according to our definition of upward mobility (maximum ISEI score is 90). 
Similarly, a person cannot be downwardly mobile if his or her ISEI score is below 15 (minimum 
ISEI score is 10). Therefore, the risk sets are limited to the individuals who have a job and for 
whom it is possible to be mobile. Since our hypotheses for men and women are partly opposing, 
we separate the analyses. Only months in which the respondent is between the ages of 20 and 55 
are considered, because we want to focus on the central part of the labour market career, not on 
(early) retirement processes. We lag all time dependent variables one month in order to be sure 
that they represent the situation before the transition takes place. 
Logistic regression models are used to analyse the probability of making an upward move 
and the probability of making a downward move. Note that after an event the respondents are 
immediately at risk of a new event (repeated events). The analysis consists of three steps. Firstly, 
we test the impact of relationship status next to the influence of individual and control variables. 
Secondly, we select months in which the respondent has a partner (that is, in a non-cohabiting, a 
cohabitating, or a married relationship) to test the importance of the resources of the partner. 
Finally, we include linear interaction terms between relationship status and year to the first 
model, and linear interaction terms between partner’s resources and year to the second model, to 
test whether the role of the partner has changed over time. 
 
5.4  Results  
Before we turn to the results of the influence of the partner, we will briefly discuss the results of 
individual resources on the probability of being upwardly and downwardly mobile. Table 5.2 (on 
females) and Table 5.3 (on males) show no unexpected results, and the patterns appear to be 
rather similar for women and men. Educational attainment increases the odds of being upwardly 
mobile, and decreases the likelihood of downward mobility. Occupational status has a negative 
effect on upward mobility and a positive effect on downward mobility, which indicates ceiling 
and floor effects. Work experience and, for men only, holding a job with supervisory authority 
lower the probability of any transition, irrespective of the direction of the move. Females who 
work many hours a week are more likely to get a higher status job, whereas working hours do not 
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affect male careers. We will not discuss the differences between occupational fields in detail 
since we only include this information in the model in order to be able to test the partner effect of 
working in the same field.  
Not unexpectedly, children in the household restrict women’s careers by reducing their 
odds of being upwardly mobile. Interestingly, children of a school-going age lower the odds for 
women of making a downward move, but one should keep in mind that these effects refer to the 
highly selective group of women who are employed while they have a young child (cf. Kalmijn & 
Luijkx, 2006). Children hardly affect mobility chances of men. 
 
5.4.1  Relationship status and partner’s resources 
We will now consider whether someone with a partner has better career chances than someone 
without a partner. Based on existing literature on labour market success (usually wages), we 
hypothesize that having a partner stimulates the labour market career of men, whereas it restricts 
the labour market career of women. Our results, as shown in Table 5.2, do not support this 
hypothesis as far as women are concerned: having a partner does not significantly affect female 
upward or downward mobility. Note, however, that part of the restrictive effect of family 
formation is expressed by the effects of children. If the presence of children would be excluded 
from the model, the negative effect of marriage on female upward mobility becomes stronger and 
significant (from -0.195 to -0.299). If we focus on women with a partner, we find that marriage 
has different consequences for women than other forms of relationships. Married women are less 
likely to make an upward move than non-cohabiting and unmarried cohabiting women, but at the 
same time, married women are also better protected against downward moves. Perhaps, non-
cohabiting and unmarried cohabiting women are more mobile in general. It is clear, however, that 
when speaking of the presence of a partner, one should distinguish between different kinds of 
relationships, and that relationship types that involve household formation do not oppose to non-
household formation types. This refutes the household production model that assumes that people 
living in a household are more productive than singles. 
Our results provide some evidence for the marriage premium that has been hypothesized 
for men (Table 5.3). With respect to upward mobility, only cohabiting men have significantly 
higher chances than single men, although the effects for married and unmarried (non-)cohabiting 
men do not differ significantly. When it comes to downward mobility, it is the married men who 
have significantly lower odds than single men, though married men do not differ from unmarried 
cohabiting men in this respect. There seems to be a dividing line between single men and men 
who are in a non-cohabiting relationship on the one hand, and unmarried cohabiting and married 
men on the other hand. This implies that the idea of a marriage premium is not only valid for 
married men, but for all men who form a household with their partner. 
 The next step in our analysis answers the question to what extent resources of the partner 
support or restrict upward and downward career moves, given that one is not single. For both men 
and women, the results show a positive effect of partner’s occupational status on upward mobility 
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Table 5.2 Logistic regression coefficients on females’ probability of upward and downward mobility 
upward mobility  downward mobility FEMALES 
 all respondents  with partner all respondents with partner 
b   se   b   se  b   se  b   se   
intercept -5.293 ** 0.385  -5.827 ** 0.570  -8.103 ** 0.425 -7.576 ** 0.592 
year 1940-1959 0    0    0   0   
year 1960-1969 0.093  0.237  0.353  0.340  0.471  0.303 0.452  0.375 
year 1970-1979 0.109  0.226  0.321  0.327  0.490  0.294 0.417  0.363 
year 1980-1989 -0.154  0.222  0.029  0.325  0.589 * 0.287 0.464  0.357 
year 1990-2003 0.459 * 0.220  0.567  0.323  1.068 ** 0.286 0.961 ** 0.356 
duration < 2 years 0    0    0   0   
duration 2-4 years -0.025  0.103  -0.047  0.115  -0.042  0.122 -0.112  0.136 
duration 5-9 years -0.031  0.109  -0.099  0.120  0.045  0.131 -0.026  0.141 
duration >= 10 years -0.294  0.165  -0.338  0.178  -0.129  0.199 -0.260  0.210 
                             children 
no children 0    0    0   0   
youngest child < 4 -0.445 ** 0.139  -0.477 ** 0.146  -0.220  0.151 -0.154  0.156 
youngest child >= 4 -0.278 * 0.129  -0.266  0.137  -0.508 ** 0.159 -0.432 ** 0.167 
empty nest -0.910 ** 0.277  -0.910 ** 0.302  -0.619 * 0.276 -0.528  0.290 
                             individual resources 
education 0.164 ** 0.015  0.177 ** 0.019  -0.051 ** 0.018 -0.060 ** 0.021 
occupational status -0.067 ** 0.004  -0.071 ** 0.004  0.035 ** 0.004 0.037 ** 0.004 
work experience -0.047 * 0.019  -0.043 * 0.021  -0.086 ** 0.024 -0.085 ** 0.026 
work experience square 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 * 0.001 0.002 * 0.001 
supervising -0.124  0.095  -0.167  0.107  -0.097  0.108 -0.096  0.119 
working hours 0.016 ** 0.004  0.018 ** 0.004  0.007  0.005 0.008  0.005 
occupational field: cultural 0    0    0   0   
occupational field: care-giving -0.444 * 0.182  -0.621 ** 0.200  -0.193  0.164 -0.237  0.179 
occupational field: technical -0.227  0.222  -0.360  0.250  0.678 ** 0.189 0.660 ** 0.209 
occupational field: economic 0.487 ** 0.155  0.425 * 0.170  0.484 ** 0.126 0.441 ** 0.141 
occupational field: agrarian -0.712 * 0.293  -0.795 * 0.333  0.749  0.524 0.920  0.527 
occupational field: other 0.107  0.210  0.163  0.228  0.535 * 0.247 0.445  0.266 
                             relationship status 
single 0    n.a.    0   n.a.   
non-cohabiting relationship 0.034  0.107  0.256 * 0.114  0.190  0.129 0.341 ** 0.129 
unmarried cohabitation 0.054  0.114  0.264 * 0.110  0.217  0.136 0.388 ** 0.124 
marriage -0.195  0.109  0    -0.136  0.131 0   
                             partner’s resources 
partner’s education     0.021  0.016     0.000  0.018 
partner no job      0.547  0.817     -1.618 ** 0.579 
partner’s occupational status     0.007 * 0.003     -0.005  0.004 
partner supervising     0.057  0.093     -0.042  0.108 
partner’s working hours     -0.009  0.006     -0.006  0.007 
partner in same field         -0.023   0.103          -0.177   0.108 
N respondents 2,487    2,334    2,493   2,340   
N respondent-months 364,943  310,437  363,537 309,346 
N events 883       708       651      546     
** p<.01;  * p<.05; n.a. not applicable 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003 
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Table 5.3 Logistic regression coefficients on males’ probability of upward and downward mobility 
upward mobility  downward mobility MALES 
 all respondents  with partner all respondents with partner 
b   se   b   se  b   se  b   se   
intercept -4.663 ** 0.286  -5.253 ** 0.373  -7.757 ** 0.315 -7.857 ** 0.426 
year 1940-1959 0    0    0   0   
year 1960-1969 0.120  0.139  0.109  0.180  0.251  0.183 0.177  0.231 
year 1970-1979 0.169  0.133  0.144  0.174  0.370 * 0.176 0.272  0.223 
year 1980-1989 0.128  0.131  0.082  0.173  0.415 * 0.173 0.286  0.222 
year 1990-2003 0.368 ** 0.129  0.321  0.173  0.716 ** 0.172 0.658 ** 0.222 
duration < 2 years 0    0    0   0   
duration 2-4 years 0.039  0.079  0.107  0.092  0.070  0.100 0.065  0.118 
duration 5-9 years 0.049  0.079  0.069  0.090  0.015  0.103 0.000  0.115 
duration >= 10 years -0.035  0.107  -0.037  0.115  -0.043  0.138 -0.131  0.148 
                             children 
no children 0    0    0   0   
youngest child < 4 0.015  0.075  0.006  0.081  0.053  0.092 0.072  0.099 
youngest child >= 4 0.210 * 0.092  0.188  0.099  -0.101  0.117 -0.079  0.126 
empty nest -0.126  0.204  -0.233  0.225  0.210  0.205 0.192  0.220 
                           individual characteristics 
education 0.139 ** 0.009  0.131 ** 0.011  -0.086 ** 0.011 -0.091 ** 0.013 
occupational status -0.061 ** 0.002  -0.060 ** 0.003  0.046 ** 0.002 0.050 ** 0.003 
work experience -0.083 ** 0.013  -0.073 ** 0.014  -0.079 ** 0.017 -0.068 ** 0.018 
work experience square 0.001 * 0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000 0.000  0.000 
supervising -0.158 ** 0.055  -0.108  0.058  -0.196 ** 0.064 -0.189 ** 0.069 
working hours 0.002  0.003  0.002  0.004  0.003  0.004 0.001  0.004 
occupational field: cultural 0    0    0   0   
occupational field: care-giving -0.159  0.181  -0.028  0.194  -0.181  0.205 -0.320  0.236 
occupational field: technical -0.045  0.147  0.026  0.158  0.580 ** 0.129 0.554 ** 0.141 
occupational field: economic 0.529 ** 0.138  0.564 ** 0.147  0.743 ** 0.118 0.717 ** 0.129 
occupational field: agrarian -0.263  0.186  -0.209  0.204  0.250  0.286 0.433  0.309 
occupational field: other 0.619 ** 0.159  0.732 ** 0.172  0.816 ** 0.181 0.792 ** 0.211 
                             relationship status 
single 0    n.a.    0   n.a.   
non-cohabiting relationship 0.097  0.077  0.022  0.083  0.009  0.095 0.276 ** 0.102 
unmarried cohabitation 0.209 * 0.091  0.126  0.088  -0.126  0.113 0.094  0.109 
marriage 0.101  0.083  0    -0.264 ** 0.100 0   
                             partner’s resources 
partner’s education     0.014  0.011     -0.021  0.014 
partner no job      -0.075  0.437     -1.076 * 0.470 
partner’s occupational status     0.007 ** 0.003     0.000  0.003 
partner supervising     -0.066  0.099     0.026  0.115 
partner’s working hours     0.004  0.003     0.003  0.004 
partner in same field         -0.041   0.083          -0.010   0.096 
N respondents 2,512    2,367    2,530   2,385   
N respondent-months 619,468  544,646  623,626 548,511 
N events 1,897       1,569       1,229      1,011     
** p<.01;  * p<.05; n.a. not applicable 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003 
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 (b=0.007). A man or woman whose partner has the highest occupational level has a 73 percent 
higher chance of being upwardly mobile than a man or woman whose partner has the lowest 
occupational level (exp(78*0.007)). For women, this effect is non-significant when upward 
mobility is defined as an increase of ten or more ISEI-points. This is probably due to a lack of 
power. The effects of spouses’ education are not significant. Obviously, the effects of partner’s 
occupational status and education are related, and partly pick up the same underlying process. In 
a model without partner’s occupational status, the effect of partner’s education becomes stronger, 
and even reaches the level of significance when female upward mobility is concerned (0.035, 
p<.05 for females, 0.020 for males). If we leave out partner’s education, the positive effect of 
partner’s occupational status on upward mobility chances increases slightly (0.009, p<.01 for 
females, 0.008, p<.01 for males). We conclude that human capital of the partner has a positive 
effect on upward mobility.  
The results further show a restrictive partner effect on downward mobility: joblessness of 
the partner prevents from downward mobility (80% lower odds for women; 66% lower odds for 
men). The interpretation of this finding is that in single-earner households, the working spouse 
cannot afford to accept a job at a lower level, since he or she is solely responsible for the 
household income. If we put it the other way round, we can say that a successful partner reduces 
the incentive to be successful on the labour market. This is in line with the economic idea. We 
conclude that supportive and restrictive mechanisms are at work on upward and downward 
mobility, respectively. 
 
5.4.2  Historical developments 
Table 5.4 shows to what extent the effects of relationship status and partner’s resources have 
changed over time. Surprisingly, no trends are found at all where partner effects on female 
occupational mobility are concerned. Despite major societal changes such as individualization, 
emancipation, cultural and economic modernization in the twentieth century, and the massive 
entry of women into the labour market, nothing has changed in the way women’s career mobility 
chances are influenced by their relationship status and the resources of their partners. Almost the 
same conclusion is true for men, although the influence of partner’s education on downward 
mobility has changed significantly. A highly educated partner used to prevent men from 
downward mobility, but at the turn of the century this supportive effect has disappeared. In other 
words, men benefit less from a resourceful partner nowadays than they did in the past.  
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Table 5.4 Trends in partner effects on females’ and males’ probability of upward and downward mobility 
females   males   
upward 
mobilitya)  
downward 
mobilitya)  
upward 
mobilitya)  
downward 
mobilitya)  
b   se   b   se   b   se   b   se   
                              Panel A 
single 0    0 0 0  
non-cohabiting relationship -0.179  0.271  0.085 0.334 0.040 0.182 0.283 0.230 
  *year (0-4.7) 0.064  0.074  0.031 0.092 0.017 0.052 -0.087 0.066 
unmarried cohabitation 0.020  0.523  0.759 0.574 0.268 0.365 1.039 * 0.411 
  *year (0-4.7) 0.008  0.124  -0.129 0.139 -0.022 0.089 -0.294 ** 0.103 
marriage 0.064  0.313  -0.005 0.385 0.332 0.178 -0.172 0.234 
  *year (0-4.7) -0.065  0.081  -0.034 0.101 -0.069 0.049 -0.030 0.062 
                         Panel B 
partner’s education 0.010  0.044  -0.073 0.050 0.010 0.030 -0.096 ** 0.036 
  *year (0-4.7) 0.003  0.011  0.020 0.012 0.001 0.008 0.021 * 0.010 
           
partner no job  0.632  0.898  -1.697 * 0.733 -0.171 0.467 -1.094 * 0.509 
  *year (0-4.7) -0.023  0.093  0.023 0.113 0.027 0.046 0.006 0.057 
           
partner’s occupational status 0.011  0.011  -0.016 0.012 0.007 0.008 -0.009 0.010 
  *year (0-4.7) -0.001  0.003  0.003 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 
           
partner supervising -0.064  0.361  0.564 0.384 0.086 0.374 0.113 0.432 
  *year (0-4.7) 0.030  0.086  -0.153 0.093 -0.037 0.092 -0.023 0.105 
           
partner’s working hours -0.006  0.009  -0.006 0.010 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 
  *year (0-4.7) -0.001  0.002  0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
           
partner in same field -0.004  0.337  -0.261 0.362 -0.048 0.239 0.036 0.259 
  *year (0-4.7) -0.005   0.081   0.021  0.088  0.002  0.060  -0.012  0.065 
** p<.01;  * p<.05 
a) the interaction terms in panel A are additive to the full model on all respondents as shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3; 
the interaction terms in panel B have been added separately to the full model on respondents with partner as shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003 
 
5.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter we have investigated to what extent relationship status affects the probability of 
upward and downward mobility, to what extent the labour market resources of the partner (if a 
partner is present) matter in this respect, and whether the role of the partner has changed over 
time, investigating the extensive period from 1940 through 2003. We performed event-history 
analyses on the Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, and 2003. 
The theoretical answer on the first question has been based on ideas about marriage 
premiums and penalties. Marriage, or having a partner in general, is supposed to be beneficial for 
labour market success of men, whereas it is believed to restrict labour market success of women. 
Proof for this idea comes predominantly from cross-sectional research. In a dynamic study on 
male career mobility by Kalmijn and Luijkx (2005), marriage appears to have no influence. For 
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females, the evidence on marriage penalties is scarce. We find support for a marriage premium 
for men (although the effects are not very strong), but have to refute the hypothesis on a marriage 
penalty for women. In addition, males do not benefit occupationally from marriage only, but also 
from unmarried cohabitation. Compared to cohabiting or non-cohabiting relationships, marriage 
can also prevent women from downward mobility. So marriage does not always imply a penalty. 
It is not only the importance of having a partner that we are interested in, but also the role 
partners’ resources play. We found a positive influence of the resources of the partner on upward 
mobility, and a negative influence of partner’s non-employment on downward mobility, for men 
as well as for women. In other words, both support and restriction mechanisms play a role; the 
former when it comes to upward mobility, the latter when it comes to downward mobility. 
Surprisingly, these mechanisms have not changed significantly over time. Despite major societal 
changes that have had a huge impact on the family and work spheres, the role of the partner on 
career decisions has not changed. The one exception we find is that a highly educated partner 
used to prevent men from downward mobility, while this is not the case anymore.  
We argue that partner effects are one explanation for inequality between households. 
Obviously, occupational or educational homogamy determines to a considerable extent whether a 
household consists of two individuals with favourable or two individuals with unfavourable 
social positions. Given homogamy, inequality would be larger if spouses positively affect each 
others’ careers during their relationship, but it would be flattened if a successful career of one 
partner leads to a less successful career of the other partner. Since we find proof for both 
mechanisms, the net effect of partner influences during the relationship on inequality between 
households might be zero (depending on the relative strength of the two mechanisms, which is 
difficult to assess).  
 Besides our increased insight into the origin of inequality between households, we believe 
we have made a first step in filling a gap in existing literature on career mobility. Although the 
role of the family seems to be smaller than the role of individual human capital, we have learned 
that having a resourceful partner stimulates upward mobility both for men and for women. It 
would be interesting to find out which mechanisms explain this positive effect spouses have on 
each other’s upward moves. We think that social capital arguments and shared ambitions offer the 
most plausible explanations, but since we have no direct measures of social capital we cannot test 
this explanation in this chapter. Furthermore, we think it is interesting to extend the scope of 
research on partner effects by not only focusing on career mobility, but also on other aspects of 
the labour market career, such as labour market participation. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Couples’ cumulative incomes over the life course: 
divergence or convergence? 
 
 
This study examines to what extent income inequality between highly and poorly educated 
couples enlarges during the life course as a result of income accumulation. Accumulation would 
occur if individual and partner’s educational levels stimulate hourly wages and working hours 
during the relationship. In order to fully implement the notion of accumulation of income, we use 
retrospective information on labour market careers of both spouses (Family Survey Dutch 
Population 1998-2003) to assess couples’ total amount of income earned in the first fifteen years 
of their relationship. For men, our results show that the highly educated have an arrear in total 
number of working hours due to the time spent at school; but in the long run, this arrear is more 
than offset by their higher wage rates, which are also positively affected by the educational 
achievements of their wives. Highly educated women work more hours and have higher wage 
rates, which are also stimulated by the educational achievements of their husbands. In total, the 
incomes of highly educated couples rise faster during the first fifteen years of their relationships 
than the incomes of poorly educated couples. Thus, we conclude that incomes of highly and 
poorly educated couples diverge over the life course.  
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, we analyse the life course development of accumulated incomes of husbands and 
wives within couples, and the development of couples’ life-time incomes with detailed 
retrospective data of the occupational careers of both spouses. We imputed monthly incomes of 
husbands and wives based on their working hours and on their job levels (occupational status). 
Our goal is to assess whether couples’ incomes diverge over the life course as a result of positive 
human capital effects of both spouses on each others’ careers. If the influence of individual and 
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partner’s human capital is positive, the initial income inequality between couples caused by 
educational homogamy would enlarge with the progress of time. 
During the life course, careers can develop in several directions. A typical continuous 
career advances during the life course, directly by job promotions and indirectly by growing older 
and gaining work experience, which is rewarded by the employer. However, reduction of 
working hours, the decision to leave the labour market, and a confrontation with unemployment 
or demotion, imply a setback of one’s career. The direction in which labour market careers 
develop is not equally distributed. Firstly, it is the people with many resources and with a 
favourable labour market career history who are most likely to further their careers (Becker, 
1964; Blau & Duncan, 1967). Secondly, it is assumed, and also proven, that the labour market 
position of the partner affects career chances. In chapter 5 for instance, we found that a highly 
educated spouse increases the likelihood of upward mobility, on top of the positive educational 
effect of the individual. Thirdly, family formation has a deep impact on working hours (Kaufman 
& Uhlenberg, 2000). When a couple has no children, both spouses can work full-time, but when 
there are young children, this often proves to be impossible or undesirable, and the couple 
typically reduces its working hours. 
Consequences of career development over the life course are not only relevant for 
differences between individual men and women; the consequences are larger for couples, since 
partners tend to have similar educational levels. Thus, the higher educated have better career 
chances on their own, and because they are likely to be married to a highly educated spouse, they 
are able to benefit from the resources of their spouse too. In other words, educational homogamy 
implies that couples consist of either two partners with favourable careers or two partners with 
unfavourable careers at the beginning of their relationship. The sum of the two means that the 
former have much better initial positions than the latter. On top of that, we expect the initial 
degree of inequality between poorly and highly educated couples to diverge in the course of their 
lives due to the more favourable career chances of men and women with a high education and 
with a highly educated partner. Also, the tendency to postpone having a child among highly 
educated couples may contribute to income divergence, but because we are mainly interested in 
the impact of spouses’ human capital, we will keep constant on the child situation in our 
empirical study. We will answer the question to what extent income differences between couples 
become larger or smaller due to accumulation processes during the life course. 
The consequences of the divergence of couples’ incomes reach further than the increasing 
differences in life chances between the adults involved; they extend to the younger generation, 
and maintain the process of social reproduction. Divergence of couples’ incomes makes the 
circumstances under which children grow up more unequal, with major consequences for the 
chances they will get in their lives. The tendency of highly educated couples to wait with having 
children enlarges this gap even more. These couples have spent more time on the labour market 
before they reduce their working hours to care for children and they, presumably, have a higher 
job level. Children of highly educated couples do, therefore, not only grow up in better initial 
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circumstances, but in circumstances that have been exposed longer to advantageous 
accumulation. 
To establish the degree of income divergence, we propose a relatively new way of 
analysing life course data which does justice to the importance of the accumulation of income 
within couples (also see de Graaf & Kats, 2007). Most labour market research that uses a life 
course perspective studies the dependence of labour market decisions on situations or events in 
the life course (also see Chapters 4 and 5). These event-history models increase our knowledge 
on mechanisms behind labour market success or income positions compared to cross-sectional 
research, because the temporal order of events is known. However, this kind of research is 
usually restricted to establishing the determinants of making a single labour market move, and 
neglects—in an empirical sense—that labour market careers usually consist of many consecutive 
moves, both with respect to upward and downward mobility, and with more and fewer working 
hours. It is the accumulation of these moves that expresses someone’s actual position, and it is the 
sum of the accumulation processes of husband and wife that expresses the actual position of the 
couple. The study of life-time incomes emphasizes the role of accumulation processes, and 
therefore produces a more accurate measure of couples’ socio-economic positions: it refers to the 
broader and more general picture by not putting too much weight on small or temporal shifts in 
individual labour market careers. Based on detailed retrospective labour market career 
information of husbands and wives in the Family Survey Dutch Population (1998-2003), we 
assess husbands’ and wives’ incomes in every month during their relationship by multiplying 
their working hours by their estimated wage rate. Accumulative incomes are then obtained by 
adding up monthly incomes. 
Although we are not aiming at getting a detailed insight into the processes behind the 
development of couples’ incomes, we compose our analyses in several steps in order to better 
understand what are the major contributors of the income development over the life course. A 
first decomposition is that we divide the first fifteen years of a couple’s relationship in three five-
year periods, to assess the importance of individual and partner’s education in the different stages 
of the relationship. After that, we consider the cumulative outcomes of the first fifteen years. A 
second decomposition is that we study husbands’ and wives’ wage rates and working hours 
separately, before turning to their accumulated incomes, so we understand the relative importance 
of the time spent on the labour market and the level on which one is employed. Finally, we come 
to couples’ accumulated incomes, and we can find out the total contribution of husbands’ and 
wives’ educational level, and the extent to which divergence between couples’ incomes takes 
place. A schematic overview of this setup is displayed in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1 Schematic overview of relations of interest in the analysis on accumulated income of the couple 
 
6.2  Arguments for accumulation 
There are several reasons to believe that the income of couples will diverge over the life course, 
or in other words, that resources will accumulate within households in the course of the couples’ 
relationship. In this study, we consider income to be the product of hourly wage (or more 
generally, occupational success) and working hours. Both individual attributes and partner’s 
attributes are believed to influence occupational success and working hours. As a result, we 
distinguish four factors that may contribute to such a development. 
First of all, human capital helps people to improve their labour market position. Blau and 
Duncan (1967) already found that education and the occupational status of the first job determine 
the occupational status of the current job. Furthermore, dynamic research has shown that highly 
educated men and women experience more upward mobility than poorly educated men and 
women (Blossfeld, 1986; Kalmijn & Luijkx, 2006; Rosenfeld, 1992). This can be understood 
from both employers’ and employees’ points of view. On the one hand, employers are more 
inclined to reward highly educated employees because of their assumed higher productivity rate. 
On the other hand, employees who have high earning capacities have much economic reason to 
realize them. Also, people who have invested in their educational career, and therefore missed 
income they could otherwise have earned in that time, want to reap the benefits of their 
investments (Becker, 1964). To sum up, the rise in income over the life course is higher for 
people with high levels of human capital than for people with low levels of human capital. 
Secondly, partner’s human capital appears to increase upward mobility chances on top of 
individual human capital (Bernardi, 1999; Brynin & Francesconi, 2004; Verbakel & de Graaf, 
2008). The explanation can be found in social capital theory, which argues that resources of the 
partner can be used to the benefit of one’s own labour market career (Lin, Vaughn, & Ensel, 
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1981). Spouses share information on job openings, but also transfer their occupational and 
cultural skills that can be of help in reaching higher level jobs.  
Thirdly, it is well documented that highly educated women are less likely to leave the 
labour market. They work more hours per week than poorly educated women as well (Kalmijn & 
Luijkx, 2006; Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2001), also after children are born (Sørensen, 1983). In 
addition to the human capital reasons mentioned above, modern values regarding working women 
and mothers are an important explanation for the difference in labour market participation 
between highly and poorly educated women. Working hours of men vary to a far lesser extent, 
and are therefore less susceptible to human capital influences, although highly educated men are 
more likely to work part-time than poorly educated men in the Netherlands. 
A fourth possible determinant is a positive partner effect on working hours. It is plausible 
that labour market participation decisions of women are not based on the values of the wife 
alone—next to non-normative factors. Spouses make decisions on working hours together, and 
the husband’s values may be as important as those of the wife’s. If we again assume that the 
highly educated adhere more strongly to modern values about working women and mothers than 
the poorly educated (Alwin, Braun, & Scott, 1992), we can expect a positive effect of husband’s 
educational level on the working hours of his wife. Chapter 4 on partner effects on working hours 
adjustments, does not support this hypothesis. The hypothesis that highly educated wives lower 
working hours of their husbands, because in their modern view fathers should exchange part of 
their working time for caring time (note: this would be a negative partner effect that dampens the 
income accumulation within couples), is not supported in Chapter 4 either. 
The general conclusion that can be drawn from these arguments regarding job level and 
working hours, is that the couples who have the best starting position at the moment their 
relationship starts, experience stronger income developments as time progresses than couples 
who start at a lower income level. Consequently, the differences between highly and poorly 
educated couples enlarge over the life course. 
Note that there is also a strong theoretical argument that opposes the development towards 
couples’ income divergence. The new home economics (Becker, 1981) argues that household 
outcomes are maximized if spouses divide paid and unpaid work in such a way that the spouse 
with the highest productivity rate specializes in paid work and the other spouse specializes in 
household and caring tasks. Formulated in a more general hypothesis (Bernardi, 1999; Bernasco, 
de Graaf, & Ultee, 1998), it is expected that a spouse with much human capital or a high income 
reduces incentives for the other spouse to work long hours or to put an effort into his or her 
career. Some studies found evidence for this financial mechanism (Bernardi, 1999; Bernasco, de 
Graaf, & Ultee, 1998; Davies, Elias, & Penn, 1994; Sørensen, 1983). Such a restrictive partner 
effect implies that the good income position of the one is not complemented by a good income 
position of the other. This tendency would counteract the accumulation of income within 
households, which makes divergence of couples’ incomes less extreme, or even turns it into 
convergence. 
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6.3  Data 
We analyse data from the Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, and 2003 (de Graaf, de 
Graaf, Kraaykamp, & Ultee, 1998; 2000; 2003). The three highly comparable surveys cover the 
Dutch population between the age of 18 and 70, with an overrepresentation of couples. The data 
are based on structured face-to-face interviews and self-completion questionnaires, which are 
identical for primary respondents and their cohabiting or marital partners. The net response rate 
varies from 40.6 to 52.6 per cent. In total, 3,235 respondents, of whom 2,582 have a partner, have 
been interviewed. We selected opposite-sex couples that were cohabiting or married at the 
moment of interview, and whose partners both were between 18 and 45 when they started their 
relationship, and who both participated in the data collection (N=2,396). The data contain 
information on complete relational and labour market careers of the respondent and his or her 
partner until the moment of interview; a retrospective design has been used in which respondents 
were asked to reconstruct, with exact dates, their careers in several domains.  
The retrospective setup of the data enables us to make a couple-month file that starts in 
the month the relationship between the respondent and his or her current partner started. We 
define a relationship as unmarried cohabitation or marriage, which means we do not consider the 
phase in which the couple was non-cohabiting. We are interested in cumulative incomes of 
husband, wife, and the couple as a whole at several points in their relationship: the first five 
years, the second five years, the third five years, and the first fifteen years after the start of the 
relationship. Not all couples observed are together for such a long time. From the 2,396 couples 
in our data set, 2,102 couples are together for at least five years, 1,766 for at least ten years, and 
1,437 for at least fifteen years. We only selected couples who can be followed for at least the first 
fifteen years of their relationship, to rule out that presumed life course developments are actually 
due to compositional differences between groups of couples that are together for only five, ten, or 
the full fifteen years. 
Respondents are not asked to recollect the income level of every job they had, since this 
information is not believed to be very accurate for jobs long ago. Therefore, we construct an 
income measure that is based on the number of working hours and estimated hourly wage. 
Transfers such as unemployment benefits are not considered, which means that our income 
measure purely reflects labour income. Number of working hours is available for every job the 
respondent has had during his or her occupational career; also, changes in working hours within 
the same job are recorded. We top-code the weekly number of working hours at 40. The sum of 
all hours the respondent has worked in the three five-year periods and in the first fifteen years of 
the relationship, gives the cumulative number of working hours. People who have a full-time job 
for five years have worked 10,573 hours in this five-year period. On average, husbands have 
worked 9,036 hours and wives 4,352 hours in the first five years. On the couple level, the average 
number of working hours (which is the sum of husband’s and wife’s cumulative working hours) 
in five years is 13,388. If we use cumulative working hours as independent variable, we apply 
mean-centring. 
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Hourly wages are not directly available in the data because of reliability issues, so we use 
husband’s and wife’s occupational status, measured with the International Socioeconomic Index 
(Ganzeboom, de Graaf, & Treiman, 1992), together with age and age-square, to estimate hourly 
wages. For this purpose, we rely on data from the Loonwijzer (Tijdens, 2005), which provides 
information on job titles and hourly wages of almost 80,000 Dutch men and women interviewed 
between 2000 and 2004. We estimate a regression model for men and women, in which the net 
hourly wage in Euros is the dependent variable and ISEI, age, and age-square are the independent 
variables. The estimated regression equations1 are used to compute male and female net hourly 
wages in the Family Survey Dutch Population (cf. de Graaf & Kats, 2007). Figure 6.2 shows the 
estimated hourly wages by age of men and women with high-status (ISEI=90) and low-status 
(ISEI=10) jobs. The net hourly wage ranges from 5.40 to 14.85 Euros for men and from 3.88 to 
11.07 Euros for women. Note that the range of these estimated hourly wages is more limited than 
in reality: about 10 per cent of the men and about a quarter of the women in the Loonwijzer have 
real wages out of the estimated ranges. This implies that our estimated income differences 
between couples could be slightly conservative. In the analysis with hourly wage as the 
dependent variable, we take the maximum hourly wage observed in the particular time period. 
Mean-centring is applied when hourly wage is introduced as an independent variable. Husbands 
or wives who have been non-employed for the whole period get a zero score on hourly wage, 
while a dummy variable that indicates continuous non-employment is included in the models 
(coefficient of dummy variable not shown in tables). 
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Figure 6.2 Estimated hourly wages for high-status and low-status husbands and wives by age 
                                                 
1 For men: hourly wage = -5.375722 + .088261*ISEI + .480644*age - .004634*age2 
For women: hourly wage = -2.480318 + .053789*ISEI + .407610*age - .004680*age2 
 111
Chapter 6 
For every month, we construct husbands’ and wives’ net income by multiplying their weekly 
number of working hours by their hourly wage, and then by multiplying the result by 52 
weeks/12 months. A couple’s income is the sum of the husband’s and the wife’s income. 
Addition of monthly incomes in the three five-year periods and in the first fifteen years of the 
relationship results in cumulative incomes in the four time periods; we do this calculation for 
husbands, wives, and couples. Note that we apply the hourly wage imputation based on the 2000-
2004 Loonwijzer data to all jobs held between 1947 and 2003. This has the advantage that 
inflation does not play a role, and thus, that we can compare couples who started their 
relationship in different historical periods. We thereby assume that the order of jobs according to 
their hourly wages is rather stable over time, corresponding to the underlying assumption of the 
ISEI measure, which is widely used. In the first five years of the relationship, husbands’ earnings 
vary from 0 (for those who have not worked at all) to 142,669 Euros. On average, husbands earn 
76,323 Euros in this period. In the later five-year periods, average accumulated income mounts to 
88,210 Euros and 95,280 Euros respectively. Female earnings are lower: 31,885 Euros on average 
in the first five years. In contrast to men, their income levels are lower in the next five-year 
periods: 20,526 and 20,199 Euros. In fifteen years time, husbands have earned 259,814 Euros on 
average, whereas wives contribute 72,610 Euros to the household income on average. A couple’s 
average income in the first fifteen years of their relationship is 332,425 Euros, but the variation is 
large (standard deviation is 123,771). 
Income information can be lacking because of missing information on working hours or 
on hourly wage (i.e. on occupational status), in at least one month during the first fifteen years of 
the relationship. This is the case for 7 per cent of the husbands, 10 per cent of the wives, and 15 
per cent of the couples. We apply listwise deletion methods, and do not use any form of 
imputation because the impact of such an approach could be rather large considering the 
cumulative nature of our measure. The net number of couples in our analysis is 1,224. 
Husbands’ and wives’ educational attainment is measured in years of schooling, in which 
zero years stands for elementary education and 14 years for a postgraduate degree2. On average, 
husbands have had 5.74 years of schooling and wives 4.84 years. Four husbands and five wives 
have missing information on education. They are assigned a score zero, and a dummy variable 
which is coded 1 if the information was lacking, is included in the models (coefficient of dummy 
variable not shown in tables). 
We include the year in which the relationship started, husband’s and wife’s age at the start 
of the relationship, and the presence and age of children as control variables. The year in which 
the relationship started varies from 1947 to 1989 and has been transformed in a way that score 0 
reflects the year 1950, and is divided by ten so the effects can be interpreted in decades. Age at 
                                                 
2 primary education=0 years, lower vocational education and lower secondary education=4 years, intermediate 
secondary education and reduced intermediate vocational education=5 years, higher secondary education=6 years, 
intermediate vocational education=7 years, higher vocational education=9 years, university=11 years, post-academic 
education=14 years. 
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the start of the relationship ranges from 18 through 44 (mean husbands=25.43; mean 
wives=23.02). This upper bound selection assures us that we generally observe couples during 
their working lives, instead of their after-work lives (maximum age in observation window is 59). 
In our models, we centre age at 25, which means that the intercept refers to husbands and wives 
who started their relationship at age 25. The child situation is measured in two variables that 
express the number of years that the couple (1) has at least one child under age four, and (2) has 
children who are all four years or older. Couples have children under the age of 4 for 2.06 years 
on average in the first five years of their relationship, 3.04 years in the second five-year period, 
and 1.44 years in the third five-year period. For children at a school-going age, the averages are 
0.09, 1.06, and 3.10 years respectively. Table 6.1 shows descriptive information of the variables 
(non-centred and centred) used in the analyses. 
 
Table 6.1 Descriptive information on non-centred and centred variables 
  non-centred variables   centred variables 
  N minimum maximum mean st dev  minimum maximum mean st dev 
year start relationship 1,224 1947 1989 1972.38 8.79  -0.3 3.9 2.24 0.88 
age at start relationship           
husband 1,224 18 44 25.43 3.99  -7 19 0.43 3.99 
wife 1,224 18 44 23.02 3.50  -7 19 -1.98 3.50 
children           
years with child <4           
   0-5 years of the relationship 1,224 0 5 2.06 1.71      
   5-10 years of the relationship 1,224 0 5 3.04 1.75      
   10-15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 5 1.44 1.75      
   first 15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 14.42 6.54 2.87      
years with child >=4           
   0-5 years of the relationship 1,224 0 5 0.09 0.51      
   5-10 years of the relationship 1,224 0 5 1.06 1.40      
   10-15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 5 3.10 1.99      
   first 15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 15 4.23 3.02      
education in years a)           
husband 1,220 0 14 5.74 3.31      
wife 1,219 0 14 4.84 3.03      
maximum hourly wage b)           
husband           
   0-5 years of the relationship 1,118 5.40 13.96 9.15 1.60  -3.75 4.82 0 1.60 
   5-10 years of the relationship 1,126 5.86 14.85 10.14 1.50  -4.28 4.71 0 1.50 
   10-15 years of the relationship 1,119 6.85 14.83 10.88 1.43  -4.03 3.95 0 1.43 
   first 15 years of the relationship 1,138 6.30 14.85 10.88 1.45  -4.58 3.97 0 1.45 
wife           
   0-5 years of the relationship 945 3.88 10.18 7.45 1.08  -3.57 2.74 0 1.08 
   5-10 years of the relationship 548 5.49 10.61 8.37 0.94  -2.87 2.24 0 0.94 
   10-15 years of the relationship 563 6.51 11.07 8.77 0.88  -2.26 2.30 0 0.88 
   first 15 years of the relationship 992 3.88 11.07 8.10 1.27   -4.22 2.97 0 1.27 
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Table 6.1 Continued… 
  non-centred variables   centred variables 
  N minimum maximum mean st dev   minimum maximum mean st dev 
cumulated working hours           
husband           
   0-5 years of the relationship 1,224 0 10,573 9,036 3,273  -9,036 1,538 0 3,273 
   5-10 years of the relationship 1,224 0 10,400 9,178 2,985  -9,178 1,222 0 2,985 
   10-15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 10,400 9,075 3,063  -9,075 1,325 0 3,063 
   first 15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 31,373 27,288 8,712  -27,288 4,085 0 8,712 
wife           
   0-5 years of the relationship 1,224 0 10,573 4,352 4,116  -4,352 6,221 0 4,116 
   5-10 years of the relationship 1,224 0 10,400 2,496 3,611  -2,496 7,904 0 3,611 
   10-15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 10,400 2,324 3,298  -2,324 8,076 0 3,298 
   first 15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 31,373 9,173 9,648  -9,173 22,201 0 9,648 
couple           
   0-5 years of the relationship 1,224 0 21,147 13,388 5,184  -13,388 7,759 0 5,184 
   5-10 years of the relationship 1,224 0 20,800 11,674 4,675  -11,674 9,126 0 4,675 
   10-15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 20,800 11,399 4,438  -11,399 9,401 0 4,438 
   first 15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 62,747 36,461 12,885  -36,461 26,285 0 12,885 
cumulated income           
husband           
   0-5 years of the relationship 1,224 0 142,669 76,323 31,189      
   5-10 years of the relationship 1,224 0 147,412 88,210 31,806      
   10-15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 153,155 95,280 34,832      
   first 15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 442,085 259,814 91,715      
wife           
   0-5 years of the relationship 1,224 0 106,711 31,885 31,016      
   5-10 years of the relationship 1,224 0 104,140 20,526 30,218      
   10-15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 105,352 20,199 29,121      
   first 15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 309,281 72,610 79,773      
couple           
   0-5 years of the relationship 1,224 0 247,634 108,209 44,304      
   5-10 years of the relationship 1,224 0 238,996 108,736 44,890      
   10-15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 247,585 115,479 45,812      
   first 15 years of the relationship 1,224 0 715,743 332,425 123,771           
a) respondents with missing values have been assigned score 0 on the centred variable, and a dummy variable has been added to the model 
b) respondents with missing values (as a consequence of non-employment) have been assigned score 0 on the centred variable, and a dummy 
variable has been added to the model 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003 
 
6.4  Results 
In order to better understand the relationship between husband’s and wife’s education on the one 
hand, and the couple’s income on the other hand, we will first have a closer look at the 
ingredients of a couple’s income: husband’s and wife’s hourly wage, and husband’s and wife’s 
working hours. We will look at three five-year periods of the relationship and at the cumulative 
outcome after fifteen years. 
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Table 6.2 Maximum hourly wage of husbands and wives: effects of individual and partner’s human capital 
 (OLS regression, unstandardized regression coefficients) 
  HUSBANDS   WIVES 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
  b   se   b   se   b   se   b   se 
 maximum hourly wage 0-5 years  maximum hourly wage 0-5 years 
intercept 8.276 ** 0.137 7.116 ** 0.326 7.409 ** 0.094  6.742 ** 0.164
year start relationship -0.191 ** 0.042 -0.184 ** 0.043 -0.017 0.028  -0.066 * 0.027
age at start relationship 0.190 ** 0.008 0.180 ** 0.009 0.120 ** 0.006  0.112 ** 0.006
years child < 4 -0.035  0.022 -0.021 0.025 -0.122 ** 0.014  -0.020  0.015
years child >= 4 -0.010  0.065 -0.008 0.065 -0.132 ** 0.043  -0.112 ** 0.040
education 0.174 ** 0.011 0.167 ** 0.011 0.090 ** 0.008  0.087 ** 0.008
partner’s education 0.069 ** 0.013 0.053 ** 0.013 0.019 * 0.007  0.008  0.007
partner’s maximum hourly wage    0.168 ** 0.043     0.058 ** 0.016
cumulative working hours (x1000)    -0.015 0.019     0.098 ** 0.007
partner’s cumulative working hours (x1000)  -0.004 0.012     -0.009  0.012
R2 0.47      0.47     0.40      0.49     
 maximum hourly wage 5-10 years  maximum hourly wage 5-10 years 
intercept 9.033 ** 0.147 7.661 ** 0.485 8.310 ** 0.078  7.666 ** 0.148
year start relationship -0.143 ** 0.040 -0.132 ** 0.041 -0.065 ** 0.021  -0.063 ** 0.020
age at start relationship 0.138 ** 0.008 0.134 ** 0.008 0.045 ** 0.005  0.040 ** 0.005
years child < 4 0.028  0.021 0.040 0.023 -0.038 ** 0.011  -0.005  0.011
years child >= 4 -0.023  0.027 -0.013 0.028 -0.038 ** 0.014  -0.003  0.014
education 0.176 ** 0.011 0.172 ** 0.011 0.050 ** 0.006  0.050 ** 0.006
partner’s education 0.068 ** 0.013 0.060 ** 0.013 0.025 ** 0.006  0.021 ** 0.006
partner’s maximum hourly wage    0.159 ** 0.058     0.033 * 0.013
cumulative working hours (x1000)    0.019 0.026     0.070 ** 0.007
partner’s cumulative working hours (x1000)  0.011 0.015     -0.009  0.013
R2 0.39      0.40     0.19       0.26     
 maximum hourly wage 10-15 years  maximum hourly wage 10-15 years 
intercept 9.862 ** 0.155 8.366 ** 0.527 8.608 ** 0.080  7.989 ** 0.158
year start relationship -0.127 ** 0.039 -0.124 ** 0.040 -0.047 * 0.020  -0.039 * 0.019
age at start relationship 0.093 ** 0.008 0.090 ** 0.008 0.021 ** 0.005  0.017 ** 0.005
years child < 4 -0.005  0.028 0.009 0.028 -0.033 * 0.014  -0.017  0.014
years child >= 4 -0.017  0.024 -0.003 0.025 -0.037 ** 0.012  -0.018  0.012
education 0.181 ** 0.011 0.176 ** 0.011 0.055 ** 0.006  0.052 ** 0.006
partner’s education 0.064 ** 0.013 0.053 ** 0.013 0.029 ** 0.005  0.022 ** 0.006
partner’s maximum hourly wage    0.166 ** 0.060     0.037 ** 0.013
cumulative working hours (x1000)    0.072 ** 0.025     0.056 ** 0.007
partner’s cumulative working hours (x1000)  0.016 0.016     0.012  0.012
R2 0.35      0.36     0.17       0.22     
 maximum hourly wage first 15 years  maximum hourly wage first 15 years 
intercept 9.823 ** 0.159 8.510 ** 0.317 7.793 ** 0.139  6.609 ** 0.238
year start relationship -0.117 ** 0.040 -0.116 ** 0.041 0.069 * 0.035  -0.032  0.030
age at start relationship 0.100 ** 0.008 0.093 ** 0.008 0.070 ** 0.008  0.062 ** 0.007
years child < 4 -0.002  0.012 0.005 0.012 -0.058 ** 0.010  -0.005  0.009
years child >= 4 -0.016  0.011 -0.015 0.012 -0.037 ** 0.010  0.020 * 0.009
education 0.194 ** 0.011 0.193 ** 0.011 0.132 ** 0.011  0.113 ** 0.009
partner’s education 0.057 ** 0.013 0.037 ** 0.013 0.026 ** 0.009  0.011  0.009
partner’s maximum hourly wage    0.163 ** 0.038    0.080 ** 0.021
cumulative working hours (x1000)    0.027 ** 0.007     0.066 ** 0.003
partner’s cumulative working hours (x1000)  -0.003 0.005     -0.006  0.005
R2 0.37      0.38     0.30       0.49     
** p<.01;  * p<.05 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003; N=1,224 
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6.4.1  Maximum wage rate 
The first issue we discuss is who earns most per hour. Or in other words, who might have a high 
income if he or she is willing to work many hours? Table 6.2 shows the relationship between 
education and hourly wage for husbands and wives. The highly educated have a significantly 
higher wage rate than the poorly educated. Every year of extra education yields 17 cents more 
hourly wage for husbands, and 9 cents more for wives, in the first five years of their relationship. 
Human capital of the partner has an additional positive effect, which results in accumulation of 
favourable positions within the household, given educational homogamy: in a homogamous, 
highly educated couple, the wage rate of the husband is stimulated positively by both their 
educational levels, whereas a poorly educated couple lacks both stimulating forces. The effect of 
the wife’s education on her husband’s hourly wage is almost half as strong as the effect of the 
husband’s education, and is partly explained by her wage rate (Model 2). The overall patterns are 
about the same for wives’ hourly wages, although the effects, individual as well as partner 
effects, are much smaller. During the life course, the impact of education on husbands’ wages 
rises slightly, whereas for women, the link between education and wage rate becomes weaker. If 
we consider the first fifteen years of the relationship, we can conclude that the educational level 
of both spouses stimulates the wage rates of husbands and wives, pointing out that the higher 
educated earn more per hour than the poorly educated because of individual human capital 
benefits and positive partner effects. On top of that, we observe a positive relationship between 
hourly wage and number of working hours for husbands and wives. Apparently, men and women 
who earn higher wages per hour make the most of it by working many hours, resulting in extra 
high earnings. 
 
6.4.2  Cumulative working hours 
The second component of income is working hours. Table 6.3 provides answers to the following 
question: who has worked the most hours? If we consider the first fifteen years of the 
relationship, we find that highly educated men have worked fewer hours than poorly educated 
men (Model 1, b=-275). The models for the separate five-year periods make clear that the 
negative effect is mainly present in the first five years of the relationship (b=-185), is lower in the 
next five years (b=-74), and has become non-significant after ten years. This can be understood 
from the larger proportion of time that the higher educated have spent in school in the beginning 
of their relationship, compared to the poorly educated who were able to be active on the labour 
market instead. On average, men with a university degree have spent the first 13 months of their 
relationship at school, and men with a PhD degree even 24 months, but men with lower 
educational degrees started their working career at about the same time as their relationship (on 
average, they spent 0.4 to 3.8 months of the first five years in school). Despite the declining 
impact of this educational effect over the life course, the arrear of the highly educated is not made 
up in the first fifteen years, as working hours hardly vary among men in the rest of their lives. In  
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Table 6.3 Cumulative working hours of husbands and wives: effects of individual and partner’s human capital 
 (OLS regression, unstandardized regression coefficients) 
  HUSBANDS   WIVES 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
  b   se  b  se  b   se  b   se 
 cumulative working hours 0-5 years cumulative working hours 0-5 years 
intercept 10,537 ** 387  10,709 ** 215  4,740 ** 411 6,187 ** 335 
year start relationship -85  119  -106  65  852 ** 124 617 ** 98 
age at start relationship 27  23  50 ** 15  -24  28 -159 ** 26 
years child < 4 97  61  40  37  -1,168 ** 63 -849 ** 51 
years child >= 4 -518 ** 183  -114  97  -552 ** 192 -32  150 
education -185 ** 31  -94 ** 18  30  38 -130 ** 31 
partner’s education -87 * 36  -36  20  -7  32 -7  27 
maximum hourly wage     -34  43     1,367 ** 100 
partner’s maximum hourly wage    -39  64     -65  59 
partner’s cumulative working hours     0  0     0  0 
R2 0.07   0.75   0.36   0.62   
 cumulative working hours 5-10 years cumulative working hours 5-10 years 
intercept 9,671 ** 388  10,135 ** 196  4,304 ** 407 7,538 ** 298 
year start relationship -49  105  -54  46  633 ** 109 111  77 
age at start relationship -54 * 21  -6  10  5  26 -25  19 
years child < 4 73  55  46  25  -893 ** 57 -453 ** 41 
years child >= 4 15  71  50  32  -899 ** 74 -445 ** 52 
education -74 * 29  -35 ** 14  120 ** 35 -83 ** 25 
partner’s education -36  34  -13  15  -24  30 -52 * 22 
maximum hourly wage     24  32     1,045 ** 107 
partner’s maximum hourly wage    -36  65     42  51 
partner’s cumulative working hours     0  0     0  0 
R2 0.02   0.83   0.28   0.67   
 cumulative working hours 10-15 years cumulative working hours 10-15 years 
intercept 9,411 ** 425  10,276 ** 207  2,467 ** 427 6,690 ** 305 
year start relationship -71  108  -60  47  613 ** 109 10  74 
age at start relationship -63 ** 23  -5  10  -32  27 9  18 
years child < 4 53  76  14  33  -525 ** 79 -266 ** 52 
years child >= 4 15  67  15  29  -509 ** 68 -301 ** 45 
education -10  30  -22  14  188 ** 35 -41  24 
partner’s education -45  35  -27  15  -27  30 -20  22 
maximum hourly wage     96 ** 33     822 ** 108 
partner’s maximum hourly wage    68  69     52  51 
partner’s cumulative working hours     0  0     0  0 
R2 0.01   0.83   0.12   0.62   
 cumulative working hours first 15 years cumulative working hours first 15 years 
intercept 29,348 ** 1,226  30,937 ** 657  11,877 ** 1,170 16,279 ** 953 
year start relationship -227  310  -232  161  2,285 ** 295 1,377 ** 235 
age at start relationship -93  63  8  34  -77  70 -239 ** 58 
years child < 4 143  90  56  47  -894 ** 86 -560 ** 68 
years child >= 4 -14  87  61  46  -857 ** 83 -702 ** 66 
education -275 ** 84  -232 ** 48  362 ** 93 -318 ** 78 
partner’s education -167  98  -87  53  -48  81 -109  70 
maximum hourly wage     417 ** 112     4,006 ** 193 
partner’s maximum hourly wage    -124  149     -72  162 
partner’s cumulative working hours     0  0     0  0 
R2 0.03   0.76   0.28   0.56   
** p<.01;  * p<.05 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003; N=1,224 
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fifteen years time, the highest educated husbands have worked 3850 hours less (14*-275) than 
husbands with primary education only. Only in the first five years of the relationship does the 
partner’s educational level have an additional negative effect. If we consider a larger time span, 
the partner’s education does not play a role in the husband’s number of working hours3. 
The negative impact of the time that highly educated women have spent in school is not 
visible at first sight: for the first five years of the relationship, Model 1 shows a non-significant 
effect of wives’ education. If we consider Model 2, we understand that highly educated women 
have indeed spent more time in school than poorly educated women, which reduces their number 
of working hours (b=-130), but that they also have higher hourly wages, which stimulates them to 
work more (b=1,367). However, the net effect of education does not deviate significantly from 
zero in the first five years. Over the life course, the balance between the two mechanisms 
becomes more and more in favour of the positive wage rate effect, resulting in a positive net 
effect of wives’ education in the later five-year periods and in the first fifteen years as a whole. In 
other words, highly educated wives have worked more hours in total in the first fifteen years of 
their relationship than poorly educated wives. There is no additional effect of the husband. Note 
that the educational effects are controlled for the presence and age of children in the household. 
The effect of wives’ education on her cumulative working hours would be much stronger if we do 
not control for the fact that highly educated women postpone pregnancy (b=144 with p<.01 in the 
first five years, and b=520 with p<.01 in the first fifteen years). 
 
Table 6.4 Cumulative working hours of couples: effects of husbands’ and wives’ human capital 
 (OLS regression, unstandardized regression coefficients) 
 
cumulative 
working hours 
0-5 years  
cumulative 
working hours 
5-10 years  
cumulative 
working hours 
10-15 years  
cumulative 
working hours 
first 15 years 
 COUPLES b   se  b   se  b   se  b   se 
intercept 15,424 ** 595  13,962 ** 584  11,805 ** 606  41,286 ** 1,750 
year start relationship 765 ** 178  585 ** 155  541 ** 153  2,059 ** 436 
age husband at start relationship -31  44  -42  41  -36  41  -112  114 
age wife at start relationship 23  51  3  47  -56  48  -56  132 
years child < 4 -1,076 ** 90  -818 ** 81  -473 ** 110  -751 ** 127 
years child >= 4 -1,049 ** 275  -885 ** 104  -492 ** 95  -872 ** 123 
husband’s education -196 ** 46  -97 * 43  -35  42  -325 ** 119 
wife’s education -55  54  83  49  143 ** 49  195  138 
R2 0.18    0.14   0.06    0.12     
** p<.01;  * p<.05 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003; N=1,224 
 
                                                 
3 The huge increase in explained variance between Model 1 and Model 2 is due to the dummy variable that indicates 
whether or not the respondent has been continuously non-employed in the particular period. This dummy variable is 
necessary in taking into account the missing values on hourly wage that are caused by consistent non-employment. 
Naturally, the score 1 of this dummy variable means zero hours of work, and is therefore an important contributor to 
the explained variance. A sensitivity analysis in which we select people who have at least worked one hour, shows 
slightly different coefficients of husbands’ and wives’ education, but does not alter the conclusions. The same is true 
for the analysis on wives’ cumulative working hours. 
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Table 6.4 shows the consequences of the above-mentioned processes for the cumulative number 
of working hours for couples. Education reduces the cumulative working hours of men, whereas 
it increases working hours of women. The positive effect of wives’ education cannot outweigh 
the negative effect of husbands’ education (b=-325, p<.01 for husbands, and b=195 for wives 
which does not reach the level of significance). The negative relationship between couples’ 
educational achievements and couples’ cumulative working hours limits the accumulation of 
income in households. It is the highly educated couples who have higher hourly wages, though 
they work fewer hours. Accumulation would, naturally, be more extreme if the couples with the 
highest hourly wages also work most hours.  
 
6.4.3  Cumulative income 
We will now turn to the results on husbands’, wives’ (Table 6.5), and couples’ incomes (Table 
6.6). We have learned that poorly educated husbands work more hours, but at a lower wage rate. 
As a result, their total earnings do not differ significantly from that of highly educated men in the 
first five years of the relationship (b=-7). However, incomes of highly educated husbands rise 
faster during the life course than incomes of poorly educated husbands, and if we consider the 
first fifteen years of the relationship, we find that highly educated men have earned more: one 
year of extra schooling yields 2,486 Euros more net income. Partner’s education does not 
contribute significantly to husbands’ income. From the beginning, wives’ educational 
achievements have raised female earnings significantly (b=576, b=1,194, and b=1,886 in the 
 
Table 6.5 Cumulative income of husbands and wives: effects of individual and partner’s human capital 
 (OLS regression, unstandardized regression coefficients) 
  
cumulative income  
0-5 years   
cumulative income 
5-10 years  
cumulative income 
10-15 years  
cumulative income 
first 15 years 
HUSBANDS b   se   b   se  b   se  b   se 
intercept 81,054 ** 3,646  83,167 ** 4,100  88,706 ** 4,782  250,801 ** 12,815 
year start relationship -2,664 * 1,126  -2,120  1,114  -2,202  1,211  -7,030 * 3,241 
age at start relationship 2,316 ** 219  1,069 ** 227  428  254  3,811 ** 660 
years child < 4 516  573  853  581  594  858  1,468  938 
years child >= 4 -4,875 ** 1,725  -184  750  86  750  -652  911 
education -7  291  912 ** 307  1,652 ** 336  2,486 ** 881 
partner’s education -68   340   361   355   161   391   442   1,023 
R2 0.09    0.04   0.03   0.04     
WIVES            
intercept 34,669 ** 3,104  35,610 ** 3,389  21,445 ** 3,741  96,411 ** 9,648 
year start relationship 5,946 ** 940  4,872 ** 911  5,046 ** 956  16,745 ** 2,437 
age at start relationship 570 ** 212  388  214  -105  235  654  576 
years child < 4 -8,584 ** 478  -7,431 ** 474  -4,703 ** 691  -7,393 ** 708 
years child >= 4 -4,592 ** 1,450  -7,530 ** 614  -4,624 ** 594  -6,977 ** 688 
education 576 * 284  1,194 ** 290  1,886 ** 309  3,783 ** 769 
partner’s education 54   243   -86   252   -132   266   -97   664 
R2 0.36    0.29   0.14   0.28     
** p<.01;  * p<.05 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003; N=1,224 
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three subsequent five-year periods respectively). Wives’ strong responsiveness to hourly wages is 
the main reason for this. Note that if we do not control for the presence and age of children, the 
income gap between highly and poorly educated women in the first fifteen years of their 
relationship would be 34 per cent larger. There is no net effect of their husbands’ education. To 
sum up, there is no clear income gap between poorly and highly educated husbands in the first 
five years of their relationship, but the gap grows over the years in favour of the highly educated; 
for women, an income gap between highly and poorly educated exists from the beginning and 
becomes larger as time progresses. 
 
Table 6.6 Cumulative income of couples: effects of husbands’ and wives’ human capital 
 (OLS regression, unstandardized regression coefficients) 
 
cumulative income 
0-5 years  
cumulative income 
5-10 years  
cumulative income 
10-15 years  
cumulative income 
first 15 years 
COUPLES  b   se  b  se  b  se  b   se 
intercept 116,790 ** 5,077  119,012 ** 5,578  109,574 ** 6,166  347,962 ** 16,670 
year start relationship 3,271 * 1,516  2,765  1,479  2,843  1,551  9,759 * 4,154 
age husband at start relationship 1,943 ** 377  1,107 ** 390  645  413  3,661 ** 1,082 
age wife at start relationship 913 * 436  493  449  -263  485  999  1,256 
years child < 4 -8,104 ** 771  -6,553 ** 771  -4,080 ** 1,122  -5,877 ** 1,209 
years child >= 4 -9,406 ** 2,344  -7,742 ** 997  -4,507 ** 966  -7,663 ** 1,172 
husband’s education 13  393  816 * 409  1,535 ** 432  2,356 * 1,135 
wife’s education 519  458  1,543 ** 471  2,037 ** 501  4,210 ** 1,311 
R2 0.19   0.15   0.08   0.14     
** p<.01;  * p<.05 
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003; N=1,224 
 
Can we conclude that highly educated couples have higher incomes, and that the incomes of 
poorly and highly educated couples diverge over the life course? Table 6.6 reveals that the 
answer is affirmative. Highly and poorly educated couples have no significantly different 
incomes after a five year relationship, but their incomes grow further apart over the years, since 
the revenues of an extra year of education increase over the life course. Both husbands’ and 
wives’ educational levels contribute to household earnings, but the impact of the husband is much 
smaller than the impact of the wife. With respect to the positive net effect of husbands’ education, 
it is the positive relationship between education and wage rate that offsets the negative 
relationship between education and cumulative working hours. Education of the wife clearly 
makes a difference, both because highly educated wives work more hours in the long run and 
because they earn more per hour. The differences are considerable: in the first fifteen years of the 
relationship, a wife with the highest education adds 58,940 Euros (14*4,210) more to the couple’s 
income than a wife with only primary education, and a husband with the highest education adds 
32,984 (14*2,356) Euros more to a couple’s income than a husband with only primary education. 
The conclusion is that a homogamous couple that attained the highest educational level, has 
earned 91,924 Euros more than a homogamous, primary educated couple. The impact of spouses’ 
education is substantial if we consider that the average earnings in the first fifteen years of all 
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couples is 332,425 Euros. We can conclude that couples’ earnings indeed diverge over the life 
course; the gap between poorly and highly educated couples becomes larger if we follow them 
longer. Figure 6.3 displays this growing gap for couples with different educational backgrounds 
by showing their cumulative incomes after five, ten, and fifteen years of having a relationship4.  
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Figure 6.3 Divergence of couples’ incomes over the life course by couples’ educational levels 
 
6.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we were interested in the long term consequences of educational homogamy for 
couples’ incomes. Education is an important contributor to occupational success and earnings, so 
spouses’ resemblance in educational achievement accumulates resources on the couple level. 
During the life course, husbands and wives make occupational decisions with respect to career 
moves and working hours that improve or deteriorate their income levels. These decisions appear 
to be related to individual and partner’s education; usually in the sense that it is the highly 
educated who obtain higher income levels. Such life course developments lead to divergence of 
couples’ incomes, and this chapter aims to find out to what extent this is the case.  
The results reveal that consequences of educational homogamy become especially severe 
in the long run: earnings of highly and poorly educated couples are not too different in the first 
five years of their relationship. This, predominantly because a higher education coincides with 
investments in time that cannot be spent on the labour market. However, as time progresses, the 
income gap between couples with much and little education becomes substantial. Major driving 
forces behind this divergence are the higher hourly wages among highly educated husbands and 
                                                 
4 The cumulative incomes after 5 and 15 years correspond with numbers in Table 6.6, cumulative incomes after 10 
years are not shown in the tables. Calculations have been based on score 0 for poorly educated and score 14 for 
highly educated, e.g. both spouses highly educated after 5 years: cumulative income = 116,790+(14*13)+(14*519). 
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wives, and the more intensive labour market participation among highly educated wives. Overall, 
income inequality between couples is more strongly driven by different labour market behaviour 
among women with different levels of education. The role of men is much smaller, although still 
significant. This result underlines the impact of the rise in female labour supply for inequality 
between couples. 
Earlier, we mentioned four mechanisms that could contribute to diverging incomes of 
couples. Hourly wages, as well as working hours, could be stimulated by the educational level of 
the respondent and the partner. We found clear evidence for positive effects of education on 
hourly wages, both from the individual and the partner. Also, our results show that highly 
educated wives are more likely to work many hours than poorly educated wives, and their higher 
hourly wages appear to be a clear explanation for that. We do not find such a stimulation for men; 
for them, working hours hardly depend on their wage rate. Instead of an expected zero correlation 
between education and working hours for men, we find a negative correlation, which is a direct 
result of the longer time they spent at school while having a relationship. Finally, working hours 
are not correlated with the human capital of the spouse. We expected wives with highly educated 
husbands to work more, which is in line with the modern values regarding working women that 
highly educated men are likely to adhere to. This does not appear to be the case, just like highly 
educated women do not restrict the working hours of their husbands. The absence of any partner 
effect on working hours, and the presence of positive partner effects on hourly wage, do not 
support the new home economics, or the more general economic hypothesis that predicts a 
negative relationship between spouses’ labour market careers.  
We need to stress that our income measure is based on estimated hourly wages and only 
includes labour income. For these reasons, it might, to some extent, lack accuracy. A panel study 
with exact income information that follows couples for fifteen years could solve this problem, 
although one should keep in mind that such a design would probably not have detailed 
information (in months) on the timing of an income change and on multiple income changes 
between subsequent waves. This might lower accuracy to a similar or even greater extent. It is 
encouraging that our estimated wage rate covers a large majority of the employed Dutch men and 
women, but caution is recommended in the interpretation of exact absolute income levels. We 
cannot think of obvious reasons why the mechanisms themselves would be affected by our 
approach. 
The strength of this study lies in showing the overall consequences of the many decisions 
couples make. Spouses make labour market decisions that are dependent and interrelated with 
many other decisions, such as each others’ labour market careers; the timing and spacing of 
children; their preferences regarding work; and the combination between work, care, and leisure. 
We do not aim at understanding these separate decisions and interdependencies in this particular 
chapter, but we want to show the total cumulative effect of such decisions on the inequality 
between couples. The total effect represents the actual income situation couples are in, which 
largely determines their opportunities and those of their children. 
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7.1  Background and questions of the study 
A study on labour market careers of couples touches upon one of the principal factors which 
structure families’ daily lives, and deals with a key component of inequality between households. 
For husbands and wives, and their children, labour market participation determines their daily 
routine, and success on the labour market sets the boundaries of their financial scope. For 
individuals, labour market careers are an important aspect of their lives, not only in terms of time 
and money, but also in terms of social prestige, self-actualization, fulfilment, and social contacts. 
Besides someone’s own career, the career of the partner also shapes one’s life, especially with 
regard to time and money constraints. Because partners share family responsibilities and make 
joint decisions in this respect, individual labour market careers are likely to be affected by the 
partner. This study deals with the interrelation between husbands’ and wives’ labour market 
careers in the Netherlands from a long term perspective. 
The association between spouses’ career outcomes indicates the degree of inequality 
between couples. The socio-economic position of a household is, in essence, the sum of the 
labour market careers of the two partners. The outcome of that sum will be especially favourable 
if ‘successful’ husbands are married to ‘successful’ wives, and relatively unfavourable if ‘less 
successful’ husbands are married to ‘less successful’ wives. In other words, the more positive the 
association between spouses’ occupational outcomes, the higher the level of inequality between 
couples; and an increasingly positive association over time indicates increasing inequality. A 
negative association would imply that the inequality between couples is flattened: one successful 
labour market career goes hand in hand with one less successful career. This potentially large 
impact of spouses’ occupational association on inequality between households motivates my first 
research question: to what extent are the labour market outcomes of husband and wife related, 
and has this relationship changed during the second half of the twentieth century? 
The analysis of the first-published table which relates husbands’ to wives’ employment 
status in the United States in the 1970s, revealed that the positive association between spouses’ 
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(non-)employment, with its far-reaching consequences for societal inequality, does not just reflect 
educational homogamy. This suggests that the association between spouses’ labour market 
positions is not just a by-product of partner choice, and thus it is not present from the beginning 
of the relationship onwards, but it is partly formed during the relationship. To what extent this is 
the case, and what mechanisms are at work, is what I try to find out for the Netherlands. My 
second research question reads: to what extent are labour market outcomes restricted or supported 
by resources of the partner, and has this changed during the second half of the twentieth century? 
As the two research questions make clear, I am interested in changes in the association 
and partner effects over time. This interest stems from the major societal changes in the previous 
century with respect to economic and cultural modernization. Especially female labour market 
behaviour and gender relations have changed drastically, and these are considered central issues 
in the way spouses form their own, and each others’, labour market careers. 
These general research questions are broken down into five empirical chapters. Table 7.1 
gives an overview of the questions of the consecutive chapters, together with the data sources and 
method of analysis that is used in answering them. 
 
Table 7.1 Overview of questions, data, and analysis of the empirical chapters in this book 
  Questions Data Analysis 
Chapter 2 1. To what extent are (a) labour market participation and (b) 
occupations of husbands and wives related?  
 2. To what extent can these relationships be attributed to educational 
homogamy? 
 3. To what extent do these relationships differ between cohorts? 
Labour Force 
Surveys (EBB) 
1994-2006 
Log-linear analysis 
     
Chapter 3 1. To what extent does spouse’s human capital positively or negatively 
affect labour market participation, job level, and the combination of 
the two: income? 
 2. To what extent has the influence of spouse’s human capital on labour 
market participation, job level, and income changed over time? 
Labour Force 
Surveys 
(AKT/EBB) 
1977-2006 
Multinomial logistic regression  
Ordinary least square regression 
     
Chapter 4 1. To what extent are working hours adjustments determined by labour 
market resources of the partner? 
 2. Under which conditions, specified as historical period, individual 
human capital, and the presence of children, do partner’s resources 
influence working hours adjustments? 
Family Survey 
Dutch 
Population 
1998-2003 
Event-history analysis 
     
Chapter 5 1. To what extent do upward and downward job moves of men and 
women depend on (a) relationship status, and (b) on the labour 
market resources of the partner? 
 2. To what extent has the influence of (a) relationship status, and (b) 
the labour market resources of the partner changed between 1940 
and 2003? 
Family Survey 
Dutch 
Population 
1998-2003 
Event-history analysis 
     
Chapter 6 1. To what extent do income differences between couples become 
larger or smaller due to accumulation processes during the life 
course? 
Family Survey 
Dutch 
Population 
1998-2003 
Ordinary least square regression 
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In this concluding chapter, I summarize the main results of the five empirical chapters. Since 
some topics are spread over several chapters, I organize the summary around four topics. The first 
topic I go into (see Section 7.2) is the association between husbands’ and wives’ labour market 
participation and occupations, including possible changes in the association. This topic reflects 
the first general research question and is dealt with in Chapter 2. Secondly, I draw conclusions 
about the influence of the partner: is the partner a resource or a restriction to one’s labour market 
career? These conclusions are based on Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 (Section 7.3). Thirdly, I combine 
the results of Chapters 3, 4, and 5, so as to report on changes in partner effects, in Section 7.4. 
Fourth, I make inferences from the results of this whole study on the consequences for inequality 
in society, giving special attention to Chapter 6 (Section 7.5). Finally, I reflect upon this study in 
a broader sense: what are its contributions to existing knowledge (Section 7.6), and what is the 
way to go in future (Section 7.7). 
 
7.2  The association between spouses’ labour market positions 
The association between spouses’ labour market positions is the central point in Chapter 2. Data 
from the Labour Force Surveys (1994-2006) on 234,688 couples between 25 and 55 years of age, 
have been analysed by means of log-linear modelling to assess the association between husbands’ 
and wives’ labour market participation and job level. Figure 7.1 displays the main results of the 
analysis on spouses’ labour market participation. I find a positive correlation: the odds ratio is 
2.46. Couples are two and a half times more likely to consist of two employed or two non-
employed persons, than of one employed and one non-employed person; this positive association 
is in correspondence with previous studies. Odds ratios can also be interpreted in terms of 
division of paid labour between spouses; an odds ratio below 1 would imply that couples tend to 
have one working and one non-working person. The tendency of mothers to leave the labour 
force is the reason why the odds ratio appears to be lower for couples with children than for 
childless couples, but it is still higher than 1 (see Figure 7.1), indicating that even in couples with 
children, husbands and wives tend to be similar with respect to their labour market participation. 
A notable exception (not shown in Figure 7.1) to the finding of positive odds ratios, is the 
following tendency among dual worker couples with children: they are more likely to have one 
full-timer and one part-timer instead of two full-timers or two part-timers. 
As can be expected, husbands’ and wives’ education partly explain the association 
between their labour market participation because education is positively related to employment 
and working hours (especially for women). More importantly however, is that the original 
association largely remains after controlling for spouses’ educational achievements, and it should 
be noted that the educational control is extensive (15 combinations of level and field of 
education). As becomes clear from Figure 7.1, about three quarters of the association between 
husbands’ and wives’ labour market participation cannot be attributed to educational homogamy. 
This conclusion corroborates the American finding on the first husband-wife (non-)employment 
table. The largely unexplained association suggests that inequality between couples is larger than 
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can be expected on the basis of educational homogamy alone. It encourages looking for other 
factors, such as partner effects, in subsequent chapters. 
Figure 7.1 also shows what conclusions we can draw with respect to trends in the 
association between husbands’ and wives’ labour market participation. A distinction into four 
birth cohorts revealed that the odds ratio of spouses’ (non-)employment is almost similar for the 
1940- and 1950-cohort, but increases in the younger two cohorts, up to almost 4 in the 1970-
cohort. In sum, we conclude that the labour market participation of husbands and wives are 
positively correlated to a substantial extent, also after controlling for educational homogamy, and 
that the association has increased over time. 
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Figure 7.1 Odds ratios between husbands’ and wives’ (non-)employment by family stage and birth cohort, before and after controlling for 
couples’ education 
 
The fact that non-employment seems to come in couples has of course important consequences 
for inequality between couples. However, the incidence of this household arrangement is rather 
small, around 3 per cent of all Dutch couples, whereas two thirds of all couples consist of dual 
workers. Therefore, the next step is to focus on this group of dual worker couples, and to 
determine whether there is a tendency of spouses’ occupational achievements being similar. If so, 
there is not only a gap in socio-economic terms between dual working and dual non-working 
couples, but also among dual working couples. The main conclusion from the log-linear models 
is that the association between husbands’ and wives’ job level is positive and very substantial. 
From the association measure phi (phi=26.8 based on standardized ISEI-scaling, ISEI as a proxy 
for lifetime or permanent income) we can deduce that a husband with an average low-level job 
(measured in terms of ISEI) is almost 27 times as likely to have a wife with the same job level 
than a wife with an average medium-level job, compared to a husband with an average medium-
level job. The maximum odds ratio, that is, between the lowest and highest occupational level in 
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terms of ISEI, is 87. The huge size and statistical power of the Labour Force Surveys enable us to 
distinguish 47 occupational categories (combining level and field of occupation), which allow 
extensive modelling. This reveals that a quarter of the overall association can be explained by the 
tendency of husbands and wives to both work on a low, medium, high, or academic level, and 
from the tendency of husbands and wives to work in the exact same occupational category. 
Again, the question whether the association can be completely attributed to educational 
homogamy is important, and must be answered in the negative. It does explain a substantial part 
of the association in job level, but half of the association based on an ISEI-scaling is not the result 
of husbands’ and wives’ educational achievements (from phi=26.8 to phi=13.0, see Figure 7.2). 
The fact that spouses have similar job levels must, therefore, depend on other mechanisms too, 
possibly occupational homogamy or positive partner effects. 
Finally, I address the question whether a trend has been observed. The log-linear models 
do not provide evidence for a trend in the association of spouses’ job level. Therefore, the 
conclusion is that there is a strong positive association between husbands’ and wives’ job level, 
which is not completely due to educational homogamy, and that the association has remained 
stable over time. 
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Figure 7.2 Association parameter (phi) for husbands’ and wives’ occupational level, before and after controlling for couples’ education 
 
7.3  The partner: resource or restriction? 
Although the questions in this book do not focus on the effect of having a partner, Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 enable us to draw some conclusions about this. Men are found to benefit from having a 
partner: a partner stimulates their labour market participation and job level. Women’s labour 
market participation is restricted by the presence of a partner, but the partner has no influence on 
women’s occupational mobility. 
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The principal theoretical subject of this book, however, is the way labour market 
outcomes, such as labour market participation and job level, are influenced by the human capital 
of the spouse. I put the hypotheses on partner effects through several tests which use different 
methods of analysis and different data sets, in order to draw thorough and detailed conclusions 
about the tenability of the partner effect hypotheses. The combination of the results makes clear 
to what extent partner effects exist, and whether they are ‘universal’, or only applicable to a 
particular setting. Partner effects have been tested in Chapters 3 through 6. In Chapter 3, I use 
cross-sectional data from the Labour Force Surveys (1977-2006) to assess the relationships 
between the human capital of the partner and (a) labour market participation, (b) job level, and (c) 
the combination of these two: income. In Chapters 4 (on working hours) and 5 (on job level), I 
perform event-history analyses on complete retrospective careers of both spouses, based on the 
Family Survey Dutch Population (1998-2003). Such a dynamic design reflects more closely the 
actual decision processes in households with respect to labour market careers, and supports 
stronger statements about causality. In Chapter 6, I use a dynamic cumulative approach which is 
also based on the Family Survey Dutch Population. Here, couples are followed for fifteen years, 
and a test is done in order to find out to what extent cumulative numbers of working hours, job 
level, and cumulative income depend on the human capital of the spouse.  
Theoretically, I distinguish three ways in which partners could influence each others’ 
careers, resulting in expectations about the partner as a resource (positive partner effects) and the 
partner as a restriction (negative partner effects). Firstly, from an economic point of view, it can 
be argued that a spouse who is successful on the labour market takes away the financial incentive 
for the other spouse to work many hours and to put an effort into his or her career. Also, someone 
can afford not to be very successful on the labour market if the spouse has a successful career. 
These argument lead to the expectation of restrictive partner effects for both men and women. 
More in particular, it is hypothesized that negative partner effects are primarily applicable to 
labour market participation because restrictions seem predominantly relevant for couples’ time 
budget. Secondly, a positive partner effect can be derived from a social capital point of view; this 
view states that people can benefit from the resources of their spouse, and use them to advance 
their own labour market career. Since social capital is mainly helpful in reaching high level jobs, 
positive partner effects are expected to be mainly applicable to occupational success. Thirdly, 
values of the partner concerning working women and division of labour are believed to affect 
men’s and women’s labour market careers. A high educational level cannot only be interpreted as 
a signal of (potential) labour market success and resources in general, but it can also be seen as an 
indicator of modern values. Since a modern view underlines the importance for women to have a 
career, and for fathers to have a caring role, highly educated husbands are expected to stimulate 
their wives’ careers, and highly educated wives are expected to restrict their husbands’ careers.  
Based on the findings of Chapters 3 through 6, I conclude that the partner’s human capital 
is a resource when it comes to labour market success, and that it is a restriction for labour market 
participation. The conclusion about the restrictive partner effect needs some refining though, as 
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will be explained in the next paragraph. The positive effect of partner’s human capital on job 
level is consistently found throughout this study. The cross-sectional design that shows the 
relationship between partner’s human capital and someone’s job level (Chapter 3), the event-
history design that examines the influence of partner’s human capital on upward mobility 
(Chapter 5), and the accumulating approach that shows the influence of partner’s human capital 
on the maximum wage rate during the life course (Chapter 6), all lead to the same conclusion, 
namely that partners act as a resource for each others’ careers (the preventive effect of the 
spouse’s joblessness on downward mobility in Chapter 5 is the only exception in this respect). 
Some illustrative results are that men and women are 80 per cent more likely to be upwardly 
mobile when they have a partner with the highest occupational status than when they have a 
partner with the lowest occupational status (Chapter 5); that every year of extra education of the 
wife increases her husband’s hourly wage with five Euro cents (Chapter 3); and that over a fifteen 
year time span, the wife’s education has a maximum impact on her husband’s hourly wage of 
2,72 Euros, which is a quarter of the average male wage rate (Chapter 6). 
The general conclusion that the partner’s human capital restricts labour market 
participation is less straightforward. A first comment is that the question of whether or not one is 
employed depends on different mechanisms than the question of how many hours one is 
employed, given that one has a job. Non-employment, both of husbands and wives, seems to be 
considered as an undesirable state by the higher strata in society, probably because of normative 
reasons. Female non-employment is (still) rather common in the Netherlands, but primarily so 
among poorly educated women. A highly educated or high job-level spouse prevents from being 
non-employed, both for men and women. This finding therefore implies a positive partner effect 
on labour market participation. The result can be considered to be in line with the positive odds 
ratio that was found in Chapter 2: non-employment comes in twos within the couples that have 
few resources. 
A second comment is that the different tests (using three different techniques and two 
different data sets) produce contradicting results. The cross-sectional study on working hours, 
based on the Labour Force Surveys (Chapter 3), shows a negative relationship between partner’s 
human capital and working hours: a partner with a high educational or occupational level reduces 
the probability of working full-time instead of part-time, and of having a large instead of a small 
part-time job. The dynamic study of Chapter 4 and the cumulative dynamic study of Chapter 6, 
both based on the Family Survey Dutch Population, do not provide support for negative partner 
effects on working hours adjustments; according to these studies, working hours adjustments and 
cumulative working hours do not depend on the human capital of the partner.  
The paradox resulting from Chapters 3 and 4 could be rephrased as follows: I find that 
favourable resources of one partner are related to few working hours of the other partner, when 
we take a snapshot of all couples in society at one moment in time; while, when I zoom in on 
couples’ life course, I find that a decision to adjust working hours at a particular moment in one’s 
life does not depend on the resources of the partner at that particular moment. One explanation of 
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this paradox could be that partner effects on single events are too small, but that the sum of all 
these effects after several events is strong enough to show up in the results. However, the results 
of Chapter 6 refute this explanation: the partner has no significant influence on cumulative 
working hours. If the argument of small effects per event was correct, it should be in an analysis 
on cumulative working hours that the partner effect shows up, since this involves the sum of 
multiple adjustments during the life course. 
I carried out some additional analyses (not shown), to investigate alternative explanations. 
Firstly, I repeated the multinomial logistic regressions on labour market participation of Chapter 
3, based on the Labour Force Surveys, on the pooled cross-sections of the Family Surveys. If the 
paradox results from the difference in the way I treat labour market participation, namely as 
current states (non-employment, part-time, or full-time employment) in Chapter 3, and as events 
in Chapter 4, this additional analysis should yield comparable conclusions to those drawn in 
Chapter 3. In contrast, however, partner effects on labour market participation are absent in this 
additional analysis, which does not corroborate the findings of negative partner effects based on 
the Labour Force Surveys. Secondly, comparison of the strength of the effects found in Chapter 3 
to the above-mentioned additional analysis, shows whether it is the difference in statistical power 
between the two data sets that causes the absence of partner effects in the Family Surveys and the 
presence of significant partner effects in the Labour Force Surveys. Indeed, in some cases, the 
strength of the partner effects in the additional Family Surveys analysis is similar to the partner 
effects in the original Labour Force Surveys analysis, while they do not reach the level of 
significance in the former. This pattern is not consistent, however, and is therefore insufficient for 
explaining the paradox fully. Thirdly, it could be that the negative correlation between the human 
capital of one spouse and the working hours of the other spouse already exists from the beginning 
of the relationship onwards. A negative correlation supports the economic argument of the 
division of labour: if one partner is successful on the labour market, the other partner has no 
incentives to work many hours and can afford to work few hours. Perhaps, couples opt for this 
division of labour from the moment they start a household. This could explain why I do not find 
the negative influence of the partner on a working hours adjustment during the life course, but 
that I do find the negative relationship in general. Another analysis on the Family Survey Dutch 
Population contradicts this explanation too; at the start of the relationship, the influence of 
partner’s human capital is not found to be significantly negative. In sum, I must conclude that, 
despite the investigation of several possible explanations, a satisfactory explanation for the 
inconclusiveness of my results with respect to partner effects on labour market participation has 
not been found. Therefore, I remain cautious in my conclusion that human capital of the partner 
restricts labour market participation. 
In summarizing the results with respect to the influence of the partner, not only the 
direction of the effects, but also the strength of the effects must be considered. It is important to 
stress that the influence of the partner’s human capital is weak in comparison to the influence of 
one’s own human capital. When making labour market career decisions, personal human capital 
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plays a decisive role, and partner’s human capital is of minor importance. Note that this result 
does not necessarily contradict the idea that labour market career decisions are joint decisions of 
spouses. Spouses can jointly decide on a career move of the husband, taking only his human 
capital into account.  
A plausible explanation for the relatively weak partner effects might be that contradicting 
mechanisms are simultaneously at work. For example, a highly educated husband stimulates his 
wife to work many hours and build a career, but at the same time, having a highly educated 
husband with a favourable labour market position makes it affordable to reduce working hours. 
The results in my models are net effects of these mechanisms, which cancel each other out to 
some extent. 
 
7.4  Changing partner effects? 
This study pays much attention to changes in partner effects over a relatively long period of time. 
In Chapter 3, I analyse possible changes in partner effects over birth cohorts, ranging from 1940 
through 1979, and in Chapters 4 and 5 the observation window covers the period from 1940 
through 2003. The major societal changes in the second half of the twentieth century were 
expected to have had an impact on the way spouses affect each others’ careers. Two lines of 
reasoning are used throughout the book. On the one hand, the trend towards individualization and 
secularization could have diminished the influence of the partner because decisions have become 
more and more individualistic and less dependent on the social environment, including the 
partner. On the other hand, partner effects are not so much expected to decline as to change in 
direction. The modernization of norms and values could have taken away, or at least loosened, 
the restriction on female labour market careers, whereas spouses’ support for male careers could 
have weakened, especially for working many hours, because in the modern view the father is 
expected to have a caring role too.  
The cross-sectional analysis in Chapter 3 provides some indications that support the 
hypothesis based on the modernization of norms. However, interestingly and surprisingly enough, 
the event-history analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 show that the influence of the spouse on decisions 
regarding working hours adjustments and job mobility, has not been subject to change over a 
period of sixty years. With analyses that generally contain between 500 and 1,900 events, the 
absence of developments does not seem to be caused by a power problem. A highly educated or 
high job-level spouse did not have another role in the 1940s than in the beginning of the twenty-
first century. And vice versa, the influence of women on their husbands’ careers has not changed 
over time. Apparently, the appearance of part-time working fathers (who are usually highly 
educated men) has not become more likely in couples with a highly educated wife than in couples 
with a poorly educated wife, ceterus paribus. I think the conclusion about the lack of 
developments in partner effects is very surprising, and deserves more attention in the future (I 
will come back to this in Section 7.7). 
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7.5  Consequences for inequality 
Throughout this book, I argue that an important justification for a study on couples’ labour 
market careers is its potential impact on inequality between couples. Let us now turn to the 
consequences of this study’s conclusions for inequality. Two mechanisms that potentially 
contribute to inequality between couples have been central in this book. 
The first mechanism is the association between spouses’ labour market participation and 
job level. Positive associations lead to accumulation of resources within couples; inequality 
between couples is higher as the association becomes more positive. Note that a positive 
association between spouses’ labour market positions does not make inequality—in relative 
terms—between couples higher than between individuals. Inequality expressed in a relative 
measure is logically lower for couples’ incomes than for individuals’ incomes, on condition that 
the association between partners’ incomes is less than one (though positive). Only if the positive 
association is perfect, will the richest men of the country marry the richest women. In the case of 
a non-perfect association, these men necessarily marry, on average, women with lower incomes. 
At the bottom of the distribution, a non-perfect association assumes that the poorest men do not 
marry the poorest women, but on average women with higher incomes. In other words, there is 
regression towards the mean. As a result, the standard deviation of couples’ incomes becomes 
smaller than the standard deviation of individual incomes, and thus, the inequality between 
couples is lower than between individuals. For example, the gini coefficient is systematically 
found to be lower for couples’ incomes than for individual incomes (Ultee, Arts, & Flap 2003, p. 
338). In absolute terms however, accumulation of income does increase inequality between 
couples compared to individuals. If two partners with a high income and two partners with a low 
income end up together, the differences between couples’ life conditions are greater than the 
differences between the life conditions of individuals. 
Conclusions with respect to the association between spouses’ labour market outcomes 
clearly point at accumulation of resources within couples. Thus, an occupationally successful 
husband is usually married to an occupationally successful wife, and vice versa, a husband with 
less occupational success is usually married to a wife with less occupational success. Success 
could be interpreted in terms of labour market participation and job level. 
The second mechanism that stimulates inequality between couples is the extent to which 
partners further each others’ careers during their relationship, thereby increasing the distance to 
couples who had less favourable starting positions. I find both supportive and restrictive partner 
effects, although the positive partner effects on job level are much more consistent throughout the 
separate empirical studies than the negative partner effects on working hours. Exercises to 
combine the positive and negative partner effects (on imputed income in Chapters 3 and 6) reveal 
that the positive effect outweighs the negative effect in strength. Therefore, also with respect to 
the second mechanism, that of partner effects, we have indications that inequality between 
couples is enhanced. 
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Chapter 6 describes an effort to quantify the degree of inequality between highly and 
poorly educated couples from a life course perspective. It should be clearly noted that the 
absolute amounts of income must be interpreted with care since they are imputed incomes based 
on occupational status and age (and age square), and not observed incomes. The results of this 
chapter show that during the life course the socio-economic positions of highly educated couples 
on the one hand, and poorly educated couples on the other hand, diverge substantially. The total 
amount of income couples earn in the first five years of the relationship does not appear to differ 
too much. Poorly educated couples earn 94 per cent of the income of highly educated couples, but 
over a fifteen years time span, this gap has risen to 79 per cent. In absolute terms, my estimation 
shows that highly educated couples have earned almost 100,000 Euros (net) more in these fifteen 
years than poorly educated couples. It is likely that the gap increases after the first fifteen years 
because the net rewards of education in terms of income grow during the life course, at least in 
the first fifteen years of the relationship. Note that inequality between the socio-economic 
positions of couples is not only relevant to the husbands and wives involved, but also to their 
children, who grow up in more or less favourable circumstances. 
  
7.6  This study’s contribution 
The field of study that is chosen in this book combines two lines of research that have long 
traditions and cover large research areas. On the one hand, there is research on status attainment, 
which has become especially popular in sociology since the introduction of the status attainment 
model of Blau and Duncan (1967). The model indicates how occupational status depends on the 
achievement factors educational attainment and job level of the first job, and on the ascription 
factors father’s educational and occupational attainment. On the other hand, research on 
sociology of the family emphasizes the fact that men and women are small firms and form 
households together. Homogamy studies are an example of an explicit introduction of the couple 
perspective. Gendered division of labour and the presence of children have often been central 
subjects in studies on labour market outcomes, particularly where women are concerned. Due to 
the emergence of dual working couples, the introduction of the couple or the partner as 
determinants for individual labour market decisions has gained popularity (Blossfeld & Drobnič, 
2001). This line of research emphasizes that partners make joint decisions and that their labour 
market careers depend on each other. In this study, I tried to provide a comprehensive view on the 
influence of the partner on two main aspects of labour market careers—participation and job 
level—for Dutch women and men over a long period of time. On top of that, this study has 
provided insight into the consequences of the interrelatedness of husband’s and wife’s career for 
social inequality. 
Theoretical expectations about the influence of the partner have been formulated in 
conflicting hypotheses. Progress has been made by a further elaboration of these hypotheses. 
Restrictive partner effects have been emphasized when it comes to labour market participation, 
whereas supportive partner effects have been emphasized when it comes to job level. The partner 
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effect hypotheses have been tested extensively from several points of views: from a cross-
sectional, dynamic, and cumulative angle. Refined tests like the event-history analyses in 
Chapters 4 and 5 have been made possible by the rich and detailed information in the Family 
Surveys Dutch Population. It is quite unique to be able to connect the complete career of an 
individual from the first job through the current job, to the complete career of the partner; thereby 
perfectly giving the times of the stages of the relationship and of the family formation. My multi-
angle approach adds to existing knowledge about the influence of the partner. Given the 
consistency of the findings, I am confident in stating that occupational success is enhanced by 
partner’s human capital. Furthermore, the multi-angle approach demonstrated that conclusions 
about partner effects on labour market participation are not straightforward. This conclusion 
should serve as a warning for future conclusions based on a single-angle approach.  
Furthermore, the historical perspective is an explicit elaboration on earlier studies which 
did not distinguish between historical periods. I have been able to examine a six-decade period, 
which is substantial. The absence of developments in the way husbands and wives influence each 
others’ labour market careers is a surprising finding, but the hypotheses I formulated on changes 
in partner effects can be useful in future research, as I will outline in the next section.  
 
7.7  Suggestions for future research 
Based on the results of this study, I suggest three ways in particular, that can lead to progress in 
this field of research: (1) include a direct measure of income, (2) include a direct measure of 
values, and (3) perform country-comparisons. 
First of all, for a further test of the economic hypothesis, a direct measure of income is 
preferable to the proxy used in this study; namely job level—if necessary weighted with working 
hours. In terms of human capital and potential labour market success, job level is a more 
appropriate measure, because income is very much dependent on the number of working hours 
and the phase of someone’s career. It makes sense that couples partly base their decisions on the 
more general indicator of current and future labour market success. However, if we consider the 
economic hypothesis in a narrow sense—the financial situation of the partner determines to what 
extent someone is encouraged or discouraged to work more hours or to accept a better job—the 
current income position of the partner is the most accurate measure. Whereas in my study, job 
level and education usually have effects in the same direction, Bernasco (1994) found that income 
and education have opposite effects. Thus, a woman is less likely to re-enter the labour market if 
her husband has a high income or a low education. This result could serve as an indication that 
job level and income are indeed different things, but this needs to be established in a more 
extensive research which also includes job mobility and working hours adjustments of both men 
and women. An additional advantage of a sharper distinction between indicators of partner 
support and restriction, is that it might solve the problem of contradicting mechanisms that cancel 
each other out, resulting in relatively weak partner effects; the negative partner effect would be 
picked up by income and the positive partner effect by education. In the retrospective design I 
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used in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, income measures would most probably be very unreliable due to 
recalling issues. Therefore, a panel design seems the most promising way to go, in order to assess 
the influence of the partner’s income versus job level. Note, however, that the benefit of having 
spouses’ complete labour market careers is likely to be lost. 
Secondly, I would recommend including direct measures of values. I have used religion as 
an indicator of traditional values in Chapter 4. Apart from that, education is used as a proxy, but 
education is much more than just values; especially in the context of labour market careers. I 
expect that the inclusion of proper measures of values will increase insight into the ways partners 
affect each others’ careers, and that these kinds of partner effects exist alongside the effects of 
partners’ human capital. In this case, values would refer to the preference side of the decision 
process, whereas human capital predominantly refers to the opportunity side of the decision 
process. Especially with respect to working hours decisions do I expect values to play an 
important role, since they deal specifically with the balance between caring for children oneself 
and outsourcing child care. A strong test for this hypothesis is needed, and by contesting this 
hypothesis with the economic hypothesis as the mechanism behind working hours decisions, it 
could produce more decisive conclusions about the falsification of the economic hypothesis 
(compare Chapter 4). Moreover, it would be interesting to see the interaction between preferences 
and opportunities.  
Thirdly, in line with the values approach, a cross-national study would be a good direction 
to head in. The Netherlands are known for its liberal values towards working women, although 
personal preferences about the combination of work and care seem much more traditional. In this 
sense, the Netherlands are a special setting for research on couples’ labour market careers. 
However, expectations derived from the new home economics and the social capital approach 
should be universal for the Western world, predicting negative and positive partner effects in 
every context. I like to argue that the cultural climate could affect the importance of these 
mechanisms. Restrictive partner effects on female labour market careers could be especially 
relevant in relatively traditional contexts since the economic arguments are backed up by values. 
Similarly, support for male working hours might be relatively weak in modern contexts since the 
benefits of supporting the husband do not withstand the preference to have a father who takes 
care of the children, thereby giving his wife the opportunity to have a career. It is this hypothesis, 
rephrased in terms of time periods instead of countries, which I tested in this study and for which 
I did not find strong support. A country comparison is a different way to test the underlying idea 
that contexts influence the way partners are a resource for, or a restriction to, each others’ careers. 
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Achtergrond 
Een opvallende verandering in de twintigste eeuw in Nederland – en de westerse wereld in het 
algemeen – is de sterke toename van het aantal werkende vrouwen. Deze ontwikkeling is een 
rijke voedingsbodem geweest voor sociologisch onderzoek naar het arbeidsmarktgedrag van 
vrouwen. De toename in arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen veranderde niet alleen het leven van de 
betreffende vrouwen; het leven van alle gezinsleden ging er anders uit zien. Zo zorgt 
tegenwoordig in het merendeel van de gezinnen niet langer alleen de man voor het inkomen, 
maar levert ook de vrouw een financiële bijdrage. Dit heeft als consequentie dat de sociaal-
economische positie van een gezin niet langer kan worden afgelezen aan de arbeidspositie van de 
man alleen, zoals vroeger gebruikelijk was. De positie van het gezin op de maatschappelijke 
ladder wordt tegenwoordig bepaald door man en vrouw samen. In ongelijkheidonderzoek heeft 
deze ontwikkeling ertoe geleid dat het individuele perspectief is uitgebreid met een 
parenperspectief. 
Dit parenperspectief kwam bijvoorbeeld tot uiting in de Amerikaanse publicatie van de 
eerste kruistabel waarin de arbeidsparticipatie van de man werd afgezet tegen de 
arbeidsparticipatie van de vrouw in de jaren ‘70. Er werd gevonden dat werkloze mannen 
bovengemiddeld vaak werkloze vrouwen hebben en dat werkende mannen vaak ook werkende 
vrouwen hebben. Voor uitspraken over de ongelijkheid tussen paren is deze bevinding uiterst 
belangrijk. Immers, gunstige en ongunstige posities blijken te cumuleren binnen huishoudens wat 
tot gevolg heeft dat paren vaak of uit twee werkende personen bestaan of uit twee niet-werkende 
personen. Dit patroon leidt tot een grotere ongelijkheid tussen paren dan het traditionele patroon 
waarin een werkende partner vaak een niet-werkende partner heeft. 
Ondanks het belang van deze bevinding, werd deze niet opzienbarend gevonden. Het is 
namelijk precies de uitkomst die verwacht kan worden op grond van opleidingshomogamie. 
Mensen zoeken een partner die op hen lijkt: een hoogopgeleide vrouw trouwt vaak met een 
hoogopgeleide man en een laagopgeleide man trouwt vaak met een laagopgeleide vrouw. In 
combinatie met de positieve samenhang tussen opleidingsniveau en de kans op werk, leidt 
opleidingshomogamie automatisch ook tot een positieve samenhang tussen arbeidsmarktposities; 
de bevinding dat partners vaak dezelfde arbeidsmarktposities innemen zou daarom simpelweg 
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een bijproduct van homogamie kunnen zijn. Onderzoek toonde echter aan dat 
opleidingshomogamie het verband tussen partners’ arbeidsmarktparticipatie lang niet volledig 
kon verklaren. Deze conclusie was een aanwijzing dat er meer processen gaande moesten zijn 
tussen partners, die bijdroegen aan een positieve samenhang tussen hun beider 
arbeidsmarktposities en dus aan ongelijkheid tussen paren. Deze conclusie heeft een grote 
interesse opgewekt voor onderzoek naar arbeidsmarktuitkomsten van paren. In dit boek wil ik 
deze onderzoekstraditie een stap verder brengen. Ik richt me daarbij op Nederland vanaf het 
midden van de twintigste eeuw. 
 
Twee onderzoekslijnen met het parenperspectief 
Binnen het arbeidsmarktonderzoek dat het parenperspectief centraal stelt, zijn twee belangrijke 
onderzoekslijnen te onderscheiden die beide expliciet aan de orde komen in dit boek. In de eerste 
plaats betreft het onderzoek naar de samenhang tussen arbeidsmarktposities van man en vrouw. 
Deze samenhang is interessant, omdat deze sterke implicaties heeft voor de mate van 
ongelijkheid tussen paren: een positieve samenhang – zoals in het geval van de Amerikaanse 
kruistabel – wijst op meer ongelijkheid tussen paren, terwijl een negatieve samenhang de 
ongelijkheid tussen paren drukt.  
De tweede onderzoekslijn bestudeert welke invloeden partners hebben op elkaars 
arbeidsmarktpositie, bijvoorbeeld: bepaalt de arbeidsmarktpositie van de man deels de 
arbeidsmarktpositie van de vrouw? Deze onderzoekslijn benadrukt de processen die binnen 
huishoudens spelen. Partners moeten samen een huishouden voeren waarin enerzijds voldoende 
inkomen gegarandeerd moet worden en anderzijds voldoende tijd moet zijn voor onbetaalde 
taken zoals het huishouden en de zorg voor kinderen. Bij het zoeken van deze balans worden 
arbeidsmarktbeslissingen genomen die afhankelijk zijn van de posities en kenmerken (in dit boek 
vaak samengevat als ‘hulpbronnen’) van beide partners. Deze zogenoemde partnereffecten 
kunnen een versterkend maar ook dempend effect hebben op de ongelijkheid tussen paren. Het 
eerste is het geval als een gunstige positie van de ene partner ook de arbeidsmarktpositie van de 
andere partner verbetert. Het laatste is het geval als een gunstige positie van de een ertoe leidt dat 
de ander een minder goede arbeidsmarktpositie bekleedt. Positieve partnereffecten zouden 
verantwoordelijk kunnen zijn voor het deel van de samenhang tussen partners’ 
arbeidsmarktparticipatie in de Amerikaanse kruistabel dat niet verklaard kon worden door 
opleidingshomogamie. Deze tweede onderzoekslijn is daarom een zeer waardevolle aanvulling op 
onderzoek dat zich richt op de totale samenhang tussen arbeidsmarktposities van paren. Daarnaast 
is deze onderzoekslijn ook theoretisch interessant, aangezien er tegenstrijdige hypothesen bestaan 
over de manier waarop hulpbronnen van de partner arbeidsmarktuitkomsten beïnvloeden. De 
theoretische focus van dit proefschrift ligt dan ook hier. 
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Onderzoeksvragen 
De beschreven onderzoekslijnen komen tot uiting in de onderzoeksvragen van deze studie, die 
worden toegepast op Nederland. Tevens ga ik in op veranderingen over de tijd, aangezien de 
aanleiding voor een onderzoek naar arbeidsmarktgedrag van paren ligt in de historische 
veranderingen die er met name op het gebied van arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen zijn geweest. 
De twee centrale onderzoeksvragen luiden: 
 
1) In hoeverre hangen de arbeidsmarktuitkomsten van man en vrouw samen en is deze 
samenhang veranderd over de tijd? 
2) In hoeverre worden arbeidsmarktuitkomsten positief of negatief beïnvloed door de 
hulpbronnen van de partner en is deze invloed veranderd over de tijd? 
 
Ik heb me gericht op twee typen arbeidsmarktuitkomsten, namelijk op participatie en op 
beroepsniveau. Met arbeidsmarktparticipatie doel ik zowel op de tweedeling tussen wel en niet 
werken als op het aantal uren dat iemand wekelijks werkt. Beroepsniveau wijst op de mate van 
succes op de arbeidsmarkt en is gedefinieerd in termen van beroepsstatus of uurloon. 
 
Theorie: de partner als hulpbron of belemmering? 
Figuur 1 geeft – in zeer simpele vorm – het uitgangspunt weer van het theoretisch model dat in 
dit boek is toegepast. De samenhang tussen de arbeidsmarktposities van man en vrouw 
(weergegeven aan de rechterkant van Figuur 1) kan het gevolg zijn van opleidingshomogamie in 
combinatie met het positieve verband tussen opleiding en arbeidsmarktposities. Deze bijproduct-
verklaring is weergegeven met doorgetrokken pijlen en leidt tot de veronderstelling dat de 
samenhang tussen partners’ arbeidsmarktposities in basis positief is. Daarnaast kan de associatie 
tussen arbeidsmarktposities van partners versterkt of verzwakt worden door partnereffecten: de 
invloed van hulpbronnen zoals opleiding van de man op de arbeidsmarktpositie van de vrouw en 
andersom (in Figuur 1 weergegeven met gestippelde pijlen).  
 
opleiding man       arbeidsmarktpositie man 
 
 
 
 
 
opleiding vrouw       arbeidsmarktpositie vrouw 
 
Figuur 1 Theoretische verbanden tussen opleiding en arbeidsmarktposities van man en vrouw; bijproduct-verklaring uitgedrukt in 
doorgetrokken pijlen en partnereffecten in gestippelde pijlen 
 
Ik heb tegengestelde hypothesen geformuleerd over de richting van deze partnereffecten. Vanuit 
economisch oogpunt kan worden beredeneerd dat partnereffecten negatief zullen zijn. Dit houdt 
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in dat naarmate een man een gunstigere arbeidsmarktpositie (veel hulpbronnen) heeft, zijn vrouw 
het relatief minder goed doet op de arbeidsmarkt en vice versa. Economische theorieën gaan 
ervan uit dat mensen keuzes maken die zoveel mogelijk nut opleveren. The new home economics 
theorie stelt dat het nut voor het huishouden maximaal is wanneer partners zich specialiseren in 
betaald dan wel onbetaald werk. Degene die de beste arbeidsmarktpositie heeft zou zich moeten 
specialiseren in betaald werk, zodat de andere partner automatisch de onbetaalde taken voor zijn 
of haar rekening zou moeten nemen. De meer algemene hypothese die van deze economische 
ideeën kan worden afgeleid is dat een gunstige arbeidsmarktpositie van de ene partner de 
financiële prikkels wegneemt van de andere partner om veel te werken en om carrière te maken. 
Of anders gezegd, een huishouden met een succesvolle partner kan het zich veroorloven dat de 
andere partner minder werkt of minder verdient. Ik verwacht dat dit economische mechanisme 
vooral betrekking heeft op arbeidsmarktparticipatie en in mindere mate op arbeidsmarktsucces. 
Tijd is beperkt waardoor het voor paren vooral moeilijk lijkt om twee voltijdbanen te combineren. 
Het combineren van twee hoge statusbanen is weliswaar ook veeleisend, maar deze leveren ook 
meer geld op waarmee tijdrovende huishoudtaken kunnen worden uitbesteed.  
In tegenstelling tot dit economische perspectief leidt het sociaal kapitaal perspectief tot de 
voorspelling dat er positieve partnereffecten zullen zijn: een man met veel hulpbronnen kan zijn 
vrouw helpen om een gunstige arbeidsmarktpositie te bereiken en vice versa. Het mechanisme 
hierachter komt uit de sociaal kapitaal theorie. Mensen in iemands netwerk (zoals de partner) 
kunnen bruikbare informatie verschaffen over vacatures, kunnen contacten met potentiële 
werkgevers inzetten of een goed woordje doen, maar ook algemene vaardigheden overdragen die 
van pas komen op de arbeidsmarkt. Deze zaken helpen bij het bereiken van een gunstige 
arbeidsmarktpositie. Mensen met veel hulpbronnen zijn beter in staat te helpen dan mensen met 
minder hulpbronnen. In de context van arbeidsmarktuitkomsten is het daarom waarschijnlijk dat 
mensen met succesvolle partners meer profijt kunnen hebben dan mensen met minder succesvolle 
partners, hetgeen leidt tot de verwachting dat hulpbronnen van de ene partner een positieve 
invloed zullen hebben op de arbeidsmarktuitkomsten van de andere partner. Sociaal kapitaal kan 
helpen bij het vinden van een baan, maar het ligt niet voor de hand om te veronderstellen dat 
netwerken en de relevante informatie die daaruit voortkomt het aantal werkuren van iemand 
beïnvloeden. Dit geldt wel voor het vinden van een betere baan en dus voor het voorspellen van 
arbeidsmarktsucces. Ik verwacht daarom dat het positieve partnereffect vooral van toepassing is 
op arbeidsmarktsucces en in mindere mate op arbeidsmarktparticipatie. 
Tenslotte zijn er verwachtingen opgesteld vanuit een waarden perspectief. In het 
algemeen proberen mensen hun gedrag in overeenstemming te brengen met de waarden en 
normen die zijzelf en hun omgeving hebben. Waarden die in het kader van arbeidsmarktgedrag 
van belang zijn betreffen het werken van vrouwen en moeders en de verdeling van taken tussen 
man en vrouw. Hoogopgeleiden blijken moderner over dit soort zaken te denken dan 
laagopgeleiden. We kunnen daarom afleiden dat mensen met een hoogopgeleide partner 
moderner arbeidsmarktgedrag tentoon zullen spreiden dan mensen met een laagopgeleide partner. 
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Wat als ‘modern’ en ‘traditioneel’ arbeidsmarktgedrag beschouwd kan worden, verschilt voor 
mannen en vrouwen. Traditionele waarden benadrukken dat vrouwen verantwoordelijk zijn voor 
de (zorg)taken in huis en moderne normen benadrukken het belang van onafhankelijkheid van de 
vrouw van haar man. We zouden daarom kunnen zeggen dat moderne vrouwen een voorkeur 
hebben om actief te zijn op de arbeidsmarkt en om carrière te maken. Voor mannen zit het anders. 
Zowel volgens traditionele als moderne waarden zouden mannen moeten werken en streven naar 
een goede baan. Het belangrijkste verschil tussen de twee zienswijzen zit in het belang dat 
mannen en vrouwen met moderne waarden hechten aan de zorgtaken van vaders. Als gevolg 
hiervan kan het als modern beschouwd worden als een vader in deeltijd werkt en eventueel een 
stapje terug doet als blijkt dat zijn verantwoordelijkheden op het werk niet te combineren zijn met 
zijn verantwoordelijkheden als vader. De hypothese vanuit het waarden perspectief luidt dan ook 
dat een hoogopgeleide partner een positief effect heeft op de arbeidsmarktpositie van vrouwen, 
maar een negatief effect op de arbeidsmarktpositie van mannen.  
 In dit boek zijn ook verwachtingen opgesteld over de verandering in de invloed van de 
partner. Redenerend vanuit sociale processen als individualisering en secularisering kan verwacht 
worden dat mensen hun gedrag in steeds mindere mate laten beïnvloeden door hun omgeving en 
daarmee ook in steeds mindere mate door hun partner. Deze redenering leidt tot de voorspelling 
dat de invloed van de partner kleiner is geworden in de loop der tijd. Redenerend vanuit 
processen als culturele en economische modernisering, verwacht ik niet zozeer een afname van 
de invloed van de partner, maar een veranderde invloed. Voor vrouwen valt gedrag dat past 
binnen de traditionele normen in feite samen met de uitkomst die volgt uit een negatief 
partnereffect: vrouwen, zeker als ze gehuwd zijn en kinderen hebben, horen niet te werken en 
verlaten de arbeidsmarkt zodra de financiële positie in het huishouden dit toelaat. Dit betekent dat 
het vroeger, toen traditionele waarden door het merendeel van de bevolking werden gedeeld, met 
name de vrouwen van mannen met veel hulpbronnen waren die niet werkten (hetgeen zich 
uitdrukt in een negatief partnereffect). Een stimulerende invloed van de man sluit beter aan bij 
moderne waarden die uitdragen dat het goed is als vrouwen een eigen carrière hebben. 
Tegenwoordig zijn het daarom met name de vrouwen van hoogopgeleide mannen die werken 
(een positief partnereffect). Deze verandering van een restrictieve naar een stimulerende invloed 
zal nog eens versterkt zijn door economische ontwikkelingen, die onder andere als gevolg hebben 
gehad dat het steeds meer in het belang van de man is, de loopbaan van zijn vrouw te 
ondersteunen: haar financiële bijdrage aan het huishoudinkomen lijkt in steeds sterkere mate 
onmisbaar. Voor mannen wordt een tegengestelde trend verwacht: met de verschuiving van 
traditionele naar moderne waarden, vinden steeds meer vrouwen het wenselijk dat de man 
zorgtaken op zich neemt en daarvoor zijn arbeidsmarktparticipatie verlaagt. Gevolg is dat 
hulpbronnen van de vrouw steeds meer een belemmering zijn geworden voor de loopbaan van de 
man in plaats van steun. 
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Data 
Ik heb gebruik gemaakt van twee databronnen. In de eerste plaats heb ik de Enquête 
Beroepsbevolking (vroeger Arbeidskrachtentelling genaamd) van het Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek gebruikt, waarbij ik de data uit 1977, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 en 2006 heb samengevoegd. Deze datasets zijn representatief voor de 
Nederlandse bevolking en bevatten gedetailleerde arbeidsmarktgegevens van beide partners. Het 
aantal waarnemingen is groot en de steekproeven en verzamelde gegevens worden als 
betrouwbaar gezien. 
In de tweede plaats heb ik de Familie Enquête Nederlandse Bevolking gebruikt. De 
herhaalde crosssecties in 1998, 2000 en 2003 zijn goed vergelijkbaar en bevatten rijke informatie 
over de levensloop en leefsituatie van beide partners. De retrospectieve opzet van de gegevens 
maakt het mogelijk volledige carrières van beide partners op het gebied van arbeid, relaties en 
kinderen in kaart te brengen. Daarnaast is het mogelijk trends te onderzoeken in de invloed van 
de partner op arbeidsmarktcarrières, aangezien de vroegste carrières teruggaan tot de jaren ’40. 
  
Vijf empirische studies 
In dit boek kom ik tot antwoorden op de twee algemene onderzoeksvragen door 
arbeidsmarktposities van partners op verschillende manieren te onderzoeken. Dit is gebeurd in 
vijf empirische hoofdstukken waarvan ik hieronder de aanpak en resultaten zal samenvatten. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 
De associatie tussen de arbeidsmarktposities van man en vrouw (geboortecohorten 1940 – 1979) 
In dit hoofdstuk staat de eerste onderzoeksvraag centraal. Ik heb onderzocht in hoeverre de 
arbeidsmarktparticipatie en het arbeidsmarktsucces van partners samenhangen en of deze 
samenhangen zijn veranderd over de tijd. Daarnaast heb ik bekeken in hoeverre de samenhang is 
toe te schrijven aan opleidingshomogamie. De gebruikte gegevens zijn afkomstig uit de 
gestapelde databestanden van de Enquête Beroepsbevolking (N=234.688 paren) en geanalyseerd 
met behulp van log-lineaire modellen. 
Als vooruitgang op eerder onderzoek heb ik niet alleen werkenden van niet-werkenden 
onderscheiden, maar ook onderscheid gemaakt tussen voltijd- en deeltijdwerkers. De resultaten 
laten een positieve en sterke samenhang zien tussen de arbeidsparticipatie van man en vrouw. Dit 
wil zeggen dat man en vrouw vaker dezelfde dan verschillende posities innemen. De positieve 
samenhang is een consistente bevinding; deze geldt voor alle onderscheiden categorieën (niet 
werken, deeltijd en voltijd), paren met en zonder kinderen en vroege en late cohorten. De enige 
uitzondering is gevonden bij tweeverdieners met kinderen: bij deze paren komt het vaker voor dat 
de ene partner voltijds werkt en de ander in deeltijd dan dat de partners een gelijke 
arbeidsparticipatie hebben. Het controleren voor opleiding is zeer uitgebreid gebeurd aan de hand 
van 15 onderscheiden opleidingscategorieën die zowel uitdrukking geven aan het niveau als aan 
de richting van de opleiding. Opleiding verklaart inderdaad een deel van het verband, maar tevens 
 142
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
blijft een groot deel onverklaard. Tenslotte laten de resultaten zien dat bij jonge geboortecohorten 
de samenhang tussen participatie op de arbeidsmarkt tussen man en vrouw sterker is dan bij oude 
cohorten. Deze bevinding geeft aan dat partners in toenemende mate dezelfde 
arbeidsmarktparticipatie hebben. Bij het vaststellen van deze verandering over cohorten is 
rekening gehouden met het feit dat mensen uit jonge cohorten minder vaak kinderen hebben dan 
mensen uit oude cohorten. 
Voor het bepalen van de samenhang tussen het beroepsniveau van partners heb ik 47 
beroepscategorieën onderscheiden. Deze gedetailleerde gegevens bieden de mogelijkheid de 
complexe relatie tussen de beroepen van man en vrouw goed te modelleren met behulp van log-
lineaire modellen, geschaald naar gemiddelde ISEI-scores van iedere beroepscategorie. De 
resultaten laten zien dat er een positieve en substantiële samenhang bestaat tussen het 
arbeidsmarktsucces van partners (de odds ratio tussen laagste en hoogste beroepsstatus is 87). Het 
best passende model geeft aan dat de positieve samenhang in drie onderdelen uiteenvalt. In de 
eerste plaats bestaat de tendentie dat partners in precies dezelfde beroepscategorie werken (dat 
wil zeggen dat ze op de diagonaal zitten van de 47x47 tabel). Vallen ze niet in exact dezelfde 
beroepscategorie, dan is het waarschijnlijk dat ze beiden op een laag, middelhoog, hoog dan wel 
academisch niveau werken (de diagonaal met vier onderscheiden niveaus). Is ook dit niet het 
geval, dan is het waarschijnlijk dat hun beroepsniveaus in ieder geval dichtbij elkaar liggen (dit 
wordt uitgedrukt in een algemene associatiemaat). De samenhang tussen partners’ 
arbeidsmarktsucces is voor ongeveer de helft toe te schrijven aan opleidingshomogamie, hetgeen 
betekent dat ook andere processen een rol spelen bij de totstandkoming van deze samenhang. 
Mogelijke processen zijn andere vormen van homogamie, zoals beroepshomogamie, en partners’ 
wederzijdse invloeden. Er is geen significante trend gevonden in de sterkte van de associatie 
tussen het beroepsniveau van partners. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 
Partnereffecten op arbeidsmarktparticipatie en arbeidsmarktsucces: tegengestelde mechanismen 
en hun gezamenlijke effect op inkomen (geboortecohorten 1940 – 1974) 
Dit hoofdstuk richt zich op het vaststellen van de samenhang tussen hulpbronnen van de partner 
enerzijds en arbeidsmarktuitkomsten anderzijds. Dit is gebeurd aan de hand van crosssectionele 
gegevens van de gestapelde bestanden van de Enquête Beroepsbevolking (N=272.570 paren). 
Uitgangspunt in dit hoofdstuk is dat de negatieve partnereffecten vooral verwacht worden bij 
arbeidsmarktparticipatie (gesplitst in niet werken, deeltijd en voltijd), terwijl positieve 
partnereffecten vooral verwacht worden bij arbeidsmarktsucces (uitgedrukt in uurloon). Deze 
arbeidsmarktuitkomsten zijn afzonderlijk bestudeerd, maar ook is gekeken naar het netto effect 
van de partner: als er werkelijk tegenstrijdige effecten spelen, is het interessant te weten wat nu 
overheerst. Daarom zijn ook partnereffecten op inkomen (een combinatie van werkuren en 
uurloon) geanalyseerd. 
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De resultaten laten negatieve partnereffecten zien op de arbeidsmarktparticipatie van 
mannen en vrouwen. Uiteraard is er gecontroleerd voor eigen hulpbronnen en de aanwezigheid 
van kinderen. Arbeidsmarktsucces hangt positief samen met hulpbronnen van de partner, 
wederom voor mannen en vrouwen. Het positieve partnereffect blijkt te domineren als inkomen 
de afhankelijke variabele is, oftewel hulpbronnen van de partner in de vorm van opleiding en 
arbeidsmarktsucces bevorderen iemands inkomen. Het afzonderlijk bestuderen van 
arbeidsmarktparticipatie en arbeidsmarktsucces is nuttig gebleken om de achterliggende 
processen beter te begrijpen: afhankelijk van het type arbeidsmarktuitkomst hebben hulpbronnen 
van de partner een positieve of een negatieve invloed, maar het positieve partnereffect overheerst. 
Veranderingen in partnereffecten zijn onderzocht door het vergelijken van 
geboortecohorten. De belemmerende werking van hulpbronnen van de partner op de loopbaan 
blijkt sterker geworden voor mannen en zwakker voor vrouwen. De stimulerende werking van 
hulpbronnen van de partner op arbeidsmarktsucces is zwakker geworden voor mannen en 
vrouwen. De optelsom van deze trends – die tot uitdrukking komt in de analyse op inkomen – 
leidt tot een stabiele invloed van de hulpbronnen van de vrouw op het inkomen van de man en 
een toenemend positieve invloed van de man op het inkomen van de vrouw. De gevonden 
veranderingen in partnereffecten lijken het meest in overeenstemming met de verwachting die 
gebaseerd is op de culturele en economische modernisering. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 
Hulpbronnen van de partner en het aanpassen van werkuren (1940 – 2003) 
In hoofdstuk 4 is expliciet een levensloopperspectief geïntroduceerd. Dit betekent dat complete 
loopbanen van respondenten en hun partners in kaart zijn gebracht met behulp van retrospectieve 
gegevens uit de Familie Enquête Nederlandse Bevolking (N=5.685 respondenten). Deze insteek 
is anders dan die in hoofdstuk 3, waarin mensen op één moment geobserveerd worden, namelijk 
op het moment van interview. De samenhang tussen hulpbronnen van de partner en 
arbeidsmarktuitkomsten die bij deze momentopname gevonden wordt, is in feite de samenhang 
die is ontstaan na meerdere loopbaanbeslissingen. In hoofdstuk 4 heb ik met een 
gebeurtenissenanalyse getoetst in hoeverre een verandering in arbeidsmarktparticipatie afhangt 
van de hulpbronnen waarover de partner beschikt vóór het plaatsvinden van die verandering. Het 
voordeel van deze methode is dat er met meer zekerheid kan worden vastgesteld of er sprake is 
van een causaal partnereffect en biedt daarom een sterkere toets van de hypothesen over 
partnereffecten. Er zijn vier typen aanpassingen in de arbeidsmarktparticipatie onderscheiden: de 
arbeidsmarkt betreden, de arbeidsmarkt verlaten, het wekelijkse aantal werkuren verhogen en het 
wekelijkse aantal werkuren verlagen. 
De economisch georiënteerde hypothese die negatieve effecten voorspelt van hulpbronnen 
van de ene partner op de arbeidsmarktparticipatie van de andere partner staat in dit hoofdstuk 
centraal. Tevens zijn interactiehypothesen opgesteld die voorspellen onder welke condities, 
gespecificeerd als historische context, de hoeveelheid individuele hulpbronnen en de 
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aanwezigheid van kinderen, negatieve partnereffecten sterker aanwezig zullen zijn. De analyse 
bestaat uit drie delen en telkens is gecontroleerd voor eigen hulpbronnen en de aanwezigheid van 
kinderen. Eerst is vastgesteld of het hebben van een partner, ongeacht zijn of haar hulpbronnen, 
invloed heeft op de beslissing meer of minder te gaan werken. De resultaten laten zien dat het 
hebben van een partner de arbeidsmarktparticipatie van een vrouw belemmert, terwijl de binding 
met de arbeidsmarkt van de man sterker is als hij een partner heeft. Ten tweede is de invloed van 
de hulpbronnen van de partner onderzocht. Hieruit is gebleken dat de economische hypothese niet 
ondersteund wordt: in het algemeen geldt dat de keuze om de arbeidsmarkt te betreden of te 
verlaten en de keuze meer of minder uren te gaan werken niet afhangt van het opleidingsniveau 
en de arbeidsmarktpositie van de partner op het moment van die keuze. Tenslotte zijn de 
interactiehypothesen getoetst die voorspelden onder welke condities de economische hypothese 
sterker zou gelden. Het restrictieve partnereffect blijkt niet sterker te zijn in vroegere tijden en 
voor mensen met veel eigen hulpbronnen. Moeders blijken onder invloed van de hulpbronnen van 
hun man wel iets vaker een stapje terug te doen dan kinderloze vrouwen, maar voor mannen is 
een vergelijkbaar effect niet gevonden. Ik heb het hoofdstuk besloten met de uitspraak dat de 
invloed van de partner op veranderingen in arbeidsmarktparticipatie in sterkere mate met 
culturele aspecten, zoals normen en preferenties, te maken lijkt te hebben dan met economische 
aspecten. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 
Hulpbronnen van de partner: steun of belemmering voor de arbeidsmarktcarrière (1940 – 2003)? 
Dit hoofdstuk bevat dezelfde dynamische aanpak als hoofdstuk 4, maar richt zich op 
veranderingen in arbeidsmarktsucces, om precies te zijn op mobiliteit in beroepsstatus. De vraag 
is of hulpbronnen van de partner bijdragen aan de kans opwaarts mobiel te zijn en neerwaartse 
mobiliteit helpen te voorkomen of dat juist het tegenovergestelde het geval is, namelijk dat 
hulpbronnen van de partner een restrictie betekenen om hogerop te komen. Aan de hand van de 
retrospectieve carrièregegevens uit de Familie Enquête Nederlandse Bevolking worden opwaartse 
en neerwaartse carrièrestappen geanalyseerd met behulp van gebeurtenissenanalyse (N=5.068 
respondenten). 
De analyse bestaat uit twee delen: eerst is onderzocht of het hebben van een partner 
medebepalend is voor mobiliteit, daarna is voor alle mensen met een partner bekeken welke 
invloed er uit gaat van de hulpbronnen van de partner. Wederom is uitgebreid gecontroleerd voor 
eigen hulpbronnen en de aanwezigheid van kinderen. De resultaten geven aan dat de kansen voor 
opwaartse of neerwaartse mobiliteit niet anders zijn voor vrouwen met en zonder partner, terwijl 
mannen wel baat hebben in hun carrières bij het hebben van een partner, zij het in geringe mate. 
Daarnaast blijkt dat de kans op opwaartse mobiliteit stijgt met het beroepsniveau van de partner, 
hetgeen duidt op een positief partnereffect. Daar staat tegenover dat het hebben van een werkende 
partner (in vergelijking met een niet-werkende partner) de kans op neerwaartse mobiliteit 
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vergroot, hetgeen duidt op een negatief partnereffect. Er zijn geen historische veranderingen in de 
invloed van de partner gevonden. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6 
Cumulatieve inkomens van paren over de levensloop: divergentie of convergentie? 
Het laatste empirische hoofdstuk hanteert eveneens een levensloopperspectief, maar verschilt qua 
invalshoek op twee belangrijke punten van hoofdstukken 4 en 5. In de eerste plaats worden nu 
paren gevolgd vanaf de start van hun relatie. In de tweede plaats worden er niet langer 
enkelvoudige gebeurtenissen bestudeerd, zoals het stoppen met werken of promotie maken, maar 
wordt bekeken wat het totale resultaat is van deze veranderingen tezamen op het moment dat 
paren vijftien jaar bij elkaar zijn. Loopbanen van man en vrouw kunnen positief beïnvloed 
worden door de eigen opleiding en de opleiding van de partner. Indien dit het geval is, blijkt dat 
paren die reeds een gunstige uitgangspositie hadden (de hoogopgeleide paren) het tijdens de 
levensloop beter doen op de arbeidsmarkt dan paren met een minder gunstige uitgangspositie (de 
laagopgeleide paren) en treedt er divergentie op: ongelijkheid tussen paren wordt groter als 
gevolg van de opeenstapeling van gunstige dan wel ongunstige arbeidsmarktuitkomsten 
gedurende de levensloop. Dit hoofdstuk heeft als doel inzicht te krijgen in de mate waarin de 
inkomens van laagopgeleide paren en hoogopgeleide paren uit elkaar groeien gedurende de 
levensloop. Uit deze conclusie blijken de lange termijn consequenties van het arbeidsmarktgedrag 
van paren voor de ongelijkheid tussen paren.  
De gegevens uit de Familie Enquête Nederlandse Bevolking zijn nu dusdanig 
geprepareerd dat de arbeidsmarktposities van paren worden geobserveerd vanaf het moment dat 
hun relatie start en vervolgens voor iedere vijf jaar totdat ze vijftien jaar bij elkaar zijn (N=1.224 
paren). Op deze momenten is voor de man en de vrouw apart vastgesteld hoe goed ze het doen op 
de arbeidsmarkt (uitgedrukt in maximaal verdiend uurloon) en hoeveel uren ze in die vijf jaar 
hebben gewerkt. Tenslotte is voor iedere maand uitgerekend hoeveel inkomen iemand heeft 
verdiend en dit wordt opgeteld om tot een cumulatief inkomen te komen. 
De analyses in dit hoofdstuk zijn stapsgewijs opgebouwd. Eerst is gekeken naar de 
effecten van opleiding van man en vrouw op arbeidsmarktsucces. Niet verrassend blijken mannen 
en vrouwen met een hoge opleiding het beter te doen, maar daarbovenop draagt ook een 
hoogopgeleide partner bij aan een hoger uurloon (een positief partnereffect). Ten tweede zijn de 
effecten van opleiding van man en vrouw op het totaal aantal gewerkte uren vastgesteld. Hieruit 
blijkt dat hoogopgeleide mannen een achterstand hebben ten opzichte van laagopgeleide mannen, 
doordat ze door hun langere opleidingstijd minder uren actief hebben kunnen zijn op de 
arbeidsmarkt. Hoogopgeleide vrouwen halen deze achterstand in gewerkte uren op laagopgeleide 
vrouwen al vrij snel in, omdat ze vaker werken en meer uren werken. Op de lange termijn hebben 
hoogopgeleide vrouwen daarom meer uren gewerkt dan laagopgeleide vrouwen. Er zijn geen 
significante partnereffecten op het cumulatief aantal werkuren. In de derde stap zijn de 
consequenties voor inkomen bestudeerd. Het hogere uurloon van mannen met een hoge opleiding 
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compenseert ruimschoots het lagere aantal gewerkte uren, zodat er een netto voorsprong is van 
hoogopgeleide mannen. Bij vrouwen is de voorsprong van hoogopgeleiden nog groter. De 
conclusie van het hoofdstuk is dan ook dat er duidelijk divergentie optreedt tussen de inkomens 
van hoogopgeleide en laagopgeleide paren. Op het moment dat paren hun relatie starten 
verdienen laagopgeleide paren 94 procent van het inkomen van hoogopgeleide paren en na 
vijftien jaar is deze achterstand toegenomen tot 79 procent. De tijd die besteed wordt aan het 
volgen van een hoge opleiding heeft echter een drukkend effect op het absolute inkomensverschil 
tussen paren met veel en weinig opleiding, maar de impact hiervan wordt kleiner naarmate we 
een langere tijdsperiode in het leven van paren bestuderen. 
 
Conclusie 
De twee centrale onderzoeksvragen in dit boek zijn middels verschillende invalshoeken, datasets 
en analysemethoden beantwoord. Ik orden de samenvatting van deze resultaten naar vier 
onderwerpen: (a) de samenhang tussen arbeidsmarktposities van man en vrouw, (b) 
partnereffecten, (c) veranderingen in partnereffecten en (d) consequenties voor ongelijkheid 
tussen paren. Tenslotte zal ik deze studie in een breder perspectief plaatsen door in te gaan op de 
vooruitgang die geboekt is en op suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek. 
Lijken de arbeidsmarktposities van man en vrouw op elkaar? Een duidelijke conclusie uit 
dit onderzoek is dat de samenhang tussen partners’ arbeidsmarktposities positief en substantieel 
is. Dit geldt zowel voor participatie als succes op de arbeidsmarkt. De eerste lijkt sterker te zijn 
geworden over de tijd, terwijl de laatste stabiel is gebleven. De samenhang tussen partners’ 
arbeidsmarktposities is niet alleen het bijproduct van opleidingshomogamie en de relatie tussen 
opleiding en beroep op het individuele niveau. Deze conclusie geeft aanleiding te zoeken naar 
andere processen die mogelijk bijdragen aan deze positieve samenhang. Andere vormen van 
homogamie, zoals beroepshomogamie, en wederzijdse invloeden van man en vrouw zijn 
interessante alternatieven. Deze laatste, de invloed van de hulpbronnen van de partner, heeft een 
centrale plaats ingenomen in dit onderzoek. 
In hoeverre blijkt de partner een hulpbron of een belemmering voor iemands 
arbeidsmarktpositie te zijn? In zeer algemene bewoordingen kunnen we concluderen dat een 
hoogopgeleide partner met een goede positie op de arbeidsmarkt als een hulpbron fungeert voor 
het bereiken van een hoog beroepsniveau (arbeidsmarktsucces), terwijl deze een belemmering is 
voor het aantal gewerkte uren (arbeidsmarktparticipatie). Met name deze laatste bewering behoeft 
echter de nodige nuance. 
Het positieve partnereffect op arbeidsmarktsucces keert consistent terug in de 
verschillende empirische hoofdstukken: in de crosssectionele analyse op basis van de Enquête 
Beroepsbevolking in hoofdstuk 3, in de gebeurtenissenanalyse op basis van de Familie Enquête 
Nederlandse Bevolking in hoofdstuk 5 en in de cumulatieve dynamische studie op basis van 
dezelfde Familie Enquête in hoofdstuk 6 (met slechts de uitzondering dat een niet-werkende 
partner de kans op neerwaartse mobiliteit verkleint). 
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Het negatieve partnereffect op arbeidsmarktparticipatie vindt geen consistente 
ondersteuning in de verschillende hoofdstukken. De crosssectionele analyse op basis van de 
Enquête Beroepsbevolking in hoofdstuk 3 onderschrijft deze conclusie, maar in de 
gebeurtenissenanalyse en de cumulatieve dynamische studie op basis van de Familie Enquête 
Nederlandse Bevolking in hoofdstuk 4 en 6 worden geen effecten van de hulpbronnen van de 
partner gevonden. Deze tegenstrijdigheid zou als volgt verwoord kunnen worden: als we een 
momentopname nemen van alle paren in de samenleving, observeren we een samenhang tussen 
de hulpbronnen van de ene partner en de werkuren van de andere partner; bekijken we paren 
echter op het moment dat er iets verandert in de loopbaan van een van de twee, dan blijkt deze 
verandering van werkuren niet af te hangen van de hulpbronnen van de ander. Er kunnen 
verschillende verklaringen zijn voor deze paradox. Zo kunnen partnereffecten op een enkele 
verandering in de loopbaan te klein zijn om te kunnen waarnemen, terwijl deze op de lange duur 
(na meerdere veranderingen) wel waarneembaar zijn. Deze alternatieve verklaring is echter reeds 
weerlegd door de afwezigheid van partnereffecten in hoofdstuk 6 waar juist de cumulatie van 
loopbaanveranderingen is bestudeerd. Andere potentiële verklaringen zijn (a) het verschil in de 
definitie van participatie: statische categorieën in hoofdstuk 3 versus veranderingen in hoofdstuk 
4, (b) het verschil in steekproefomvang tussen de Enquête Beroepsbevolking van hoofdstuk 3 en 
de Familie Enquête Nederlandse Bevolking van hoofdstuk 4, hetgeen mede bepaalt of effecten 
statistisch significant blijken en (c) dat de samenhang reeds aanwezig is vanaf het begin dat 
partners een relatie hebben en niet meer verandert gedurende de levensloop. Aanvullende 
analyses hebben geen van deze alternatieve verklaringen ondersteund. Voorzichtigheid bij de 
conclusie dat hulpbronnen van de partner een negatieve invloed hebben op de 
arbeidsmarktparticipatie blijft dan ook geboden. 
Bij het beantwoorden van de vraag welke invloed de hulpbronnen van de partner hebben 
op arbeidsmarktuitkomsten, is niet alleen de richting van het effect, maar ook de sterkte van het 
effect relevant. Partnereffecten blijken relatief klein; eigen hulpbronnen zijn duidelijk veel 
belangrijker dan hulpbronnen van de partner. Deze conclusie is niet per definitie in tegenspraak 
met het idee dat loopbaanbeslissingen gezamenlijke beslissingen van man en vrouw zijn; paren 
kunnen bij het gezamenlijk beslissen over een carrièrestap van de man alleen zijn hulpbronnen in 
ogenschouw nemen. 
Is de invloed van de partner veranderd over de tijd? De cohortanalyses in hoofdstuk 3 
ondersteunen in grote lijnen de hypothese die is gebaseerd op het proces van culturele en 
economische modernisering. Deze verwachting luidde dat de invloed van de partner op 
arbeidsmarktuitkomsten van vrouwen verschoven is van restrictief naar stimulerend en op de 
arbeidsmarktuitkomsten van mannen van stimulerend naar restrictief. In hoofdstukken 4 en 5 
waar een tijdspanne van meer dan 60 jaar is onderzocht, zijn echter geen veranderingen in 
partnereffecten geconstateerd. Dit is naar mijn mening een verrassende conclusie gezien de 
ingrijpende ontwikkelingen die zich in deze periode hebben voorgedaan op het gebied van man-
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vrouw verhoudingen en de arbeidsmarktparticipatie van vrouwen. Ik zal hierop terugkomen bij de 
uiteenzetting van suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek. 
Welke consequenties hebben bovengenoemde conclusies voor de ongelijkheid tussen 
paren? In dit boek hebben twee mechanismen die kunnen bijdragen aan ongelijkheid centraal 
gestaan: de samenhang tussen de arbeidsmarktposities van partners en invloeden van de ene 
partner op de loopbaan van de andere partner. De resultaten op beide terreinen wijzen op 
cumulatie van hulpbronnen binnen huishoudens en dus op een versterking van ongelijkheid 
tussen paren. Hierbij dient echter te worden opgemerkt dat er ook enige aanwijzingen zijn voor 
negatieve partnereffecten die de mate van ongelijkheid tussen paren dempen, ook al blijken 
positieve partnereffecten de overhand te hebben. 
Dit boek combineert twee rijke onderzoekstradities binnen de sociologie. Enerzijds betreft 
dit het statusverwervingsonderzoek dat ingaat op factoren die bijdragen aan beroepssucces. 
Anderzijds is dit de gezinssociologie die als uitgangspunt neemt dat mannen en vrouwen niet 
alleen gezien moeten worden als individuen, maar ook als leden van een paar. Onderwerpen die 
hierbij bestudeerd worden zijn homogamie, de arbeidsverdeling tussen man en vrouw, de invloed 
van kinderen op loopbanen en de invloed die partners uitoefenen op elkaars loopbanen. In dit 
onderzoek heb ik getracht te komen tot een gedegen beeld van loopbanen van partners in 
Nederland door deze vanuit verschillende invalshoeken, met verschillende databestanden en 
verschillende onderzoeksmethoden te bestuderen. Vooruitgang is geboekt door het opstellen van 
tegenstrijdige hypothesen die zijn toegespitst op verschillende aspecten van de loopbaan, 
namelijk participatie en succes. De rijke retrospectieve data van de Familie Enquête Nederlandse 
Bevolking hebben verfijnde toetsen mogelijk gemaakt van deze hypothesen. Juist door de 
toepassing van verschillende invalshoeken is duidelijk geworden dat de stimulerende invloed van 
de hulpbronnen van de partner op beroepssucces een consistente bevinding is. Tevens is duidelijk 
geworden dat er niet zonder meer gesproken kan worden over de belemmerende invloed van de 
hulpbronnen van de partner op arbeidsmarktparticipatie, hetgeen als waarschuwing kan gelden 
voor onderzoek dat deze relatie vanuit slechts één invalshoek bestudeert. Het historische 
perspectief dat in het hele boek is toegepast is een uitbreiding op eerdere studies en heeft de 
interessante conclusie opgeleverd dat er weinig veranderd is in de manier waarop hulpbronnen 
van de partner de loopbaan van man en vrouw beïnvloeden. 
Ter afsluiting ga ik in op drie suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek. In de eerste plaats 
verwacht ik dat een directe maat voor inkomen of uurloon waardevol is voor een strengere toets 
van de economische hypothese, die een negatieve invloed van hulpbronnen van de partner 
voorspelt. Beroepsstatus, soms omgezet in uurloon, betreft een goede maat om weer te geven dat 
paren hun beslissingen ook laten afhangen van toekomstig beroepssucces. Inkomen is in zo’n 
geval minder geschikt, omdat het sterk afhankelijk van het huidige aantal gewerkte uren. Voor 
het toetsen van het economische idee in enge zin, namelijk dat een paar het zich kan veroorloven 
dat de één een stapje terug doet als de ander veel verdient, is het huidige inkomen echter wel een 
betere maat. Een aanwijzing dat beroepsstatus en inkomen inderdaad andere dingen zijn, komt 
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voort uit de observatie dat in dit onderzoek beroepsstatus en opleiding vaak effecten hebben in 
dezelfde richting, terwijl Bernasco (1994) gevonden heeft dat inkomen en opleiding 
tegengestelde effecten hebben. Een bijkomend voordeel van een directe inkomensmaat is dat 
positieve en negatieve effecten beter uit elkaar gehaald kunnen worden. In dit onderzoek kan niet 
worden uitgesloten dat zij elkaar deels opheffen, zodat de gevonden partnereffecten mogelijk 
kleiner lijken dan ze in werkelijkheid zijn. Het retrospectieve design dat ik gebruikt heb in 
hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 is niet geschikt om naar inkomens van respondenten te vragen, omdat het 
voor respondenten erg moeilijk is het exacte inkomen te herinneren van een baan lang geleden. 
Een panel studie is waarschijnlijk de beste manier om aan geschikte inkomensdata te komen. 
Een tweede suggestie voor vervolgonderzoek is het opnemen van een directe maat voor 
waardeopvattingen om hypothesen op dit terrein scherper te toetsen. In hoofdstuk 4 heb ik religie 
gebruikt als indicator voor traditionele waarden, maar in overige hoofdstukken is opleiding de 
gebruikte proxy. Zeker als het gaat om loopbanen, bevat opleiding veel meer dan alleen een 
aanwijzing voor moderne of traditionele waarden. Het opnemen van een directe meting voor 
traditionele en moderne waarden maakt een betere splitsing mogelijk van de verschillende zaken 
waar opleiding voor staat. In dat geval staan waardeopvattingen voor preferenties op het gebied 
van loopbanen en opleiding voor de mogelijkheden die iemand op de arbeidsmarkt heeft. Ook het 
bekijken van het samenspel tussen voorkeuren en mogelijkheden zou hierbij interessant zijn. 
Tenslotte wil ik een landenvergelijkende studie voorstellen. De hypothesen die ik heb 
opgesteld over historische veranderingen gaan er in basis van uit dat de context waarin een paar 
leeft, gevolgen heeft voor de manier waarop man en vrouw elkaars loopbanen beïnvloeden. Deze 
trendhypothesen hebben geen ondersteuning gevonden in dit boek. Dit verrassende resultaat 
maakt het interessant deze hypothese op een alternatieve manier te toetsen. Het onderzoeken van 
de invloed van partners op elkaars loopbanen in verschillende landen biedt hiertoe goede 
mogelijkheden. 
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